anchorage grounds, wharf and watering facilities, or otherwise.

But say the English partisans, Great Britain will not insist upon this. If we admit her right to insist, as we do, when we strip from Article III its bearing upon the neutral operation of the Canal, she can object and doubtless would. Each time an insurmountable objection which invalidates her claims is brought we find partisans eager to waive it.

The equality of treatment covered in the rules is equality of treatment of belligerents meted out under the rules we have adopted to secure the neutralization of the Canal. We can only be neutral as between others; we cannot be neutral in case we are ourselves a belligerent.

While this was admitted by Lord Lansdowne we find Sir Edward Grey, realizing that such prior admission was damaging to their case, endeavoring to extend us certain special rights for our man-of-war on the score that we now have sovereign rights in the Canal Zone. This is a dangerous concession, for if we are in a class apart with our man-of-war we are, of course, in a class apart with our merchant vessels, and changes, in vital respects, brought about by changed relations of principals, render the entire treaty voidable.

Since Dr. Oppenheim states in his recent booklet that we have no such rights, a quotation from Sir Edward Grey's protest will be of interest. The protest says:

Now that the United States has become the practical sovereign of the Canal, His Majesty's Government do not question its title to exercise belligerent rights for its protection.

Since successful contention that "all nations" of Rule 1 includes the United States is manifestly impossible, the United States is of course in a class apart. While this was conceded February 22, 1901, by Lord Lansdowne and by Sir Edward Grey in the late protest by the British Government, we find a labored argument in a recent booklet by Dr. Oppenheim, which taking as an axiom the fact that the United States is not in a class apart, proves to his satisfaction that we too are prevented from using the Canal to our advantage in time of war. As his premise is wrong his conclusion cannot hold and in view of the fact that what he contends for is already conceded by the British Government his inferences may be ignored. While wrong as to his premises however, he is too well versed in international law to attempt to give a strained and impossible definition to "neutrality." He says:

There ought, however, to be no doubt that the United States is as much bound to obey the rules of Article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as Great Britain or any other foreign State. These rules are intended to invest the Canal with the character of neutrality. If the United States were not bound to obey them, the Canal would lose its neutral character, and, in case she were a belligerent her opponent would be justified in con

sidering the Canal, a part of the region of war and could, therefore, make it the theater of war.

Great Britain contended during the negotiations that while other nations if our enemy were free to violate the neutrality of the Canal in time of war in which we were engaged, she as a party to the Treaty could not. Lord Lansdowne said, August 3, 1901:

I understand that by the omission of all reference to the matter of defense the United States Government desires to reserve the power of taking measures to protect the Canal, at any time when the United States may be at war, from destruction or damage at the hands of enemy or enemies.

Mr. Hay clearly states his sense of our rights and they are in accord with Lord Lansdowne's when he states that the omission of the words "in time of peace as in time of war" is that this "would give to the United States the clear right to close the Canal against another belligerent and to protect and defend itself by whatever means might be necessary." And that this omission dispensed with necessity of the Davis amendment.

Is not this a clear intimation to Great Britain that our ships are not to be treated upon terms of equality with the vessels of other powers?

Now, Lord Lansdowne did attempt to make these rules apply to ordinary commerce when he suggested August 3d, 1901, an amendment that the neutrality rules should "govern all inter

oceanic communications across the Isthmus.” This was stricken out as explained elsewhere. But we have in force an article covering all communications not affected by the obligations and duties of neutrality. Let us read this strong, virile and unambiguous Article II, which says:

It is agreed that the Canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or corporations, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present treaty, the said Government shall have and enjoy all rights incident to construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the Canal.

We agree in Article III not to use the Canal to advance the fortunes of any particular belligerent by a frank and open adoption of rules of neutrality to be applied by us to the nations of the world as the conditions under which they may use the Canal. If a belligerent should betray the faith we put in him by injuring the Canal for hostile advantage we could debar such nation from further use of the Canal after belligerent operations, or penalize such nation in our discretion.

But outside of such obligations of neutrality we have in Article II full freedom of action. While under our favored nation treaties we shall probably accord in general equal tolls to the vessels of other nations, there is nothing to prevent our mak

ing reciprocal concessions with other nations. I of course assumed that Senator Root justified on this score his negotiation of the Tripartite Treaty between Panama, Colombia and the United States, extending reciprocal concessions not accorded to all other nations. In similar manner the HayBunau-Varilla Treaty extended special privileges to Panama.

No one will question or deny that the rules of Article III are to be taken together. If the interpretation of one rule as forbidding preference for our own vessels of commerce and war renders the remaining rules absurd we have reasons as old as Euclid's teachings for setting such interpretation aside.

Rule 1 says that the Canal shall be free and open to the vessels of Commerce and War of all nations observing these rules upon terms of entire equality. Now they construe this to mean that we are prevented from preferring our own vessels of commerce.

But if it applies to vessels of Commerce it must in exact terms apply to vessels of War.

In other words, under any unquibbled construction of this section we cannot exclude vessels of war and include vessels of commerce under our flag unless we are in a class apart, as of course we

are.

Please read Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, for they must be read together to clear up this question. All, I believe, will admit that the constitutional