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cowardice, negligence, or disaffection shall in time of action withdraw, or keep back, or not come into fight," etc.

The worst that Byng was guilty of was bad judgment; of deciding that his fleet was too weak to justify him in making further effort against the French fleet. Loyal and brave as he undoubtedly was, he was evidently the kind of man,

"Who either fears his fate too much,

Or his deserts are small

That dares not put it to the touch
To gain or lose it all."

Byng's execution caused a vast uproar of disapproval, and the article was soon after modified so as to allow a lesser penalty than death at the option of the court-martial. This is the case under our code. But note how closely the language of our article coincides with that of the British: "Any person in the naval service who in time of battle displays cowardice, negligence, or disaffection, or withdraws from or keeps out of danger to which he should expose himself."

Even after the articles were adopted, commanders of fleets kept on issuing codes of instructions and rules, covering details. of service and discipline. Finally, effort was made to digest and codify these innumerable rules and to make a clear and comprehensive set of regulations conformable to accepted principles of naval usage. So in 1731 appeared the first issue of "The King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions." This code. has been revised from time to time to conform with modern ideas and conditions, but remains in substance much what it was when first issued. Naturally, this code has had its influence on the development of similar regulations for the American Navy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the two greatest navies in the world are practically alike in their organization, in the principles that animate and control their efforts, and in their ideals. of service. Until less than a century and a half ago they have a common history and ancestry, stretching back into the dimness of the middle ages. Their conceptions of service and discipline like the principles of freedom, have

"broadened slowly down

From precedent to precedent,"

and from precisely the same precedents. Moreover, because Britons and Americans possess similar mental and moral char

acteristics, they have constantly, though sometimes unconsciously, absorbed much from each other, and so the development of their navies has been in nearly all respects along parallel lines. As a consequence of this fact, an officer of either navy soon feels perfectly at home on a ship of the other. He would have little to learn before he would feel completely at ease in performing the duties of his rank under the other's flag. Ships of the two navies in recent months have worked together without friction or jealousy and with perfect understanding and rivalry of effort, no matter whether for the time being the admiral directing their courses owed allegiance to the White Ensign or to the Stars and Stripes.

The Articles of War do not present a theme calculated to excite eloquent speech. But this cursory survey of the long history of their development proves in a very striking manner, as it seems to me, that

"We that are to-day

Live of the life that long has passed away."

The rules of the greatest and most glorious game in the world are not a thing of yesterday or the day before. They were born of the travail and the trial of ages; they are the result of centuries of experience and experiment; heated at the forge of battle, hammered into shape on the anvil of practical knowledge; tested and approved by great heroes of the sea. Any man in the navy that has a heart to understand and appreciate the spiritual in life must breathe freer and walk with a firmer step when he recalls that he is obeying the same laws that Rodney and Nelson and Napier obeyed; that he is under the same discipline that Decatur, McDonough, and Perry, Dahlgren and Porter, Farragut and Dewey, and a host of other patriots have honored and made illustrious.

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

PRESENT VITAL NEED OF A NAVY PERSONNEL

POLICY

By COMMANDER FORDE A. TODD, U. S. Navy

"Now there may be 'too much Nelson' for the

Times have changed since then,

But as long as man is human, we shall

Have to count on men;

Though machines be ne'er so perfect, there

May come a day perhaps—

When you find out just how helpless is

A heap of metal scraps."

CAPTAIN R. A. HOPWOOD, R. N.

Should the reader have to do with navy personnel in conjunction with the demobilization plan there may be no need of his going further than through the above few lines. Still, each has his view and, to properly arrive at the whole, many sides have to be considered.

On August 29, 1916, our navy was small. Since then it has grown large, at least in men. Hundreds of thousands of men have flocked to the navy's call. Now we trust that the reason of that great demand is wholly past, and the Navy Department stands ready to make their going out as voluntary as their coming in. A most liberal view has been taken and one that shows that the department has faith in the future.

But the navy must have men to exist. What will be the policy for the navy to adopt to man its ships? The answer to this question must be soon made and upon that answer depends the future of the navy. If that answer meets the navy's obligations it needs must be a liberal policy-a new policy-which concerns this article.

During the history of the United States our navy has risen four times and fallen three times. Its present rise has been con

sistent over a period of twenty years and at the present is in the zenith of that rise. During each rise and fall the material has followed the lead of the personnel. So will it be this time if the personnel does not at once lay the foundation for getting new blood into the navy during the demobilization from this war.

Men will have to be drawn into the navy for different reasons than have just caused its immense increase. The majority of men at present in the navy came in with a view of doing their bit to win the war. Now that the war is over they are naturally anxious to resume their studies or business in civil life. The men to run the navy in the future will come in from an entirely different motive and that motive will, to a large extent, have to be created if the navy is to get and to hold men. And to hold men is one of the most important, to use an anomaly, necessities; for a continuous service man is, on the average, worth two rookies.

As we look at recruiting in the past, it has depended largely upon the publicity the subject has received, and, in peace times, has not been greatly influenced by hard times nor by the seasons of the year. It is fairly well established from interviewing several thousands of men, that conditions existing in the navy, and even pay offered, have very little to do with a man's first enlistment, but it has all to do with his subsequent enlistments and his potential value as a recruiting agent even after he is out of the navy.

Our policy must be shaped for holding men and creating recruiting agents of all men. The way to hold one man may lose another. We must hold the home builder as well as the rover, the mechanic and specialist as well as the seaman.

The navy is largely made up, especially in the deck force, of what is known as the motive type of man. He loves motion, action, and change of scenery. This desire is what made him give up the school, the office, the farm, or the factory.

Another class, or rather the men with a different viewpoint, are the married men. Almost without exception men coming into the navy in peace times are single, but a large number of them afterwards marry. Their viewpoint then is apt to change. They then desire a home port-a place where at even irregular intervals of necessary overhaul to their ships they will have a chance. to be with their families.

There are others who look upon the navy merely as a shop where advance and money will come to the industrious. This is especially so in the engineer's force and in the special trades. Military necessity and discipline are incomprehensible to them. Not that they are refractory themselves, but merely that they find their off-duty hours aboard most irksome. Their idea is work during working hours and then stop work and go home.

It is true that there are very many other classes, but the number in each class is very small and may be neglected in considering the whole. The two latter large classes enumerated above are evolved after the men come into the navy, but the first big class is inherent in them all and is never dormant no matter how much counteracted upon by other desires and conditions.

To shape a personnel policy to fulfill the above conditions would not be hard nor would it detract from the efficiency of the navy or add to the budget. We have a building program, a gunnery program, an engineering policy, and even an insurance policy, but we have no policy for attracting and holding enlisted men.

We remember, about nine years ago, of reading a department letter to prospective recruits that a policy of foreign cruises had been adopted and recruits were promised that they would have the education and pleasure of travel to offset the close confinement and artificial existence on shipboard. Since then, until the war, few in the navy have, barring Guantanamo Bay and the York River, which belong to us, seen any foreign land except the coast of Mexico.

We, in the navy, shouldered with the responsibility of making the navy efficient are very apt to lose the proper perspective and fail to appreciate the man's point of view. The officer at the Navy Department goes home when working hours are over and refreshes himself with other interests. The officers at sea on whose shoulders rests the responsibility are kept going and occupied all their waking moments, even with messages and "shop" throughout their meals and with scarcely a night passing without demands for their services. The enlisted man stands his watch or does his drill and cleans his station and then only thinks of his condition in general or sleeps. More thought should be given to the enlisted man's condition. The officers of the navy should arouse themselves to the vital needs of the thousands of men who are more necessary to make a navy than the ships themselves.

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