QUINLAN v. QUINLAN.

parties to the expense of opposing such an appeal in a case where they could not recover any costs if successful. But in saying this their Lordships do not intend to invite a premature discussion of the merits of the case on a petition to discharge an order to appeal in forma pauperis, nor will they entertain an application of that character. Usually the statement of counsel shewing that there is a real question to be argued should be received, and it is enough if there be such a question, although the success of the proposed appellant may be doubtful.

In the present case their Lordships are satisfied on the materials before them that there is no question to be tried in either suit, and if the facts had been as fully before them when they advised the Crown to make the order as they are now, the order would not have been made. They have, therefore, humbly advised his Majesty that the Order in Council of June 29, 1900, should be discharged. The petitioner does not ask for costs.

The respondent suggested that their

Lordships might grant a new trial on the ground of the bias said to have been exhibited against him by the Chief Justice. They could, of course, after hearing the appeals, direct a remand if they considered that justice required that course. But it would have to be shewn that there had been a serious miscarriage of justice. In the present case nothing of the kind appears. The question in each suit was purely one of fact, and there are no grounds for saying that the judgments were wrong on the materials before the Court, or that the respondent was prevented from adducing further evidence if he had been so minded.

Solicitors-H. J. & T. Child, for petitioner; Hutchison & Cuff, for appellant.

[Reported by J. Eyre Thompson, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

of the inability of a defendant by reason of accident or misfortune to appear and shew cause against a decree absolute for default. Ib.

New South Wales-Crown Lands-Powers of Local Land Boards-Jurisdiction of Land Appeal Court-Jurisdiction of Supreme CourtCase Stated on Points of Law.]-The decision of a Land Board on questions of fact referred to it by the Minister for Lands is subject only to appeal to the Land Appeal Court. Such appeal is a re-hearing on which fresh evidence may be admitted, and the Court has power to reject irrelevant evidence and to draw inferences of fact. Minister for Lands v. Wilson, 100.

The Minister for Lands has power to direct any local Land Board, whether within or outside the district in which the land in question is situated, to conduct an enquiry into any matters in question, and to order such enquiry to be held wherever he pleases. Ib.

-Crown Lands-Suspension of Pastoral Lease -Amount of Compensation.]-The power of suspension of a lease or licence of Crown lands conferred by section 13 of the Mining Act, 1874, is unrestricted, and is solely vested in the Governor acting under the advice of responsible ministers. During suspension all the rights of the lessee or licensee are in abeyance, and the lessor, unfettered by the lease, is entitled to resume possession. Cook v. Ricketson, 113.

The compensation payable to a lessee or licensee in case of suspension is limited to a

remission of rent, there being no provision under this Act for cases in which such compensation would be inadequate. Ib.

-Practice - Appealable Value Evidence of Value.]-The Mining Act, 1874, of New South Wales gives by section 115 a right of appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the amount involved is not less than 5001.-Held, that this right of appeal is not lost by the failure of the appellant in the Warden's Court or in the Mining Appeal Court to adduce evidence of value. The Supreme Court has itself jurisdiction to institute enquiry and decide on the evidence before it. Scully v. Murn (14 N.S.W. Rep. 289) overruled. Falkners Gold-Mining Co. v. M'Kinnery, 116.

New Zealand-Land-Native Titles-Crown Lands-Extinction of Native Rights.]-The Courts of New Zealand have under the Native Rights Act, 1865, power to enquire into native title and to ascertain whether or not it has been extinguished according to law. The appellant claimed an interest in part of certain lands which had been declared by the Governor, acting under statutory powers, to be waste lands of the Crown, and were subsequently offered for sale, alleging that the native rights had not been extinguished therein :- Held, that he was entitled to maintain the action. Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, 66.

-Power to Sue an Officer of the Crown.]-An aggrieved person may sue an officer of the Crown to restrain a threatened act in alleged pursuance of an Act of Parliament, but really outside its limits. The Attorney-General is not a necessary or proper party to such an action. Ib.

Victoria-Appeal to County Court-Rating -Power to State a Case for the Supreme Court.] By the Justices Act, 1890, s. 139, the Court of general sessions is in any case of appeal, if so required by any party to proceedings, to state the facts specially for the determination of the Supreme Court thereon, "any Act to the contrary notwithstanding." By the Local Government Act, 1890, s. 277, an appeal is given to the Court of General Sessions for any cause, and its decision is to be "final and conclusive on all parties." By the Local Government Act, 1891, s. 60, all rate appeals are transferred from the general sessions to the County Court, whose decision is to be "final and conclusive on all points"; and section 61 applies to rate appeals all the provisions of other Acts, and gives to County Courts all powers and jurisdictions possessed by Courts of general sessions "subject to the provisions of this Act":-Held, that the Local Government Acts did not take away from the County Court the power to state a Case possessed by the Court of general sessions. Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co. v. Fitzroy Corporation, 1.

-Lunacy-Habeas Corpus-Right to a Jury.]— In the colony of Victoria an alleged lunatic has no right either on an application for a habeas oorpus or under the sections of the Lunacy Act, 1890, relating to discharge, to have the question of his sanity ascertained by a jury. Gregory, Ex parte, 19.

--Revenue-Sugar Duty-" Molasses, refined in bond."]-A process which simply removes foreign impurities from an article without producing any change in the article itself is not a process of refining for the purpose of differential duties as between the refined and the unrefined article. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Att.Gen. for Victoria, 75.

-Income Tax-Mode of Assessment-Company Holding Investments, but not Trading in the Colony.]-By the Victorian Income Tax Act, 1895, s. 2, the word "person" includes every company except a company whose head office or principal place of business is in the colony, and the word "company" includes every corporate body howsoever or wheresoever incorporated or situated. By section 10 companies not having their principal office or place of business in the colony are to be assessed on the proportion of their total dividends represented by the amount of their receipts or assets and liabilities in the colony :-Held, that a company not trading in the colony, but holding investments therein, is taxable, not under section 10, but on the full income of their Victorian investments, that section being applicable, by clear implication, only to companies carrying on trade in the colony. Scottish Provident Institution v. Commissioner of Taxes, 50.

The holding of investments is not the trade of an insurance company, but a necessary incident of every business. Ib.

Western Australia-Mining Lease-Statutory Forfeiture Notice of Forfeiture to Lessee.]By clause 70 of the Regulations of 1892 then in force under the Goldfields Acts, 1886 and 1895, each application for the forfeiture of a lease was to be heard by the warden in open Court, and his report on evidence taken to be forwarded immediately to the Minister for the decision of the Governor-General :-Held, that the Governor-General's decision to cancel a lease was not operative until it was communicated to the lessee or the land declared vacant by some other overt act of the Governor. Minister of Mines v. Harney, 38.

-Patent-Colonial Registration of British or Foreign Patent-Prior Publication or UserAmendment of Specification-Renewal Fees.]— Section 49 of the West Australian Patent Act, 1888, which provides that registration of a British or foreign patent in the mode prescribed shall have the effect of the grant of original

letters patent, merely affords a machinery for the protection of patents so registered, but is subject to all the incidents and conditions applicable to letters patent. Thus common knowledge, user, or publication outside the colony subsequent to the date of the original patent, but prior to the registration, avoids the registration, except so far as they may be grounds of objection applicable to the original letters patent. Australian Gold Recovery Co. v. Lake View Consols, 14.

The renewal fees charged by the Second Schedule of the Act on letters patent are not payable in respect of the letters of registration. Ib.

The recording by the Registrar of Patents in the colony of an amendment of a British specification has not the effect of an amendment of the specification in letters of registration of the British patent. Ib.

Zanzibar Exterritoriality Land Abroad Compulsorily Acquired by British Government -Ascertainment of Price-British or Local Law Judicial Notice of Foreign Law.]-By the Zanzibar Order in Council, 1884, British subjects in civil and criminal matters are to have their cases tried by their own Consuls. In bankruptcy or on death their property is to be administered according to British law, and their houses may not be entered by the Zanzibar authorities without the Consul's permission:Held, that these privileges do not confer on land purchased by a British subject the character of absolute exterritoriality, and that the incidents of such land are governed by the law of its site. Consequently, when the land is compulsorily taken by the British Government under the Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the owner is not entitled to compensation for the value of the buildings erected, without lawful authority, on behalf of the Government thereon, before the notice to treat, that being the rule of the Mohammedan law which prevails in Zanzibar. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling & Co.,

25.

Although by virtue of the treaty grant the British Sovereign becomes an authority in Zanzibar, exercising powers independently of the Sultan, Zanzibar remains foreign territory, and the British Sovereign acts in all respects as a Zanzibar authority; and a British Judge acting within these limits is a Zanzibar Judge, and bound to take judicial notice of the Zanzibar law, and not to treat that law as mere matter of evidence. Ib.

The Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894, provides that land required by the Government is to be taken at its market value on a given day, and that the Court is not bound to give more

because the object for which it is taken is likely to increase the value, or less because the same object is likely to add to the value of the owner's remaining land :-Held, that the probable effects of a railway are not to be taken into consideration, except to the extent to which it is shewn that such speculations had actually affected the market price. Ib.

Appeal to Privy Council-Form of Security for Costs of Appeal.]-Where a municipality is respondent to an appeal to her Majesty in Council the condition that security shall be given in bond, mortgage, or personal recognisance is sufficiently complied with by delivery of the bonds to the Prothonotary and not to the municipality. Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co. v. Fitzroy Corporation, 1.

-Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis-Rescission of Order Granting such Leave.]-Leave to appeal to the King in Council in forma pauperis is not of course, and ought not to be granted where it is made apparent that the proposed appeal is idle and frivolous. Order in Council (69 L. J. P.C. 85; [1900] A.C. 496), granting leave to appeal, rescinded on the petition of the respondent, on the ground that there was no real question to be tried. Quinlan V. Quinlan, 122.

COMPANY.

Shares-Indemnity.]-See TRUST AND TRUS

TEE.

CONSPIRACY.

Trade Union-Inducing to Breach of Contract -Inducing Persons to Withdraw Custom or from Employment Intent to Injure-Trade Dispute.] -A conspiracy to injure, if there be damage, gives rise to civil liability, and an oppressive combination differs widely from an invasion of civil rights by a single person. It is a violation of right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law if there be no justification for the interference. This principle cannot be confined to inducements to break contracts of service. If such wrongful interference with a man's liberty of action is intended to injure and in fact damages a third person, such third person has a remedy by an action. Quinn v. Leathem, (H.L. Ir.) 76.

Annoyance and coercion by many may be actionable where like conduct on the part of one person would not be so. Ib.

The appellant, an officer of a trade union, in combination with other members of the union-first, induced a servant of the respondent to break his contract with the respondent; secondly, induced a customer of the respondent, by threats of calling out the

customer's men, to withdraw his custom; and thirdly, induced the respondent's servants to leave his service :-Held, that the appellant had been guilty of an actionable conspiracy for which he was liable in damages, and that, as there was no "trade dispute" within the meaning of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, s. 3, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of that section. Ib.

By LORD LINDLEY.-Section 3 has no application to civil actions; it is confined entirely to criminal proceedings, and the civil liability does not depend on the criminality of a combination. Ib.

Allen v. Flood (67 L. J. Q.B. 119; [1898] A.C. 1) distinguished. Lumley v. Gye (22 L. J. Q.B. 463; 2 E. & B. 216) and Temperton v. Russell (62 L. J. Q.B. 412; [1893] 1 Q.B. 715) approved. Ib.

CONTRACT.

Correspondence Construction - Agency or Vendor and Purchaser Agreement.]-The respondent by letter agreed "to sell and convey certain property without mention of the purchaser, and gave "reasonable and sufficient time" to the appellant "for correspondence and communication with foreign and near correspondents. ... pending the arrangements by you for completing sale," offering "Two and a-half per cent. commission payable to you on the said sum after completing sale." The appellant simply accepted the offer and agreement therein":-Held, that the letters constituted an agency and not a vendor-and-purchaser agreement, under which the appellant was not regarded as himself the purchaser, but was to find a purchaser and earn a commission. Livingstone v. Ross, 58.

CROWN.

Power to Sue Officer-Joinder of AttorneyGeneral.]-See COLONY.

INSURANCE.

Marine-Loss from Unknown Cause-Presumption of Unseaworthiness-Rebutting Evidence.]-The presumption of unseaworthiness in the case of the loss of a ship soon after leaving port, of which the insured cannot prove the cause, is rebutted when the balance of evidence is that she was neither overloaded nor topheavy when she left port, and that the loss was attributable rather to mistakes of management after she started than to unseaworthiness when she left port. Pickup v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. (47 L. J. Q.B. 749; 3 Q.B. D. 594) approved. Ajum Goolam Hossen & Co. v. Union Marine Insurance Co., 34.

Prolongation-Petition by Assignees -Expiration of Foreign Patents.]-Petition for the prolongation of a patent refused on the grounds that the petitioners were assignees and purchasers, and that there was no satisfactory evidence that the inventor had not been adequately remunerated. Bower-Barff Patent, In re ([1895] A.C. 675), Hopkinson's Patent, In re (66 L. J. P.C. 38; [1897] A.C. 249), and Saxby's Patent, In re (L. R. 3 P.C. 292), followed. Henderson's Patent, In re, 119.