parcels, which were taken into the carriage according to a practice which prevails in India as well as in England:-Held, that the company was not liable, and was not under obligation to disprove that the parcels suggested danger, or to search every parcel carried by a passenger. Collett v. London and NorthWestern Railway (20 L. J. Q.B. 411; 16 Q.B. 984) explained. Ib.

Agreement as to Tolls.]-See TOLLS.

RATING.

Tramway-Deduction of Interest and Sinking Fund of Money Borrowed-Parochial or Mileage Rating.]-In rating a tramway leased by a corporation to a tramway company on which tramway the company is to repay, by means of a sinking fund, borrowed money with interest thereon, no deduction is to be made in respect of the money so borrowed or the interest. Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co. v. Fitzroy Corporation, 1.

The company is the occupier of the land in such circumstances, though the ownership is in the Crown, and its rating is that of a simple occupation rate, and the true test of value is the rent obtainable from a hypothetical tenant. Ib.

When a tramway passes through several rating areas, the parochial principle of rating is to be applied by which buildings are rated separately to the area in which they stand, and the remainder of the rating value is distributed among the rating areas on the mileage principle.

1h.

REVENUE.

Estate Duty-Settled Property.]-By a marriage settlement a life interest in the settled funds was given to the husband, then a life interest to the wife, and after the death of the survivor the trustees were to hold the trust property and the income thereof, in the event, which happened, of there not being a child of the marriage who should attain the age of twenty-one years or be married, for such person or persons as the wife, notwithstanding coverture, might by deed or will appoint. The wife died a month before her husband, having by will exercised her power of appointment over the settled property. On the wife's death estate duty was paid on the principal value of the settled property after deduction of the estimated value of the husband's life interest. On the husband's death further duty was claimed on the full value of the property. The trustees of the settlement claimed return of this duty subject to deduction of duty on the value of the husband's life interest:-Held, that the trustees were entitled to the return of the duty which they claimed, as the duty had already been paid on the death of "a person competent to dispose of" the property under

Railway-Joint Line Constructed by Two Companies Agreement-Construction.] · Two colliery companies in terms of an agreement constructed a joint railway, each paying half the cost. The renewal and maintenance of the line were to be paid for by the companies in proportion to the extent of traffic done by either of them. The line was to be open to the use of the public on payment of specified tolls. Power was given by the agreement to construct an extension line in connection with the joint line-Held, that the owners of the extension line were not chargeable with tolls for goods carried from the extension over the joint line, their liability being limited to the proportion which fell to them of the renewal and main

TRUST AND TRUSTEE. Power to Retain Testator's Assets in Partnership Business-Partners Trustees of a Deceased Partner-Retirement of One Partner-Discharge from Liability-Breach of Trust Continuing Liability of Retired Partner-Following Trustmoney.]-Power in a testator's trustees to lend trust funds to a firm does not authorise a loan to what is constituted a new firm by the retirement of a partner, and on the insolvency of the new firm the retired partner, who has notice of the breach of trust, is still liable to make good the trust estate, although the trustees have affected to grant him a discharge. Still less is such a loan authorised when the trustees of the will were the testator's partners. Smith v. Patrick, (H.L. Sc.) 19.

The substitution of new trustees is no bar to an action against the retired partner to make good the trust fund, though the old trustees are neither parties nor witnesses, and there are concurrent remedies both against the partnership estate and the estate of the retired partner. Ib.

A testator appointed two of his partners his trustees, and empowered them to leave his estate in the business. A third partner retired and received the value of his share. The two trustees executed a discharge of all liability in favour of the retiring partner, treating the

trust fund as a debt due from the continuing partners. At this time the business was solvent. Subsequently it became unable to meet its obligations; new trustees were appointed, and they sued the retired partner to make good the deficit of the testator's trust fund-Held, that the retired trustee, having been party to a fraudulent breach of trust, was liable to make good the trust fund. Ib.

Registered Holder of Shares-Assignment of Beneficial Interest Calls - Liability of Assignee-Indemnity.]-The relation of trustee and cestui que trust is established as soon as it is shewn that the legal title is in one and the equitable title is in another; and where the only cestui que trust is sui juris the trustee's right to indemnity by the cestui que trust against liabilities incurred by the trustee, as such, is not limited to the trust property, but also imposes on the cestui que trust a personal obligation enforceable in equity to indemnify his trustee, and the obligation attaches not only where the cestui que trust has created the trust, but where he has accepted a transfer of the beneficial ownership with a full knowledge of the facts. Hardoon v. Belilios, 9.

WILL.

Testamentary Capacity Instructions for Will.]-If a person has given instructions for his will, and the will has been prepared in accordance therewith, it is sufficient to establish the validity of the will that the testator should, in executing it, accept the instrument as carrying out his instructions, even if he fail to follow all the dispositions of his property as they are read over to him. Parker v. Felgate (52 L. J. P. 95; 8 P. D. 171) approved. Perera v. Perera, 46.