after the time at which the right of such corporation sole, or his predecessor, to recover shall first have accrued; viz. the period during which two persons in succession shall have held the office or benefice in respect whereof such land or rent shall be claimed, together with six years after a third person shall have been appointed thereto, if the times of such two incumbencies and six years (taken together) shall amount to the full period of sixty years; and if not, then during such further number of years as will make up the sixty years (b).

6. That no person shall bring quare impedit, or other proceeding to enforce a right to present to or bestow any ecclesiastical benefice, as the patron thereof, after the expiration of such period as thereinafter mentioned,―viz., the period during which three clerks in succession shall have held the same, all having obtained possession thereof adversely to the right of such person, or of some one through whom he claims, provided such incumbencies taken together shall amount to the full period of sixty years; and if not, then after the expiration of such further time as will make up the sixty years (c).

7. That no person shall bring any such proceeding as mentioned in the last paragraph, after the expiration of one hundred years from the time at which a clerk shall have obtained possession of such benefice adversely to the right of such person, or of one through whom he claims, or who is entitled to some preceding estate or interest, or undivided share, or alternate right of presentation or gift, held or derived under the same title,-unless a clerk shall subsequently have obtained possession of such benefice on the presentation or gift of the person so claiming, or of some person through whom he claims, or of some other person entitled in respect of an estate, share or right, held or derived under the same title (d).

(b) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 29. (c) Sect. 30.

(d) Sect. 33. The periods thus limited as above for enforcing a

II. Of limitations as to actions not brought for recovery of things real.

1. A period of limitation with respect to most of these was fixed by 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3 (e); which provided in substance, that actions of trespass in general; all actions of detinue (f), trover, replevin or account (g); all actions upon the case, except for verbal slander; and all actions of debt on simple contract, or for arrears of rent not due upon specialty (h);—shall be limited to six years after the cause of action accrued: that actions of trespass for the particular injuries of assault, menace, battery, wounding, and imprisonment, shall be limited to four years; and that actions on the case for verbal slander, shall be limited to two years. But to these limitations there are exceptions in favour of persons labouring under disability (i). For if the person entitled to sue shall, when the cause of action accrued, be an infant, a feme covert, or non compos,-then he (or she) may sue within the same period after the removal of the disability, as is allowed to persons having no such impediment (j). And it was also provided by

right to present to or bestow an ecclesiastical benefice, extend to the case where a bishop claims as patron; but the Act does not affect the right of any bishop to collate by reason of lapse. (See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 54, s. 3.)

(e) As to the time from which this limitation begins to run in particular cases, see Collinge v. Heywood, 9 Ad. & Ell. 633; Rhodes v. Smethurst, 6 M. & W. 351; Waters v. Earl of Thanet, 2 Q.. B.757; Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259; Tobacco Pipe Makers' Company v. Loder, 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 414; Webster v. Kirk, 17 Q. B. 949; Bonomi v. Backhouse, 9 H. of L. Cases, 503.

(f) See Wilkinson v. Verity, Law Rep., 6 C. P. 206.

(g) In 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3,

"ac

"tions of account between mer"chants" were excepted from this limitation-but they are brought within it by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, 8. 9. As to the former law, see Cottam v. Partridge, 4 Man. & G. 271.

(h) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3. See also as to arrears of rent, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 42; c. 42, s. 3. (i) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 7.

(See Le Veux v. Berkeley, 5 Q. B. 836; Townsend v. Deacon, 3 Exch. 706. The statute of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 7, also made exception in other cases, viz., that of imprisonment of the party entitled to sue, and that of his being beyond the But these are no longer disabilities; for by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 10, no person or persons shall be

seas.

4 & 5 Ann. c. 3, s. 19, that if any person liable to be sued shall, when the cause accrued, be beyond the seas (k),a similar extension of the time for bringing the action shall in that case also be permitted; but this provision must be taken in connexion with the subsequent enactment of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 11, viz., that where the cause of action lies against two or more joint debtors, the person entitled to sue shall not be entitled to any extension of time, against such one or more of them as were not beyond seas when the cause of action accrued; and on the other hand, that he shall not be barred from suing the joint debtor or debtors, after his or their return, by reason only that judgment has been already recovered against one or more of the others (7).

The operation of the statute of James with respect to actions upon simple contract, was at one time considerably narrowed by the doctrine which prevailed, that not only a payment on account of principal or interest, but any mere verbal acknowledgment, made before action brought, that the debt was due,-would suffice to take the case out of the statute (according to the common phrase), by raising an implied promise to pay the debt; upon which promise, (as upon a new cause of action,) the same time for instituting proceedings would be allowed, as upon the original contract (m). But the law on this subject has been since materially altered; for by Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo.

entitled to sue at any time beyond the period fixed by 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, by reason only of such person, or one or more of such persons, being beyond the seas or imprisoned at the time when the cause of action or suit accrued. (See Cornil v. Hudson, 8 Ell. & Bl. 429; Pardo v. Bingham, Law Rep., 4 Ch. Ap. 735.)

(k) By 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12, no part of the United Kingdom, Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney,

and Sark, nor the adjacent islands, being part of the dominions of her Majesty, shall be deemed "beyond seas" within the meaning of 4 & 5 Ann. c. 3.

(1) As to the law on this point, before the enactment mentioned in the text, see Towns v. Mead, 16 C. B. 123.

(m) See Bateman v. Pindar, 3 Q. B. 574; Maber v. Maber, Law Rep., 2 Exch. 153.

IV. c. 14, s. 1), it was enacted, that in actions grounded upon any simple contract, no acknowledgment, or promise, shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take any case out of the operation of the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, unless it be contained in some writing (n), signed by the party to be charged (0); and that where there are two or more joint contractors, no such joint contractor shall be chargeable, in respect only of the written acknowledgment of the other. Moreover, by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 14 (p), it has been since provided, (with reference to the statute of James, and to the effect of a payment on account of principal or interest in respect of a joint contract or debt,) that no co-contractors, or co-debtors, shall lose the benefit of the limitation, by reason only of payment of any principal or interest by any of the others (9).

2. The statute of 21 Jac. I. c. 16, was also in itself materially defective: for it made no provision for actions on bonds, indentures, or other instruments under seal; and

v.

(n) In a great variety of instances the courts have had to decide whether a sufficient acknowledgment or promise has been given to take the particular case out of the statute. Some of the more recent or important cases bearing upon this point will be found among the following:-Spong v. Wright, 9 Mee. & W. 629; Hart Prendergast, 14 Mee. & W. 741; Williams v. Griffith, 3 Exch. 335; Gardner v. M'Mahon, 3 Q. B. 561; Willins v. Smith, 4 Ell. & Bl. 180; Goate v. Goate, 1 H. & N. 29; Rackham v. Marriott, 2 H. & N. 196; Cornforth v. Smethard, 5 H. & N. 13; Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 603; Everall v. Robertson, 1 E. & E. 16; Lee v. Wilmot, Law Rep., 1 Exch. 364; Chasemore v. Turner, ib. 10 Q. B. 500; Quincey

v. Sharpe, ib. 1 Ex. D. 72; Skeet v. Lindsay, ib. 2 Ex. D. 314; Meyerhoff v. Froehlich, ib. 3 C. P. D. 333; Sanders v. Sanders, ib. 19 Ch. D. 373; and consider Sutton v. Sutton, Weekly Notes, 1882, p. 172.

(0) By 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 13, a writing signed by an agent duly authorized to sign will suffice.

(p) See Jackson v. Woolley, 8 Ell. & Bl. 778; Cockrill v. Sparkes, 1 Hurl. & C. 699.

(9) As to payments in particular cases, and their effect to take the case out of the statute, see Cleave v. Jones, 20 L. J. (Exch.) 238; Burn v. Boulton, 2 C. B. 476; Wainman v. Kynman, 1 Exch. 118; Bodger v. Arch, 10 Exch. 333; Walker v. Butler, 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 377; Turney v. Dodwell, 3 Ell. & Bl. 136; Maber v. Maber, Law Rep., 2 Exch. 153.

consequently parties having claims on such instruments were at liberty to sue upon them at any period of time, however distant. And though to prevent the injustice which such a state of the law would otherwise have occasioned, it became the practice on the trial of such actions, for the judge to recommend the jury, in cases where no payment on account of principal or interest had been made or demanded within twenty years, to presume that the bond or other specialty had been satisfied,-this method of proceeding was found not to be attended with the same advantage, or to adapt itself so correctly to the purposes of justice, as a law of direct limitation. Such limitation has been consequently now provided with respect to claims on instruments under seal,-as well as some other cases, not embraced by the statute of James (r). For it was enacted by the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 3, that all actions of debt for rent upon any indenture of demise, or of covenant or debt on any bond or other specialty, and all proceedings on recognizances, shall be brought within twenty years after the cause of action or proceeding accrued; and that all actions of debt upon an award, (where the submission is not under seal,) or for a copyhold fine, or for an escape, or for money levied upon any writ of fieri facias,-shall be brought within six years (s). This enactment is, however, subject to exception in the case of any person who, when entitled to sue, is under disability—as an infant, feme covert, or person non compos (t); and also to a proviso, that if any acknowledgment in writing be signed by the party liable or his agent, or payment or satisfaction made

(r) See Coope v. Cresswell, Law Rep., 2 Ch. Ap. 116.

(s) There are also enactments of a date prior to this statute, fixing six years as the period of limitation in certain cases not provided for by the statute of James. See 4 & 5 Ann. c. 3, s. 17, with respect to the recovery of seamen's wages; and 55 Geo. 3, c. 127, s. 5, with respect to

the recovery of the value of tithes.

(t) In the cases in which a period of limitation is fixed by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3, "absence beyond seas" of the party entitled to sue, was also (by sect. 4) made a disability; but its character in this respect has now been abolished by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 10.