i THE ATHENÆUM. No. 15. MARCH 1st, 1808. GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE. For the Athenaum. A WORD FOR PHILOSOPHY. UNFORTUNATE Philosophy! not only to have retained the enmity of all her old foes, the tyrants and deceivers of mankind; but to have incurred the reproaches of many who in better days were well pleased to be regarded as her friends and coadjutors! Perhaps, however, the prejudice conceived against her is beginning to subside; at least, an enquiry how far the imputations under which she has laboured have been merited, may at this time hope for a patient hearing. Philosophy has been accused of contributing to the subversion of every thing sacred and venerable among men, of vilifying authority, insulting dignities, unsettling established customs and opinions, and substituting her own crudities and fallacies to the results of long experience. I have no doubt that her real influence has been greatly exaggerated, and that the bad passions of mankind have been the true causes of the deplorable evils which the world has lately witnessed: but admitting that Philosophy has had her share in the work of destruction, let us calmly consider what were the things against which her batteries were erected. Politics and religion, the two master-springs of human affairs, have both been touched by Philosophy, and, it must be acknowledged, with a free hand. She has been guilty, too, of what many seem to regard as an unpardonable offence-resorting to first principles in order to justify her attacks upon existing systems, and lay a foundation for proposed improvements. Thus, in the science of politics (to begin with that department) she has boldly assumed that inen come into the world with rights that the maintenance of these rights ought to be the great object of social institutions that government was intended for the good of the whole, not the emolument of the fewthat legitimate authority can have no other basis than general consent, VOL. III. 2 F for : for that force can never constitute right--that civil distinctions, originating from the agreement of society, always remain within the determination of society and that laws, in order to be just, must bear equally upon all. These principles have doubtless borne a hostile aspect towards the greater part of existing governinents, which have supported themselves upon maxims so much the reverse; but has Philosophy urged the demolition of all such governments? Certainly not, unless she is identified with Fanaticism. It has been her invariable method first to recommend to the usurpers of undue authority to repair their wrongs by gradual concessions; and secondly, to the sufferers under tyranny, to state their grievances in a quiet way, and patiently, though firmly, to expect redress. This she has done as the decided friend of peace; for Philosophy (and Philosophy alone) has been incessantly employed in lifting up her voice against war, that monstrous aggregate of all the evils, natural and moral, that conspire against human happiness. The works of all the writers, ancient and modern, who have merited the title of philosophers, may be confidently appealed to for their strenuous endeavours to correct the false opinions of men with respect to the glory of warriors and conquerors, and to inculcate the superior claims to admiration and gratitude arising from the successful culture of the beneficent arts. but inc Had, then, the dictates of Philosophy been equally listened to by the governors and governed, reforms might have been effected by mutual agreement to the advantage of both, and a progress have been made towards that melioration of the state of mankind, which a phiJanthropist can never cease to have in view amidst all his disappointments. That such expectations have failed through the predominance of the selfish principle, combined with the impetuous and ungovernable character of a particular nation, is not the fault of Philosophy. She held up a torch to point out the safest path to a necessary reformazion, incendiaries snatched it from her for the purposes of mischief. It is acknowledged that some of the evil proceeded from the Fanaticism of her honest but deluded votaries; but much more from those who disclaimed all connexion with her. The most sanguinary tyrant of the French revolution was notoriously the foe to all mental cultivation, and obliterated the precepts of philosophy in the blood of its professors. And no one can suspect the man who now aims at uniting all Europe in the fetters of a military despotism, of an inclination to promote liberal discussions on the rights of man and the foundation of government. In point of fact it appears that the sole European power that steadily resists the present tendency to an universal barbarism of civil polity, is that which is most enlightened by free investigation, and in which alone philosophy at this time possesses. a pen and a tongue.* With • This is said not with regard to all the acts of its occasional administrations, but to that public voice which, through the medium of a free press, pronounces npon the principles and conduct, as well of its own government, as of those of other nations. With respect, therefore, to the political system of the world, Philosophy (I mean, of that kind which was chiefly prevalent in the latter half of the 18th century) may stand acquitted of any thing inimical to the true interests of mankind; and whatever improvements took place in the administration of the continental governments of Europe during that period may fairly be ascribed to her influence. She promoted the enfranchisement of slaves and vassals, the relief of the lower orders from arbitrary and burthensome requisitions, the liberation of internal commerce from impolitic restrictions, the encouragement of every species of useful industry, the melioration of laws, the abolition of cruel punishments and of judicial torture, and above all, religious toleration-which leads me to the second point, namely, the conduct of Philosophy with respect to religion. Here, again, it is proper to begin with enquiring what it was that Philosophy actually opposed under the appellation of Religion; for nothing can be more unfair than to draw a picture of religion as it has existed only in a comparatively few philosophical minds, and then to display it as the object against which Philosophy has aimed her shafts. A system of faith, the sole essentials of which should be a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being of infinite perfections, the moral governor and judge of mankind, and of a future state of rewards and punishments, would, I am persuaded, command the respect of every genuine philanthropist, who would rejoice in such a powerful support to morality, and such a consolation under the unavoidable evils of life, and prize it the more for the sanction of revelation. But where has national religion appeared under this simple aspect? Certainly not in those countries in which philosophers have been its adversaries. There cannot be a more copious source of error than to confound under a common name, on account of an agreement in certain particulars, things in their nature essentially different. To instance in the different sects which bear the general title of christian-though all referring to the same primary authority, it is scarcely possible to conceive of greater variations than subsist among them, both with relation to each other, and to the doctrines of their common founder. Accuracy, therefore, requires that in speaking of them they should be specifically denominated, and not be grouped under a generical appellative. Thus it is right to say, the religion of Rome, the religion of Luther, the religion of Calvin, and the like; for the religion of Christ will convey but a very inadequate idea of their several characters and tenets. Let us then see what that Roman religion was which peculiarly excited the enmity of what is called the French school of philosophy. It was a system which, in the first place, demanded the renunciation of all right of private judgment, and subjected the religious opinions and practices of all the world to the determination of a foreign priest-which took from men the direction of their own consciences, and put it into the hands of a cast, detached in all countries from their fellow-subjects, and universally connected by peculiar claims and interests-which uniformly discouraged all enquiries and discussions tending, tending, however remotely, to invalidate its own authority, and exacted implicit submission in all points on which it had thought fit to decide-which taught doctrines the most irreconcileable to reason and common sense, and enjoined observances the most triffing, degrading and burthensome. It was a system, moreover, radically hostile to every other, spurning all community or accommodation, annexing extravagant ideas of merit to proselytism, and therefore, when allied to -power, infallibly leading to persecution: a system, the influence of - which was traced in lines of blood through every page of modern history. Was it then no just object to the friends of reason and humanity to loosen the hold of such a religion upon the minds of men? Was it not a necessary preliminary to every attempt for introducing substantial improvements in the countries where it prevailed; and if, ⚫ in the contest with a mass of opinion so powerfully supported, some things were necessarily endangered which were worth preserving, was not the prize adequate to the hazard? A consistent protestant cannot, certainly, dispute these conclusions; but he may blame philosophers for not fairly examining christianity at the source, and adopting it in such a form as shall approve itself to a rational enquirer. Before he does this, however, he must be prepared to admit that an enquiry conducted upon such a principle justifies itself, whatever be the system in which it settles. He must renounce all anathematizing denunciations; disclaim any preference due to a particular system because it is that of the state; and disavow any right of annexing penalties and privations to non-conformity to a predominant faith. Unless he agrees to these preliminaries, he is in effect no more a friend to free enquiry than the Romanist; and when he urges examination, it is only upon the tacit condition that its result should be conversion to his own opinions. The philosopher who has thrown off the authority of a pope and council is not likely to yield to that of Luther or Calvin, a convocation or a synod. To conclude-Philosophy, understood in its proper sense of " the love of wisdom," or of truth (which is the same thing) is the only principle to be relied on, not only for meliorating the state of the world, but for preventing a relapse to barbarism. If She be excluded from all guidance of human affairs, in whose hands shall it be placed?-in those of Avarice, of Ambition, of Bigotry? She may have had her moments of delirium, but she is essentially the votary of Reason, and possesses within herself the power of correcting her own errors. Policy, if She be not called in as a counsellor, degenerates into craft; and Religion, without her direction, into superstition. They who are afraid of her searching spirit, must be conscious of something that will not bear the light of investigation. They are foes to the truth because "the truth is not in them." Sir, PASSAGE IN ÆSCHYLUS EXPLAINED. To the Editor of the Athenaum. THE following explanation of a passage in the Agamemnon of Æschylus, on which much has been written, but written in vain, may be gratifying to your classical readers. Clytemnestra, the Lady Macbeth of ancient days, boasts in it of her fidelity during the absence of her Lord, and the joy with which she would receive him on his return. Ουδ' οιδα τερψιν, ουδε επιψογον φατιν The lines are thus rendered in the elegant and poetical version of Mr. Potter: Never knew I pleasure In the blamed converse of another man, On this passage he has the following note: "Paw honestly says "aliquid subest quod non intelligo." Mr. Heath disapproves the allusion, though he thinks it a proverbial expression, the grace of which is lost on our ignorance, and says, " quod nos non videmus, alius olim forsan videbit." In the old Persian, called the Pehlevi, the first principle of things was called באב,bab; and though supposed to be fire by the disciples of Zoroaster, the term is a modification of ab, water, which the Arabians maintained to be the original element. With the notion that water is the primary matter, the early Greek philosophers borrowed the term. Hence βαπτω, to plunge in water; and βαφη, immersion; and the phrase χαλκου βαφη is a metaphor for a stab or wound, it being produced by a weapon plunged into the body as in water. The sentiment which the words convey to the Herald, whom she addressed, is to this effect: I knew no pleasure with any man, and felt no more the sting of calumny than the point of steel. But the language is studiously equivocal; and in this peculiarity at once consisted the skill and the obscurity of it. While the Queen appeared to express the above meaning, she in reality expresses quite the reverse: I know no greater pleasure, though no report more disgraceful, than the steel plunged in him by another man. This artful equivocation arises from the manner in which the clause αλλου προς ανδρος is connected. If taken with τερψιν, the lines convey the first sense; but with χαλκου βαφας, the last. For this interpretation we have the best authority-the authority of the Chorus, who perceiving that the Herald was misled by the artful ambiguity |