LIVES OF LORD CASTLEREAGH AND SIR CHARLES STEWART. CHAPTER X. CAMPAIGN OF DRESDEN, CULM, AND DENNEWITZ. CHAP. X. 1813. 1. WHEN the Grand Army of the Russians and Prussians crossed the Bohemian frontier and assembled under the walls of Prague, the object was to form, by a junction with the Austrian forces in that province, an imposing army, Plan of the which was estimated vaguely at 200,000 combatants, Allied sovereigns for destined to descend from the salient bastion which Bole- the campaign. mia formed in the centre of Germany, threaten the communications of the French Emperor with the Rhine, and, by turning, render nugatory all the vast preparations he had made for maintaining himself on the Elbe. The design formed at Trachenberg, and subsequently matured by the aid of the celebrated French general, Moreau, who had come from America to join the Allied armies, was ably conceived, and promised the greatest results if vigorously carried into execution. But it required for its full development a larger efficient force than the Allied sovereigns had at their disposal, and a degree of unity in VOL. II. A 97. Confirmation of the same principles from subsequent experience, 98. Reason of the territorial arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, 99. Additional proof of its justice furnished by subsequent events, 100. Reasons why revolutionary Powers ever incline to France, 101. Inconsistency of the foreign and domestic policy of this country in LIVES OF LORD CASTLEREAGH AND SIR CHARLES STEWART. CHAPTER X. CAMPAIGN OF DRESDEN, CULM, AND DENNEWITZ. CHAP. X. 1813. paign. 1. WHEN the Grand Army of the Russians and Prussians crossed the Bohemian frontier and assembled under the walls of Prague, the object was to form, by a junction with the Austrian forces in that province, an imposing army, Plan of the which was estimated vaguely at 200,000 combatants, Allied sovereigns for destined to descend from the salient bastion which Bole- the cammia formed in the centre of Germany, threaten the communications of the French Emperor with the Rhine, and, by turning, render nugatory all the vast preparations he had made for maintaining himself on the Elbe. The design formed at Trachenberg, and subsequently matured by the aid of the celebrated French general, Moreau, who had come from America to join the Allied armies, was ably conceived, and promised the greatest results if vigorously carried into execution. But it required for its full development a larger efficient force than the Allied sorereigns had at their disposal, and a degree of unity in VOL. II. Α CHAP. X. 1813. council and precision in movements which was hardly to be expected in a huge array, composed of the armies of the three great military powers, not accustomed to act together, and mutually jealous of each other's directions. Seventy-five thousand Russians and twenty-five thousand Prussians had crossed the Moldau on the 17th, 18th, and 19th August, in the highest spirits and finest condition; and the Austrians had held out assurances that these would be joined by 120,000 troops of their nation. But though their total array in arms in Bohemia was little short of that amount, yet the proportion of it capable of undertaking the duties of a campaign, and standing in line with the veterans of Russia and Prussia, did not exceed 80,000; and from the Russian and Prussian contingent, 5000 were to be deducted, from the effects of fatigue and sickness, before the campaign commenced. Thus, at the very utmost, not more than 170,000 men could be relied on for active operations beyond the 204-208; mountain frontier in the Saxon plain-a great force un242, 247- doubtedly, but hardly adequate to the arduous under109, 110. taking of expelling from its fortified position the enormous multitude which Napoleon had there collected.1 1 Cathcart, Thiers, xvi. 249; Lond. 2. Forces at disposal. For the army, which the unwearied energy and admirable organisation of the French Emperor had now asNapoleon's sembled under his immediate command at Dresden, was immense, and such as went far to justify the confidence in his good fortune which had led him to reject the Austrian proposals and hazard all on the doubtful issue of war. We have the authority of M. Thiers, founded on the Imperial muster-rolls in the archives of Paris, that, independent of the army of 100,000 men, or thereby, which was opposed to Marshal Blucher in Silesia, Napoleon had no less than 172,000 men under his immediate orders, in and around Dresden, stretching from the Bohemian Mountains on the right to Torgau on the left. In addition to this, he had placed 110,000 men under the orders of Oudinot, Girard, and Davoust, |