CHAP. X. 1813. the imperial and royal headquarters, was to move on Kommotau, and enter Saxony by the road to Leipsic ; and as soon as this column reached Marienberg, it was ordered to turn to the right and march by Töplitz and Saida on Dresden. A fourth column, composed of Austrian new levies under Klenau, was to march by Anna1 General berg, and continue its route by Freyburg on Dresden. orders, Aug. These columns were all in full march on the 22d, and it 12, 1813; Lond. 110; was not long before the advanced-guard fell in with the 213, 214; posts of St Cyr, who was stationed in the camp of 268-270. Pirna and in front of Dresden with his corps, 22,000 strong.1 Cathcart, Thiers, xvi. 8. Their ad- Notwithstanding his great abilities, Marshal St Cyr was no match for the overwhelming force thus directed against him. He had clearly foreseen it, and urged Napoleon to make provision accordingly; but the Emperor for once was at fault, and had thrown all his disposable forces to the right bank of the river to restrain the incursion of Blucher. On the evening of the 22d, Wittgenstein's advanced-guard encountered the French outposts, attacked the lines of Pirna with the bayonet, and carried them, though defended by the whole division of General Bonnet. A part of the French retired upon Dresden; the remainder crossed the Elbe on bridges of boats, and got off. After this success, no further resistance was attempted. Koenigstein was blockaded; and the different corps, pursuing the routes assigned to them, were, on the afternoon of the 25th, with the exception of Klenau's corps, which was a day's march in the rear, all grouped in the valleys which lay behind the amphitheatre of swelling hills, rising one behind another, which form the beautiful boundary Lord Castle on the south and west of the plain of Dresden. Witt28, 1813, genstein's advanced-guard, closely following the enemy, had already reached the suburbs of Dresden, and the iv. 78.80 vicinity of the splendid ornamental enclosure called the Grosse Garten, lying close to the walls of the southern side. A chain of pickets was established in a wide 2 Sir Chas. Stewart to reagh, Aug. MS.; Cathcart, 214, 215; St Cyr, Fain, ii. 252, 253. CHAP. X. circle, all round the southern and western side of the Saxon capital; and the Allied sovereigns, riding to the front corps, reached, and long rested on, a projecting 1813. eminence, the end of one of the spurs of the Bohemian Mountains, from whence, in the serenity of a beautiful evening in autumn, they had a perfect view of Dresden, its smiling environs, and the windings of the Elbe, destined so soon to be the theatre of a sanguinary and memorable conflict. 9. the Allied tack. The original intention of the Allied generals was to have moved upon the French communications with Leip- Changes in sic and the Rhine, and thus draw Napoleon from his plan of atstrongholds on the Elbe into the Saxon plains, where Aug. 24. their superior cavalry might operate to the greatest advantage. This design, which was perfectly suited to the state of affairs when the bulk of Napoleon's forces was in and around Dresden, became, however, less advisable when he had thrown the greater part of them across the Elbe to combat Blucher, and after the intelligence received on the 23d of the easy capture of the camp of Pirna. At the same time, the comparatively small force left under St Cyr for the protection of Dresden, suggested the project of a sudden advance upon that city, which it was hoped might be carried by a coup-de-main before Napoleon, now far advanced towards Liegnitz in pursuit of Blucher, could return for its relief. Orders accordingly were given to all the columns to converge upon Dresden; but the Austrian corps, which were far advanced on the road to Freyburg, in the same plain, could not be brought into action for two days. This change of plan, in the middle of an operation in which hours required to be counted, as Napoleon with his Guards and 1 Lond. 111; reserves was known to be hastening back to the threat- Cath. 215, ened point, proved extremely prejudicial, and was the 28; St Cyr, iv. 96-99; real cause of the failure of the well-conceived movement Fain, ii. 253. in which it occurred.1 But while indecision as to an attack on the Saxon 216; Bout. X. 1813. 10. Extreme terror in Dresden. CHAP. capital thus pervaded the Allied councils, the utmost alarm existed in Dresden lest the town should be taken before the anxiously-expected succour could arrive for its relief. St Cyr almost hourly despatched messengers to anxiety and the Emperor, with accounts constantly more pressing of the advance of the Allies, their vast numbers, and formidable artillery, and the imminent danger of its being immediately carried by assault. In truth, the Allies. had now performed successfully the greatest feat in strategy; they had thrown themselves in almost irresistible strength on the enemy's communications without compromising their own. They stood, on the evening of the 25th, in great numbers on the direct line to Leipsic and the Rhine; their light troops inundated the whole of Saxony in the rear of the French army; and their main body, 120,000 strong, with 500 guns, formed a vast semicircle, surrounding within cannon-shot the whole of the old town of Dresden on the left bank of the Elbe. The troops, it is true, were extremely fatigued with the forced marches they had made almost incessantly during the last ten days, and Klenau's entire corps, 25,000 strong, were still a day's march in the rear; but, on the other hand, the troops in the town were only 30,000, and the defences consisted almost entirely of a few earth reLond. 112, doubts, wooden palisades, and enclosure-walls, which could iv. 96-99; not be expected to resist for many hours a concentric fire of the heavy artillery which was arranged on the heights around the city.' 1 Cath. 217; 113; St Cyr, Jomini, iv. 382-384. 11. Debate as In these circumstances, it was anxiously debated at the Allied headquarters, whether an immediate attack should diate attack be hazarded on the town, or it should be delayed till on the town. Klenau had come up, and the whole Allied force was to an imme Aug. 25. assembled. On the one hand, it was strongly urged by the Emperor Alexander and General Jomini that an attack should be made at latest at daybreak on the following morning; that notwithstanding his boasted activity, they had now anticipated Napoleon at the decisive point; CHAP. X. 1813. that the newly-constructed defences of Dresden, consisting chiefly of wooden palisades, could not long resist the attack of a hundred thousand men and three hundred guns, which could be concentrated for the assault; that though undoubtedly the place could not be carried without a heavy loss, yet that was as nothing compared to the advantage of winning, in the outset of the campaign, the centre of the enemy's defensive line, with its garrison and immense military stores; that the Allies, thus masters of the principal passage over the Elbe, would at once gain the immense advantage of being able to operate at pleasure on either bank, which Napoleon had made such efforts to secure to himself; but that these advantages could not be gained if this attack were delayed more than twelve hours, as next day the French Emperor would arrive with his Guards and reserves, and turn the scale in his own favour. The King of Prussia was of the same opinion. Lord Cathcart strongly supported it. He had ridden alone behind the Grosse Garten, between Plauen and Raecknitz, to the close vicinity of the enemy's outposts, and reported that the way was clear and everything ready for the assault. On the other hand, Schwartzenberg and the whole Austrian generals strongly insisted on the fatigue of the troops, the absence of Klenau's corps, and the inexpedience of putting in hazard the great advantage already gained, of having got possession of the enemy's communications, by an unnecessary and perilous iv. 96-99; attack, which, if unsuccessful, might induce the most Cath. 216, serious disasters. This opinion, after an animated dis- 111; Thiers, cussion, prevailed; it was resolved not to hazard an 299. assault.1* "On this occasion," says Sir George Cathcart, "while the important conference of sovereigns and chiefs was going on at a little distance from us, General Moreau, * The author received the account of this important conference from Lord Cathcart himself, and he was entirely corroborated by Sir Charles Stewart, who gave the same account of it, and was also present. 1 Jom. iv. 382, 383; St Cyr, 217; Lond. xvi. 297 CHAP. X. 1813. 12. Remarkable between Moreau. Aug. 25. 6 who was either not invited to join, or studiously kept aloof from it, was conversing familiarly in English, which he spoke perfectly, and smoking his cigar, with the author and some others of the suite. We asked him whether the conversation town was to be attacked? He told us he was glad to Cathcart and say the town was not to be attacked, and that the intention had been given up, for,' said he, its fortifications are in good repair, and within the town, as well as in the faubourg, houses have been loopholed. There is a garrison of 35,000 men; but, notwithstanding this, if attacked with determination by the superior forces at our disposal, it might be taken with a loss of 5000, perhaps even 15,000 men. We are already on Napoleon's communica1 Cath. 216. tions. The possession of the town is no object-it will fall of itself at a future time."1 13. Accident which But although the idea of an assault was thus abandoned at the headquarters of the sovereigns, yet it took place brought on nevertheless, owing to a very singular circumstance, arising an assault. from the variety of separate authorities which obtained in the Allied army. Great jealousy, as already observed, existed there as to the party which was to be intrusted with the supreme command; and the Russians, in particular, were so distrustful of the Austrian generalissimo that it had been found necessary to conceal his command from them by having all the orders to the troops of that nation conveyed through Barclay de Tolly. Schwartzenberg had the evening before sent instructions through his chief of the staff, RADETSKY, destined for celebrity in future days, for a demonstration against Dresden on the following day, which might or might not be converted into a serious attack, according as it might seem or not, when it was commenced, to promise success. When the plan of an attack on Dresden was abandoned at the conference held late on the evening before-a resolution confirmed in another council held early the next day-he promised to countermand the orders. Whether it was the difficulty of doing so, or that counter orders did not, through the im |