XI. which had been already commenced and was far ad- CHAP. vanced, and to maintain his post to the last extremity. With a heavy heart that able commander obeyed his 1813. new instructions, foreseeing clearly that the Emperor's fatal propensity to grasp at everything at once and 1 Thiers,xvi. abandon nothing, was about to involve him in fresh 492-500 difficulties. His anticipations proved too well founded; 492; Napo the 30,000 men which lay inactive at Dresden would Cyr, Oct. 11, 1813, have probably turned the scales of fortune on the field of Ibid. Leipsic.1 1 * St Cyr, iv. 10. own account at this Napoleon has told us himself what his plan of operations at this time was. "He intended to have allowed the Napoleon's Allies to advance into the country between the Elbe and of his views the Saale, and then, manoeuvring under protection of the time." fortresses and with the aid of the magazines of Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Hamburg, to have carried the war into the territory between the Elbe and Oder, on which latter river France still held Glogau, Stettin, and Cüstrin; and, according to circumstances, to have raised the blockade of Dantzic, Zamosc, and Modlin, on the Vistula. Such were the advantages which might have been expected from this vast plan, that the Coalition in Monwould have been dissolved by it."2 He himself enter- 125. Napoleon's first orders to St Cyr on 4th October, were as follows:"Napoléon lui traça ensuite tout ce qu'il aurait à faire pour l'évacuation de cette ville [Dresden]. D'abord il devait évacuer successivement Konigstein, Lilienstein, Pirna, lever en même temps les ponts établis sur ces divers points, réunir les bateaux qui en proviendraient, en conserver une partie à Dresde même pour le cas où l'on y retournerait, charger les autres de vivres, de munitions, de blessés, et les expédier sur Torgau. Tout en faisant ces choses qui ressemblaient si fort à une évacuation définitive, le Maréchal St Cyr devait dire hautement qu'on ne songeait pas à quitter Dresde, que loin de là on allait s'y établir, et se servir de ce langage pour ôter aux habitants la velléité de s'agiter. Puis ces dispositions terminées, ses trente mille hommes tenus sur pied, il devait décamper au premier signal, et rejoindre Napoléon par Meissen."-THIERS, xvi. 492, 493. His second orders, a week later, were just the reverse:-"Il suspendit l'évacuation de Dresde à laquelle le Maréchal St Cyr était tout préparé. Il ne la contremanda pas précisément, mais il prescrivit de la différer, par le motif que l'ennemi s'engageant à fond, soit du côté de la Bohême, soit du côte de la Mulde et de l'Elbe, la bataille tant désirée devenait certaine, la victoire aussi, et qu'alors il serait bien heureux d'avoir conservé Dresde, où le quartier général rentrerait presque aussitôt qu'il en serait sorti."-THIERS, xvi. 500. 2 Napoleon tholon, ii. CHAP. XI. 1813. 1 Thiers,xvi. 507. 11. in the French army at tained the most sanguine hopes of success from this great operation; and firmly expected to be able to return to Dresden by the right bank of the Elbe, and debouch from thence on the rear of the Allied Grand Army. He was in an especial manner desirous to conceal it entirely from the enemy. All the orders to the different marshals and generals were given in cypher, and with the most positive injunctions of secrecy; "for," said Napoleon, 'during three days it is the secret of the army involving the salvation of the empire."1 66 Notwithstanding all his efforts, however, to keep his Discontent intentions concealed, it was impossible for the Emperor to prevent his generals from divining them, for the direction. this project. given to the march of the troops clearly proved what was in contemplation. Many of the marshals were seized with consternation when the intention to carry the war beyond the Elbe into Northern Prussia transpired; and it must be admitted they had good ground for their apprehensions. They felt the danger of plunging with 250,000 men, supposing he took with him all the garrisons, into the north of Germany, when 350,000 of the Allies were preparing to interpose between them and the Rhine, and cut them off from all communication with France. In the desperate strife in which they were about to engage, when each party passed his adversary and threw himself upon his communications, would not the more numerous body prevail over the less numerous--that which was strongest in light horse over that which was weakest? What would the Allies lose by the war being transferred into Prussia, except Berlin, and the warlike resources, now nearly exhausted, of that country? There still would remain to them the rich and fertile territories of Bohemia, Silesia, and Austria, from whence they could derive all needful supplies. But if 572, 573; the French were once cut off from the Rhine, a few vi. 38-40 weeks' warfare like that to which they had just been 438, 439. exposed, would be sufficient to exhaust all their resources;2 and the very magnitude of their forces would only the Fain, ii. Las Cases, Jom. iv. sooner induce ruin, by consuming all their provisions and CHAP. ammunition. XI. 1813. 12. Napoleon's conversation shal Mar The knowledge of these discontents, together with uncertainty as to the movements of Blucher and Bernadotte, who were now reported to be moving towards Leipsic, interesting caused doubt to arise in the mind of Napoleon as to the with Marfeasibility of carrying out his plan, and rendered his stay mont. in the gloomy old chateau of Düben, amidst a howling tempest of wind and rain, desolate and mournful in the extreme. We possess, fortunately, the best possible evidence of his views at this eventful crisis, in an interview which he had with Marshal Marmont on the night of the 10th, at Düben, which lasted till daybreak on the 11th. That able general, in a long and most interesting conversation with Napoleon on that occasion, thus expressed himself: "The only course which remains to your Majesty, is a vigorous offensive against the armies of Blucher and the Prince Royal, now in communication on the left bank of the Elbe. With the 130,000 men whom you have in hand, and disposable, you are in a situation to gain the most decided advantages. Eight days of active operations will suffice for that purpose; being master of all the fortified places on the Elbe, you have every facility for undertaking them. By so doing, you will bring yourself on the enemy's communications; you may reinforce your army by a great part of the garrisons on the Elbe, and thus both greatly increase your own force, and extricate the old soldiers composing them from a situation, in the event of a reverse, of the utmost danger. To effect this, all that is necessary is, that the three corps left at Dresden and on the Bohemian frontier-viz., the 2d, 5th, and 8th-with Murat's cavalry, should retire slowly towards your Majesty's headquarters here, while St Cyr, with the whole garrison of Dresden, should move rapidly by the right bank of the Elbe on Torgau and Wittenberg, taking the garrisons of these places with him. Davoust can easily bring up 20,000 from Dantzic, after providing CHAP. XI. 1813. 13. for the defence of that place. The necessity of abandoning Dresden, after the turn events have taken, has long been evident, and can no longer be matter of doubt. The hostile dispositions of Bavaria cannot be unknown to you; by removing the theatre of war from that power, you retard or weaken its action against you.' "During these remarks," says Marmont, "the Emperor Continued. continued attentive but silent. It was evident he could not bring himself to the voluntary abandonment of Leipsic. On the contrary, he was disposing everything for a grand battle under its walls. He wished to preserve everything: he lost all by wishing to preserve all." "I will not fight," said he, "but when I am inclined; they will not dare to attack me." "The great losses which your Majesty's army has sustained," replied Marmont, "have arisen, not so much from the sword of the enemy, as from the entire want of provisions, care, and attention requisite for the soldiers. If they had been properly attended to in the hospitals, 50,000 men more than you now have, at the very least, would have stood in your ranks. Twenty-five millions of francs, in addition, spent on the commissariat and hospital stores, would have preserved the lives of 50,000 soldiers, and saved you, in the end, twenty-five millions." "If I had given them that sum," replied Napoleon, "they would have robbed the troops of it, and things would have been just as they are. My reverses have arisen from the defections of my allies; but for that, I would have made head against all my enemies. They have evinced a discreditable want of faith. There is a distinction between a man of honour, and a man of conscience the former is greatly to be preferred, for he simply adheres to his engagements, whatever they are, and with whatever consequences attended; the latter makes his conduct depend on his intelligence and his judgment. My father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, has done what he thought would be advantageous for the interests of his people; he is an honest man, a man CHAP. ΧΙ. 1813. of conscience, but not a man of honour. You, for example, if the enemy, having invaded France, were on the heights of Montmartre, would think, probably with reason, that the safety of France obliged you to abandon me; you would, in so doing, be an honest man, a man of conscience, but not a man of honour." "These words," says Marmont, "pronounced by Napoleon on the 11th October 1813, have often since recurred to my mind as 1 Marmont, prophetic. Their impression never will be effaced from. 274-276. my recollection." 1 That the Emperor's plan of carrying the war into 14. peror is plan by Murat. Prussia was the best that in the circumstances could have The Embeen adopted, is evident from the consideration that, obliged to if coupled with an abandonment of the fortresses on the change his Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, it would have enabled him advices from to regain the Rhine with above 100,000 additional veteran Oct. 12. troops, who, as matters stood, would, in the event of defeat, be all made prisoners of war. But how firmly soever he might be set on this project, he received, on the morning of the 12th, advices from Murat and Marmont, which compelled him to change his determination. During the course of the movement from Dresden to Düben, the Allied Grand Army had not been idle. Issuing in huge masses from the defiles of the Bohemian mountains, it had pressed hard on Murat in every quarter. He did everything which skill and courage could effect to retard their advance; but it was impossible that 50,000 men could hold their ground against 120,000. The Austrians continued steadily to advance. On the 7th, headquarters were at Chemnitz. On the 10th, the Allied advanced-guard, under Wittgenstein, advanced from Altenberg to Borna, and in so doing cut off Murat, who was marching on the same point from Frohburg. A severe action here ensued, Murat fighting with desperation to recover his natural position on the Leipsic road, between the Allies and that point. Although success was at first nearly balanced in the charges of the opposing horse, and the loss on both sides was about |