XI. CHAP. equal, yet the advantage, on the whole, remained with the French, who drove the Russians out of Borna, and 1813. regained possession of the Leipsic road, and their line of Oct. 9. retreat to that place. On the night of the 9th, a detached corps under Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein and Thielman surprised Wetlau on the direct road between Leipsic and Mayence. The Allies, therefore, now stood on the French communications, right between them and the Rhine. And although Augereau, hurrying up with his corps of conscripts from Mayence, regained this important post on the day following, and, continuing his advance, entered Leipsic on the 13th, yet the Allied Grand Army was now advancing fast, in great masses, along the road from Chemnitz, by Borna, to Leipsic; while Giulay, with their extreme left, had entered Weissenfels on the direct road from Leipsic towards France, and made prisoners twelve hundred sick and wounded. Oct. 10. Oct. 13. 15. This intelligence of Schwartzenberg's continued advance, Reasons for sent by Murat, and the accounts received from Marmont, Napoleon's who had ascertained, by a reconaissance, that Blucher was change of plan. ascending the Saale towards Leipsic, established the fol He lowing points: 1st, That the Grand Army was steadily CHAP. XI. 1813. Bernadotte, between him and the Rhine. This, combined with the general and loudly expressed desire of the army, left no doubt on the Emperor's mind as to the necessity of abandoning his project of hurling back Blucher and Bernadotte, and then returning, by Dresden or Torgau, from the right bank of the Elbe, to fall upon Schwartzenberg. With his wonted decision, accordingly, he at once changed his plan; and, countermanding the orders previously given 1 Vaud. i. to the corps of Reynier, Ney, and Bertrand, to march on the 199, 200 Elbe, he, on the forenoon of the 12th, wheeled his whole 1813, ii. army about, and directed every sabre and bayonet on 103, 104; Leipsic, intending to establish himself there, between the 154, 155; Grand Army and those of Silesia and the North, and 514-516. prevent their junction.' Recueil de 380; Bout. Vetter, i Thiers, xvi. 16. valry action at Borna on the 14th. A reconnaissance, ordered by Schwartzenberg along the road from Borna towards Leipsic, led, on the 14th, to a Severe cabrilliant cavalry action between the French and Wittgenstein's corps, which did equal honour to each of the contending parties. Three thousand of Murat's horse there encountered Pahlen's dragoons, and several splendid charges, with various success, were made on both sides. The ground was eminently favourable to a cavalry encounter, consisting of level meadows, presenting no peculiar advantage to either side. The cannonade on both sides soon became extremely loud, and under cover of it the opposing cavalry fought with alternate success. The action took place in the open plain between the Leipsic road and the wood of the University. The French cavalry, headed by Murat, attacked at first with the utmost vigour, and broke the Russian cavalry, who would have been cut to pieces but for a brilliant charge of a large body of Prussian cuirassiers, who assailed them in flank when in the heat and confusion of success, and in their turn routed the victors with great slaughter. In the course of this desperate mêlée, six regiments of French cuirassiers which had just arrived from Spain, and were among the best horsemen in the French army, were most XL 1813. CHAP. severely handled, and nearly destroyed. In the pursuit which followed, Murat was closely chased by the enemy, and an officer who headed the chase, knowing the monarch by his white plume, repeatedly exclaimed, while almost touching him with his sabre, "Stop, king! Stop!" The Italian monarch's orderly at this moment saved his master's life by passing his sword through the pursuer's body; but the Allies were soon after brought up by a charge in flank from a fresh body of French horse. Although the success in the cavalry charges, however, was thus balanced, and the loss on either side was nearly equal, being about 2000 Odel, ii. 18, to each, yet the advantage on the whole remained with Vetter, i the French, for in the evening Wittgenstein retired to Thiers, xvi. Espenhain, and Murat, with his whole force, about 60,000 cart, 29 strong, took up the ground he had chosen for making a final stand in front of Leipsic.1 1 Bout. 106; 160, 161; 515; Cath 17. Bernadotte While the armies of Bohemia and Blucher were thus Inactivity of converging on all sides around Leipsic, where Napoleon at Köthen. Was fast concentrating his forces for the decisive struggle, the Prince Royal, with the Army of the North, held back at Köthen, neither co-operating in the general movement, nor doing anything to promote the object of the Allies. Blucher was at Halle on the Saale, to the north-west of Leipsic, where he had remained firm even when Napoleon had cut off his communications by the advance to Düben; but Bernadotte, who, on that event, had retired two marches to the rear to Köthen, remained there, even after the change of movement on the part of the French Emperor, on the 12th and 13th, had given unequivocal proof of a general concentration of troops at Leipsic. This immobility was sufficiently justified when the French legions were crossing the Elbe and menacing Berlin, but it remained without an intelligible, or at least an avowable, motive, when the movement in retreat on their part had commenced, and both parties were concentrating their forces for the decive shock at Leipsic. This conduct on the part of th ce Royal, which so painfully verified CHAP. XI. all his predictions and realised his worst anticipations, did not escape the vigilant eye of Sir Charles Stewart, who respectfully but firmly represented to his Royal Highness 1813. that the enemy's movement on Leipsic was now clearly pronounced; that the reasons for any longer stay at Köthen had come to an end; and that, if he delayed any longer there, he would not only fail in the part assigned to him in the general plan of operations, but be deprived of any share in the grand and decisive battle which was approaching. To all these considerations, how just and obvious soever, his Royal Highness remained insensible; and instead of issuing orders to move towards Leipsic, he detached a division towards the Elbe, and gave directions indicating an intention of moving the whole army in the same direction. The altercation was animated, and at length became painful. Baron Witterstedt, minister of Sweden, and General Adlercreutz, were present, but took no part in the discussion. At length, with great difficulty, he got the Prince Royal to change his movement so far as to promise to move the bulk of his troops on Zörbig, which, although still thirty miles distant from Leipsic, was half a march nearer it than Köthen had been.* * The following very curious and interesting account of this altercation between the Prince Royal and Sir Charles Stewart, is contained in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, on the 17th October :- "SCHNECK DITZ, October 17, 1813. "MY LORD,-I feel it an incumbent duty to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Government, to put your Lordship in possession of my candid sentiments on the Crown Prince of Sweden's late operations, and the part I have felt it my duty to take. It will be for your Lordship to judge whether I have outstepped the bounds of propriety. But an anxious observer and well-wisher to the success of the common cause could not reconcile it to himself, placed as I have been, and honoured with the confidence of my Government, of the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, to remain silent. I have no hesitation in declaring to your Lordship, that indisputable proof can be adduced by military authorities that if the Crown Prince had done his duty the whole of the French army engaged against General Blucher would have been destroyed. Of the Crown Prince's march across the Saale, his wishes intimated to General Blucher to pass before him, which threw the General on his right, and out of the general order of battle, and his attempt afterwards to force General Blucher to the left, as well as his management of the Swedes, I will not now speak, as you are in possession of the heads of these facts in a private letter. I shall commence CHAP. 1813. 18. In addition to the pressing reasons already given, which induced Napoleon to abandon his project of crossing the Elbe and carrying the war into Northern Prussia, there was another circumstance which contributed to recommend kingdom of the same course. Intelligence had now been received at Westphalia, the French headquarters of the crumbling to pieces of the throne of Westphalia under the strokes of the Allied par and defec tion of Bavaria. my observations from our position at Köthen, on the 14th, when General Blucher was at Halle. So soon as the information was certain that the enemy's corps which had passed the Elbe were retiring towards Leipsic, I waited on the Prince Royal, as I was in the habit of doing, on the evening of the 14th, and urged his Royal Highness to make a forced march and collect at Zörbig, having his advance towards Britenfeldt, Delitch, and Düben. I humbly expressed my opinion that, according to the dispositions from the Grand Army, and General Blucher's operations, if his Royal Highness did not cover the General's left, he might bear no part in the approaching contest. The Prince replied, ' Provided the French are beaten, it is indifferent to me whether I or my army take part, and of the two I would much rather they did not.' This was stated to me in presence of many military men then at Köthen, and repeated next day at Sylbitz near Halle, before Baron Witterstedt and Baron Adlercruitz, who on this, as upon every other occasion, have expressed themselves as the most devoted and loyal individuals to the cause. His Royal Highness next observed, I wanted him to make a march, with his flank to the enemy, as at the battle of Eylau. I replied, that I humbly conceived, as all the bridges over the Mulda were destroyed, and its passage was so difficult that his Royal Highness had told me he would not pass it to attack, the enemy, I conceived, even if they were there, would not attempt its passage to attack him, especially with Blucher before them, and the Grand Army so close; that his Royal Highness had 60,000 men, a river to protect his flank on his march, on which he might throw an additional corps to his advanced-guard, during his movement, if necessary; but, above all, as we know the enemy were filing towards Leipsic, there could be no risk. After some more conversation, which I managed, I trust, with the utmost respect, he agreed to march to Halle. I urged that Halle was in rear of General Blucher, and if he was engaged, his Royal Highness could never reach him for support during the battle. His Royal Highness answered, he would be in second line, and ready to support, if necessary; and in his orders on the following day, of which I shall send you a copy, he directed his army 'to prepare to follow the enemy if they are beaten, and to do them all the mischief possible in their retreat,' evidently showing he did not intend to be in the action. I left the Prince Royal in the evening with a promise on his part he would change the direction of the march from Halle to the left on Zörbig, whither the troops were en route in the morning. Here I must beg your Lordship to observe, that my urgent proposition was to reach Zörbig on the 14th, which could easily have been achieved, as we remained two days at Köthen. Still I thought it would be something to get the army near Zörbig on the 14th, and I left Köthen with that impression. On the morning of the 15th I rode out with the Prince, and your Lordship may conceive my surprise when I found that, instead of directing his troops to the left to Zörbig, as he had promised, or even to Halle, he had marched the Swedes by Gröpzig, in the rear of Petersberg, towards Wettin; the Prussians to the Petersberg and Oppin; and the Russian corps with their left on |