XI.

tisans, and the dangerous fermentation which prevailed CHAP. over the whole of that kingdom and the adjacent provinces. And though the news of the defection of Bavaria, which 1813. took place on the 8th instant, and was known at the Allied headquarters on the 12th, did not reach Napoleon till the 15th or 17th, yet he was aware that such an event was probable, and even imminent; and that although the

Zörbig. The army was collected at Köthen on the 14th, and their obvious march to support General Blucher was to their left and forward, but his Royal Highness directed them to the right, in rear of General Blucher, and backward, making at the same time an angle to the rear which nearly doubled their distance. At Sylbitz, when the Prince Royal stopped to issue orders to the troops, I humbly but urgently requested it might be weighed whether the other armies would not complain of this movement, especially General Blucher. The Russian General Suchtelin, I am sorry to say, encouraged his Royal Highness in his opinion, and at length I was told that any one who recommended the march on Zörbig was 'un sot.' I bowed, and kept my temper, but said I was still not convinced. After some time, however, I had the satisfaction of finding the Russian corps ordered to Zörbig. Baron Witterstedt and General Adlercreutz were present at this discussion-the former will no doubt remember what passed. I must here observe, that the orders of this day, issued by the Prince Royal, were wilfully, for they could not be ignorantly, issued to the different corps to have brigades formed towards the Elbe, evidently to give the impression that the enemy was to be looked for in that quarter; and this was in spite of the information received from the lieutenant-colonel of the French étatmajor, which I communicated to the Prince Royal at Köthen, at 3 P. M. on the 14th (showing the orders to march on Leipsic).

"On the 16th, in the morning, being personally much dissatisfied with the Prince's proceedings, I repaired to General Blucher. All I had been able to accomplish by dint of the most urgent persuasion was to get the Russians to Zörbig. General Blucher naturally was most indignant at the Prince's conduct. The Prince could not plead ignorance; and wilful determination, either from jealousy of General Blucher or other causes, evidently operated to keep his troops away.

"I must not omit to mention, that at Syblitz the Prince Royal gave me his word that, in case General Blucher attacked the following day (16th), I might give the General his word that he would be on the ground, in the direction of Delitzsch and Eilenberg, with 8000 or 10,000 cavalry and light artillery, and support, even if his infantry could not arrive. This pledge I stated as given to me to General Blucher when I joined him. I wrote from the ground where General Blucher's dispositions were making, the following letter to his Royal Highness, which I sent by an aide-de-camp :

"Le 6 d'Octobre, 9 heures A.M. "MONSEIGNEUR,-D'après le rapport de M. de Général Blucher l'ennemi a quitté Dolitsch. Il est de la première importance selon ses idées que l'armée de V. A. R. se porte à la gauche derrière Dolitsch; les marais et les defiles la mettent absolument hors de risque, et V. A. R. sera en état de prendre part au combat, qui sera plus decisive, avec votre armée et vos talens militaires. Comme toute la force de l'ennemi est dans les environs de Leipsic, permettez moi de vous observer que les momens sont precieux. La nation Anglaise vous regarde;

XI.

CHAP. King was faithful, and desirous to adhere to his engagements, yet it was more than doubtful whether he would 1813. long be able to withstand the united pressure of Austria on the one side, and his own subjects pining for the deliverance of the Fatherland on the other. Indeed, Na

il est de mon devoir de vous parler avec franchise. L'Angleterre ne croira jamais que vous êtes indifferent pourvu que l'ennemi soit battu si vous y prendrez part ou non. J'ose supplier V. A. R. si vous restez en seconde ligne d'envoyer le Capitaine Bogue avec sa brigade de Roquetiers pour agir avec la cavalerie au Général Blucher. J'ai l'honneur d'être, etc., CHARLES STEWART, Lt.-Genl.'”

"I sent this letter by an aide-de-camp. General Blucher urged me strongly to go to H. R. H. myself to press the purport of it. I proceeded thither immediately, and on my way met an aide-de-camp of the Crown Prince, who stated that in consequence of my pressing solicitations, H. R. H. had consented to move with his advance (the Russians) to the left to Landsberg on this day; the Prussians were a march behind them, and the Swedes a march behind the Prussians.

"I, in vain, on arriving, sought the Prince; and not finding H. R. H., I stated to General Adlercreutz, who was at Landsberg, how indispensably necessary it was for the Russian cavalry and light artillery to advance immediately in the direction of Taucha, that the Prince's word had been pledged to it. The General said, if I could arrange it with General Winzingerode, he would answer for it with the Prince. I proceeded to this General (Winzingerode). His orders, he said, were so positive from the Emperor of Russia not to act but with orders from the Crown Prince that he could not move; but he could send 3000 horse forthwith, or 8000 the following morning, if I could procure the order. I returned to General Blucher in despair; but I have since learned that 3000 horse were pushed forward yesterday evening (16th) on General Adlercreutz's seeing the Prince, and they appeared on General Blucher's left this morning.

"After seeing General Blucher's action yesterday, being uncertain where to find the Prince Royal, I rode late at night to Halle, where I found Baron Witterstadt. I made him send an express to H. R. H., with the following letter, of which I send a copy, with the most earnest prayer to him to break up, and march immediately forward with the most advanced corps, not waiting for the rear. Baron Witterstadt's answer afforded me the satisfaction of knowing that, by repeated goading, the head of the Northern Army would have been in its place at noon this day (17th), if an attack had then been made.

466

'HALLE, 16 Octobre, 9 heures de soir. "MONSEIGNEUR,-Je viens du champ de bataille du Général Blucher. J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer les details de cette affaire. J'ose supplier V. A. R. de vous mettre en marche le moment que vous recevez cette lettre, et de vous porter sur Taucha. Il n'y a pas un instant à perdre. V. A. R. me l'a promis. C'est vous parler en ami. Je parle actuellement comme soldat; et si vous ne commencez pas votre marche vous vous en repentirez toujours. J'ai l'honneur d'être, etc., CHAS. STEWART, Lt.-Genl.””

"Whatever may be the subsequent events, I think I have said enough. I am sure I can prove more than enough to show that if the Prince had barely done his duty, the corps of Marmont, Ney, and Bertrand would have been entirely

poleon went so far as to ascribe in the bulletins the retrograde movement to Leipsic, and all the disasters with which it was followed, entirely to the defection of that power. But this was a political falsehood, intended to throw, according to his usual custom, the responsibility for his own acts upon others; for, as already mentioned, the march on Leipsic was begun on the 12th, and he only learned that the defection of Bavaria was certain on the 15th, and that it had actually taken place on the 17th. But without doubt the knowledge he had of the pressure applied to that power must have contributed to strengthen him in his resolution to adopt that step. With the marshals this intelligence, when it was received, was still more conclusive, and added to the joy with which they turned their faces towards the Rhine. "By the inconceivable defection of Bavaria," said they, "the question is entirely changed. We must look forward to other defections which will follow. Wirtemberg, Baden, and Darm

overthrown, and the serious losses in D'York's corps, by his timely arrival, would have been spared. A moment's reference to the map, and the detail of the positions, will convince your Lordship that if his army had marched on Zörbig on the 14th, or even the 15th, with its advance towards Delitsch, which the enemy evacuated that day, he would have been enabled to act on Ney's force, which filed from the neighbourhood of Düben and Delitsch on General Langeron's attack, and protected Marmont's right; and if an impression had been made and followed up to the Partha simultaneously with General Blucher's attack, the whole enemy's force must have been lost.

"Your Lordship is now in possession of a fair and candid detail of what has passed within my knowledge. I pledge myself for the facts therein stated. It is for the Prince Regent's Government to consider them, with all other accounts they may receive, in the manner their wisdom may think fit.—I have the honour to be, &c., "CHAS. STEWART, Lt.-Genl.

"His Excellency LORD CASTLEREAGH, &c."

(Most secret and confidential).—MS.

The substance of this very interesting and important letter is given in Lord Londonderry's War in Germany, pp. 160, 161; much modified, however, and diluted, as was proper when the actors in the scene were in great part alive. Now, however, that they are all gone to their rest, the time has come when historic truth must assert its permanent reign, and praise or blame be awarded to the actors on this mighty stage according to the merit or demerit of the parts they have respectively played on it. It is needless to say how large a meed of the former must be awarded to Sir Charles Stewart for his intrepid conduct on the occasion.

CHAP.

XI.

1813.

XI.

1813.

CHAP. stadt will be swept away by the impulse already so violently given to Southern Germany. The Austrian which was on the Inn, is doubtless already in march army, 1 Fain, ii. for the Rhine. The Bavarian army will follow it. They 377, 378; will draw after them the whole armed force which they 387; Thiers, find on the road; our position will be first menaced, then invaded. What can be so urgent then as to draw near to it ? "1*

Bign. xii.

xvi. 527

529.

19.

conversation

On the evening of the 14th Napoleon arrived at LeipInteresting sic, and Murat, Marmont, Berthier, and the other marof Napoleon shals and generals present, repaired to his headquarters marshals on to receive his instructions previous to the decisive battle the evening which was expected. As the numerical As the numerical superiority of

with his

of the

the Allied to the French forces, if the former were all brought into the field, in the proportion of nearly three to two, was known to all, Napoleon's plan was to fall in the first instance on Schwartzenberg with 120,000 men, over whom, as he had no larger force, he anticipated an easy victory, and then to debouch against Blucher and the Crown Prince, the latter of whom he knew was

The true secret of Napoleon's march on Leipsic, and the false motives to which he ascribed it in the bulletins, is thus explained by M. Thiers:-" Napoléon n'avait pas pu se porter sur Leipsic à cause de la défection de la Bavière, puisqu'il l'ignorait. On s'est fondé pour répandre cette fausseté, sur une assertion du Moniteur de cette époque, qui prétend que la défection de la Bavière avait contraint Napoléon de revenir sur Leipsic. On vient de voir par les preuves matérielles que nous avous rapportées, que l'assertion est radicalement fausse. Mais voici le motif de Napoléon pour dissimuler la vérité en cette circonstance. Cherchant pour le public une explication palpable de la manœuvre qui l'avait ramené sur Leipsic, et dont le résultat avait été si désastreux, il imagina cette raison de la défection de la Bavière, qui était frappante pour les ignorants, et qui lui servait à masquer ce qu'on pouvait croire une faute, comme pour 1812 il avait imaginé de dire que le froid était cause de nos malheurs, et pour Culm que Vandamme avait manqué à ses instructions. Mais Napoléon, en se justifiant ainsi devant les ignorants, se calomniait devant les gens instruits. Si en effet il eût été certain que la route de Mayence allait se fermer par la défection de la Bavière, c'eût été une raison de plus de descendre sur Magdeburg et Hamburg, au lieu de remonter sur Leipsic, puisqu'il se serait assuré ainsi la route bien meilleure et encore libre de Wesel. Mais Napoléon désespérant de faire comprendre à la masse du public comment il avait été forcé à la suite des plus savantes manoeuvres de revenir sur Leipsic, adopta une assertion spécieuse, facile à saisir par tout le monde, et la donna dans les nouvelles officielles, aux dépens de la vérité et de sa propre gloire."— THIERS, xvi. 531, 532, note.

net.

66

ΧΙ.

1813.

so far in the rear that he would be able to take no part CHAP. in the engagement. To compensate his inferiority of force, whenever it could not be avoided by a rapid concentration of his troops on his interior line of communication, he proposed to draw up his men in two lines instead of three, alleging as a reason that the third line was of no real use, either for firing or charging with the bayoHe supported his design to Berthier, Murat, and Marmont, who were present, by observing that such a formation would impose upon the enemy, and cause them to ascribe to the French a force a third greater than they really possessed. In the midst of this discussion, Augereau was announced, who had just come into line with his corps of recruits from Mayence. Ah! here you are at last! Come, my old Augereau, we have been long expecting you" he then added, but in a friendly tone, "But I fear you are no longer the Augereau of Castiglione.' "Yes," replied Augereau, “you will find me the Augereau of Castiglione, if you will give me back the soldiers of the Army of Italy." Napoleon took this retort in good part, and continued the conversation, censuring much the conduct of others, and laying the fault on every one but himself. "He complained," says Thiers, "of his brother Louis, who, from Switzerland, whither he had retired, asked him back Holland; of Jerome, who had just lost Cassel; of Joseph, who had recently been driven from Spain. He then added that his misfortune had been to do too much for his family; that his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, had often told him so, and that he now saw it was true, though it was too late. 'Even you,' added he, turning to Murat, 'have been on the point of abandoning me.' 'I never was so,' replied Murat, ‘but I have always been surrounded by hidden enemies, who have done everything in their power to prejudice me in your Majesty's eyes.' Yes yes!' replied Napoleon, with a tone which showed that he knew or had divined

* Alluding to his brilliant victory there in 1796 in the Italian campaign. VOL. II.

H