XI. 1813. their brave allies in arms, made the most gallant efforts, CHAP. and they were entirely successful, night only putting an end to the action. After this, and during the retreat of the French, the Russian cavalry acted in the most brilliant manner in several charges. General Kolp's cavalry took a battery of thirteen guns, and the Cossacks of General Emanuel five. After this the enemy drew off towards Siegeritz and Pfosen, and crossed the Partha, retreating at all points. Among the Russians, General Chinchin and several officers of distinction were killed or wounded, and I estimate General Blucher's loss at 6000 or 7000 men. But the glorious Army of Silesia added another victory to its list, and the brow of its victorious leader 1 Sir Chas. was again decorated with a fresh laurel. Forty pieces of Lord Castlecannon, 12,000 killed or wounded, of whom 2000 were 17, 1813, prisoners, one eagle, and many caissons, were the fruits 311-313. of the victory of Radefeld and Lindenthal.”1 * Stewart to reagh, Oct. MS.; Cath. battle. 33. Such was Sir Charles Stewart's account of the battle, in which he bore so honourable and distinguished a part; French acand as it was written next day, and he was with Marshal count of this Blucher's staff during the whole engagement, it is worthy of every credit, as far as his own side was concerned. Indeed, the French accounts of the day are substantially the same, with this difference, that they show, what was unknown to Sir Charles when he wrote this account of it, that Marmont's whole force in the field consisted, till a late hour, of his own corps and Dombrowski's division alone; Marshal Ney's corps (now under Souham) not having come up till the victory was decided in favour of the Allies. During the greater part of the day Marmont combated with 25,000 men against more than double that qui aient jamais été livrés. Les troupes y monteront la plus grande valeur Si les Wirtemburgeois avaient fait leur devoir, un succès complet aurait été le prix de nos efforts."-MARMONT, v. 286, 287. * Sir Charles Stewart's estimate of the enemy's loss was too high. It amounted to 4000 killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners-much the same as the loss of the Allies; but the number of prisoners and guns taken, as well as the possession of the field of battle, gave them an unquestionable right to claim the victory.-See PLOTHO, ii. 388, and CATHCART, 313, 314. VOL. II. I XL 1813. number of the best troops in Europe; and at the time the Allies attacked he was, in obedience to Napoleon's orders, actually retreating from his original position, in order to march with his whole corps to his monarch's assistance at Wachau. This caused the advanced villages to be abandoned at once; but, finding he could no longer draw off, he took post between Möckern and Entzritzch to meet the Allied attack, while Ney sent Dombrowski's division to Widderitzch to cover his right. This circumstance renders this battle, though unsuccessful, highly honourable to Marshal Marmont and the troops he commanded. Their loss, according to his own admission, was 6000.* None of the troops of the Prince Royal took any part in the action. It is evident that if the Prince Royal had done his duty, or even kept his word pledged to Sir Charles Stewart, the French army, immediately in front, must have been totally destroyed, for the force assailing them would have been doubled. As it was, the success of the Allies was mainly owing to this, that Souham's corps, which Ney had ordered up from Düben in time to have been present from the beginning of the battle, was intercepted by Napoleon on its march, and directed towards Liebertwolkwitz, which order was countermanded when he heard how hard pressed Marmont was, but not in time to allow his men to arrive on the field till the contest was decided. Thus this im1 Bout. 120, portant corps, as D'Erlon afterwards did at Quatre Bras, 121; Fan, spent this eventful day in marching and countermarching, Richter, ii. without being of real use to either army. During this xvi. 572; double battle Bertrand's corps had crossed the Elster to 288. the support of Margeron at Lindenau, and driven back Giulay's Austrians.' + 406; 237; Thiers, Marm. v. * "Mon corps d'armée perdit de six à sept mille hommes. Le seul corps d'York, d'après les relations officielles, dont les evaluations sont probablement inférieures à la verité, eprouva une perte de 5467 hommes." - MARMONT, v. 289. + "J'avais du compter sur le troisième corps de l'armée, mais le Maréchal Ney en avait disposé par l'ordre de l'Empereur, et l'avait dirigé sur la Grande Armée. Napoléon, informé de mon engagement, lui envoya l'ordre de rétrograder, mais déjà il était près de lui. Il se mit cependant en mouvement pour XI. 34. "This battle of the 16th," says Marshal Marmont, CHAP. "decided the fate of Germany. We fought that day to preserve our command of it; to liberate it from our do- 1813. mination was the object of the Allies. It remained only Decisive to combat for our individual safety. When, therefore, importance writers fix on the 18th as the day when the decisive battle. battle was fought, they are in error. It was on the 16th that the great question was decided. Napoleon having not succeeded in beating the enemy, and I having been obliged to combat one against four, even when the Army of the North, 60,000 strong, had not yet entered into the line, and the army of Prince Schwartzenberg being about to receive on the 17th powerful reinforcements under Benningsen and Colloredo, there was nothing more to be done. Our means were used up; our ammunition consumed; our corps half destroyed. We had no longer, therefore, anything to hope, and our sole thought should have been to effect our retreat in good order, to save our debris, and to regain France. Nevertheless the day of the 17th passed over in tranquillity. We were engaged only in restoring order to our troops. We should from the first moment have commenced our retreat, or at least have prepared so as to effect it at the commencement of the night. But a sort of inexplicable insouciance and fatality, difficult to conceive, seized upon Napoleon, and 289, 290. gave the finishing-stroke to all our calamities."1 1 Marm. v. It was during this battle that Sir Charles Stewart 35. Stewart's discord with wrote the first of the letters which has been quoted in the Sir Charles secret despatches to Lord Castlereagh of the 17th, and after it was over that he wrote the second, and rode over the Prince at nine at night, at Blucher's particular request, to his réunir, sans pouvoir arriver à temps pour nous secourir, et pendant cette journée decisive, ayant toujours marché d'un armée à l'autre, il ne fut utile nulle part.” -MARMONT, v. 238. It is a very curious circumstance that the decisive battle of Leipsic, and the still more decisive campaign of Waterloo, were determined against Napoleon by the same unusual circumstance of an entire corps in both cases- -Ney in the first, D'Erlon in the second-marching and countermarching, under Napoleon's orders, from one army to the other, without rendering any aid to either. Royal. XI. 1813. CHAP. headquarters to enforce the requisition contained in it personally. Bernadotte, who had promised to Sir Charles Stewart, on the 14th, that he would advance his troops on the next day by his left to Zörbig to aid Blucher, had only moved the Russians in that direction, and marched the rest of his army on the Peterberg and Oppin to their right rear-by so doing increasing, not diminishing, his distance from the Prussian marshal. On the road to his headquarters Sir Charles Stewart met an aide-de-camp of the Prince, who stated to him that he had, in consequence of his pressing solicitations, agreed to move the Russians to the left of Landsberg on that evening; but the Prussians were a march behind, the Russians and the Swedes one more behind the Prussians. In despair at this intelligence, which proved too clearly that the Prince was about to take no part in the decisive battle which was expected on the following day, Sir Charles went on to his headquarters and requested to see him personally; but as this could not be attained, he wrote the letter already quoted at half-past nine at night, couched, it must be admitted, in terms rather suited to the frankness of a soldier than the flattery of a courtier, and to which royal ears are little accustomed. It had, however, the desired effect. The Prince Royal saw that his system of procrastination and holding back could no longer be maintained, and Sir Charles had the satisfaction of learning that the head of the Northern Army, should an attack on the Allies be made, would be in its 1 Sir Chas. place at noon on the following day. They were at hand Low accordingly on that day, but the Swedes were still a day's donderry, march in rear, and took no part in the great battle of 1813, MS. the 18th. Well may Sir George Cathcart say, "The remarkable manner in which the Swedish contingent happened to find itself placed out of reach of harm, on 2 Cath. 317. this and all other occasions during the war, certainly bears more the appearance of design than of chance." " Stewart to Oct. 17, Sir Charles Stewart did not see the Prince Royal on 36. Sir Charles stormy in the Prince the 18th. the 17th, as he was engaged all day with General Blucher CHAP. in making the arrangements for the renewal of the battle XI. on the 18th. But on the morning of the latter day, 1813. having been sent by General Blucher over to the Prince's headquarters, he was desired by the aide-de-camp in Stewart's attendance to walk in, and he there met the Prince, terview with who was in a towering passion, and reproached him in Royal on warmest terms for the letters he had written to him on the 16th. "What, General Stewart!" said he "what right had you to write to me as you did? Have you forgotten that I am Prince of Sweden, one of the first generals of the age? If you were in my place, what would you think of any one who should dare to write to me as you have done? You are not accredited to me: it is owing to my friendship that you are here, and the only return you have made is to give me all this pain. Sir Charles answered in the most respectful tone, and confessing that his zeal might have carried him too far, but referred to recent events as a proof that his views as to the movements of the French had been well founded. By degrees the Prince was mollified, and he concluded at length, in a good-humoured way, "Well! do you really wish that we should be friends? Why not discuss military matters with me in an amicable way? Tell me your thoughts openly, but I beseech you do not again write to me." Sir Charles assured him of his anxious wish to assist the Swedish nation, but that he could never see their chief depart from what he knew were the true interests of his situation, without remonstrating boldly. The Prince, upon this, took his hand, assuring him of his friendship; they discussed the principal features of what had passed, and he kindly invited him to dinner two 1 Lond. 177days afterwards, to meet the Emperor of Russia and 179. King of Prussia, he being the only minister present.1 * #66 LEIPSIC, October 21, 1813. "MY LORD,-The hurry in which I despatched Mr James, precluded me from giving your Lordship an account of some occurrences with the Crown Prince of Sweden since my last despatch, No. 115, was written. I feel it essential to dis |