CHAP. XI. 1813. Both hosts remained in a state of inactivity on the 17th ; the French reorganising their army after so desperate a shock, the Allies awaiting the powerful reinforcements 37. under the Prince Royal, General Benningsen, and Count are inactive Colloredo, who were expected to come up in the course of that day. The French showed some large masses of in Both armies guise nothing from you at this moment in regard to H. R. H., inasmuch as I am firmly persuaded that nothing but the most vigilant and constant watching will impel H. R. H. to that line of conduct which he is called upon to perform. "On joining the Prince, on the morning of the 18th, from General Blucher at Breitenfeld, when dispositions were making for the attack, the general officers being with H. R. H., the aide-de-camp in waiting desired me to go into the room. On entering I was somewhat surprised to find the Prince come up to me with a look and countenance of fury. He took me to a window and addressed me, as nearly as I can recollect, as follows, but purposely in a low tone of voice, so that others might not hear it. Comment, Général Stewart! Entrez chez moi sans vous faire annoncé! Quel droit avez-vous de m'écrire? Ne rappellez-vous que je suis le Prince de Suède, un des plus grands capitaines de l'âge? Si vous étiez à ma place, que penseriez-vous si quelqu'un vous écrivait comme vous m'avez écrit ? Vous n'êtes pas accredité près moi; c'est par amitié que vous êtes ici, et vous m'avez donné beaucoup de peine. As soon as H. R. H. had finished, I answered in the most respectful manner: 'It is possible my zeal may have carried me too far, but to my own conception I could not repent one step that I had taken. I had urged the march to Zörbig, and reluctantly he had consented to it in part. I implored the forward movement to Landsberg, and H. R. H. adopted it. After General Blucher's victory on the 16th, it was my letter and prayers that made your R. H. break up, at two in the morning of the 17th, so that the head of the army is now up. Your Royal Highness may judge whether I was mistaken. The whole circumstances were known to the staff, his Ministers, and the principal officers of the army. I desired to be judged by Baron Witterstedt and General Adlercreutz and the result. I had never been deficient, to my knowledge, in respect to him; but it was beyond endurance, after acting as I had done, instead of receiving one kind word of thanks, to be met with displeasure. It is true, I was not accredited to H. R. H., but I was charged with the interests of Great Britain in the north; England paid his army, and my reports whether the army did its duty, or was withheld from it, might have an effect H. R. H. was not aware of. I was incapable of the vanity of placing my military opinions on a level with those of H. R. H., but I was not quite inexperienced, and it required very little discrimination to perceive that all our late movements were evidently departing from the combinations and dispositions of the armies; H. R. H. might recollect his own words to this effect. This was not a moment for concealment; I should speak my opinion openly and respectfully, but firmly; I never should shrink from any duty in the most painful circumstances, which, I confessed, after listening to H. R. H., this appeared to be.' "His countenance during my speech had changed, and become quite calm, and he replied, quite in another manner: "Eh bien voulez-vous que nous soyons amis? Vous savez, mon ami, l'amitié que je vous porte. Pourquoi ne pas causez ensemble de nos dispositions? Dites moi vos pensées, mais ne fantry on the high ground between Liebertwolkwitz and Wachau, and the cavalry of Latour Maubourg was displayed in one extended line, as it had been the day before; but they stood on the defensive merely, and seemed to be disinclined to commence the attack, which the Allies, as m'ecrivez pas je vous en prie en grâce.' I assured H. R. H. I was honoured by his friendship, when I considered that he was acting as became him, that if he was displeased with my letters I would write in future to General Adlercreutz, although his own invitation on my first arrival had led me rather to address him; my anxious efforts were to assist H. R. H., but I never could see him depart from what I knew were his own interests, without remonstrating, trusting it would be in a becoming manner. Upon this, he took my hand and assured me of his friendship. He went over the dispositions of the battle, and I have been favoured with great attention by him since. He asked me yesterday to dinner to meet the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, being, I believe, the only minister present. "However distressing all this has been, and however disagreeable it is for me to state it, still it is indispensable that your Lordship should know all that has passed, and I shall request his Majesty's minister at the court of Stockholm, to whom I shall give the perusal of this despatch, to obtain from Baron Witterstedt and General Adlercreutz their opinions on the line of conduct I have adopted throughout all this trying period, and I beg to be judged by them. I feel this the more necessary, as the Prince Royal might prejudice me in those quarters where it is naturally my ambition to stand highest. I will fairly avow to your Lordship, one kind word would recompense me for using my ardent exertions throughout these operations. But when the Prince has acted so unhandsomely by me, as he did at the conversation I have detailed, it is for me to do myself justice, and to call for those opinions which I flatter myself will be at least satisfactory to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent and his Government. I have the honour to be, &c., CHAS. STEWART, Lt.-Genl." In the following very curious letter the same opinion is still more energetically expressed after the battle of Leipsic :-"I am nearly dead with fagging, my dearest Castlereagh, and oppressed with a bad cold, so I shall add nothing of public events to my despatch, sent by Mr James. The news is so glorious, I can scarce think of it with common ideas. But Bernadotte is a terrible cheat, and quite artificial. Rely upon what I say, I cannot see a man in battle without seeing a little into him. Though I say it that should not say it, I feel conscious that if I had not been here the Northern Army would have played no part before Leipsic, and the Grand Army would have been beat on the 16th. I have thought it right, for fear of misrepresentation, to give you my opinions, and the conduct I have adopted officially; I am willing to be judged of, if he complains of me, by the data I can produce. However, he is as subservient to me as need be; he knows I can show him up, and therefore fears me. He has been made to play his part, however; and perhaps he is an instrument we may yet need; but I wish we were not to be the means of confirming his powers, when he has done more than enough to lose it for ever. Write to me, dearest friend, and give me some comfort, as I have had hard and ungrateful work, and I hope not to be disapproved of. Kiss my dear boy for me. Ever, in great haste, your most devoted, "To LORD VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH." (Most secret and confidential.)-MS. C. S." CHAP. XI. 1813. XI. CHAP. Benningsen and Colloredo were close at hand, had no wish to force on prematurely. Early on the morning, Napoleon, 1813. according to his usual practice, mounted on horseback and rode over the field of battle, accompanied by Murat, Berthier, and Count Daru. Many as had been the similar scenes of horror which he had witnessed in the course of his life, this exceeded them all. The French dead bodies lay in long rows as they had combated on the field of battle, but those of the Allies did the same; and those of the Russian Guard, in particular, who had stopped the charge at Auenhayn, were found in regular array, "with their back to the field, and their face to the foe." The scene was melancholy in the extreme. The troops evinced none of their wonted enthusiasm at sight of the wellknown imperial cortège. No cries of "Vive l'Empereur" were heard. With downcast looks, and weltering in their blood, they lay on the ground, breaking the mournful silence only by cries for water or surgical aid, which was not to be had. Gloom pervaded every visage, despair had seized on every heart. All felt that their efforts were in vain, and that the decree of fate had gone forth for the deliverance of Germany, and their own expulsion behind the Rhine. Ere long Napoleon dismounted, and after walking about for some time in silence among the dead 577, 578; bodies, he was the first himself to pronounce the word "RETREAT❞—a word which was on every lip, but before him none had ventured to utter.1 1 Thiers,xvi. Cath. 318, 319. 38. Extreme difficulties of Napo leon's situa tion, and ne- with Meer- Yet though his resolution, which, in truth, was unavoidable, was taken, it was no light matter to adopt it; and never, perhaps, was so terrible a sacrifice imposed on a sovereign as this measure implied. It involved not only the abandonment of Germany; the loss of the prestige of glory which had so long encircled the French arms; the relinquishment of the supremacy which France had for long exercised in European affairs; but, what was still more painful, it involved the ultimate surrender of the whole fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula; and with * XI. 1813. them of a hundred and seventy thousand veteran troops СНАР. composing their garrisons, of whom a hundred and twenty thousand were excellent soldiers ready for the field. It was heartrending to think of such a multitude of prisoners being the trophies of a single battle; their loss might endanger the independence of France itself. It is not surprising that Napoleon underwent a fearful mental strife, and hesitated long before he adopted a resolution fraught with such tremendous consequences. Yet, situated as he was, it appeared to be unavoidable, for the other alternative seemed to be still worse-that of being surrounded by an overwhelming superiority of force, and obliged to lay down his arms on the open field. In this perplexity it was with the most lively satisfaction that he learned that Count Meerfeldt, who was a military man of great talent and address, with whom he was intimately acquainted, had been made prisoner on the preceding day. At two in the afternoon of the 17th, he ordered him to be brought before Thiers, xvi. him, hoping by his intervention to extricate himself from Burghersh's his difficulties by opening a negotiation with the Allied 1813-14. powers.1† * "Battre en retraite, c'était donc à l'aveu d'une défaite ajouter une perte irréparable, perte qui était la suite d'une immense faute, celle d'avoir voulu garder jusqu'au bout les éléments d'une grandeur impossible à refaire, perte enfin désolante, quelle qu'en fût la cause. On ne peut blâmer Napoléon d'avoir consumé en affreuses perplexités la journée du 17, sans juger bien légèrement les mouvements du cœur humain. Se déclarer soi-même vaincu dans une rencontre générale, abandonner tout de suite 170,000 Français laissés dans les places du Nord, sans quelques heures de méditation, de regrets, d'efforts d'esprit pour tâcher de trouver une autre issue, était un sacrifice qu'il serait peu juste de demander à quelque caractère que ce soit. Il y avait dans le nombre bien des malades, bien des écloppés, mais il était possible d'en tirer 100,000 à 120,000 soldats excellents, qui, se joignant à ceux qui restaient, rendraient invincible la frontière du Rhin. Pourraient-ils se grouper, et former successivement une masse qui sût se rouvrir par Hamburg et Wesel le chemin de la France."-THIERS, xvi. 579. + Baron Fain, in his very interesting Memoirs, has assigned as the date of this conference with Meerfeldt, the 16th, at ten at night; and the Author, following his authority, has assigned the same date for it in his History of Europe, chap. lxxxi. § 44. Lord Westmoreland, however, since the accomplished British ambassador at the Court of Vienna, then attached to the Allied headquarters, has given the conference its true date-viz., 17th, at two P.M. The latter date is accordingly adopted by Thiers, xvi. 581, 582. The reason of 562, 581: War of СНАР. XI. 1813. 39. Napoleon's conversa tion with on a peace. 66 دو "Were the Allies aware, when they commenced the attack yesterday, that I was present personally on the field?" said Napoleon, when Meerfeldt was brought up. They were," replied the Austrian. "Then you wished to engage in a general battle?" said Napoleon. "We did," Meerfeldt rejoined Meerfeldt, firmly, "because we were desirous to bring this long struggle to a termination by a decisive battle." "But you deceive yourself as to my forces,' resumed Napoleon: "how many men do you suppose that I have?" "A hundred and twenty thousand at most," replied Meerfeldt. "You are mistaken," resumed Napoleon, "I have above two hundred thousand; and how many have you? "Three hundred and fifty thousand," replied Meerfeldt.* "I did not think you had so many; the contest is becoming very serious," answered Napoleon. Are there no means of coming to an understanding? Can we not think of making peace?" "Would to God that your Majesty would incline to it!" exclaimed Meerfeldt; "we seek for no other object from all our efforts. We combat only to conquer a peace. Your Majesty, if you had been so inclined, might have had it at Prague two months ago." "At Prague," answered Napoleon, "they did not act sincerely with me; they sought to envelop me in a fatal circle, which is a mode of proceeding I am not accustomed to. England did not wish for peace; and England led Russia and Prussia, as she will lead Austria. It is for the Cabinet of Vienna to labour for the establishment of peace if she really wishes it." "I speak without authority," rejoined Meerfeldt, " as I have no accredited mission; but I am convinced that England is sincerely desirous of peace, and stands much in need of it; and that if France would only consent to make the sacrifices which the erroneous date given by Fain evidently was to account for Napoleon's inaction during the 17th. *Both parties, for very obvious motives, were here greatly exaggerating their respective forces, immense as they were on both sides. On the morning of the 18th, however, the Allies had a great superiority; for the Allies had in all, on the north and south of Leipsic, 270,000; the French, only 180,000. |