66 XI. 1813. the happiness of the world and of France herself requires, CHAP. "Sacrifices!" expeace would be concluded to-morrow." claimed Napoleon, "I am ready to make them. Let England restore to me my colonies, and I will give her back Hanover." That, I fear, will not suffice," said Meerfeldt. "If so," replied Napoleon, "I will go farther; I will restore the Hanse towns." I 40. Had the last words been uttered at the congress of Prague, peace would at once have been concluded; but Concluded. now it was too late. The Allies had since that time obtained immense advantages; their present position promised them still greater, and they were resolved to make the most of them. M. de Meerfeldt, therefore, expressed the opinion of the coalesced Cabinets when he said, "If peace is to be made, I suspect your Majesty must consent to abandon Holland." "If Holland," replied Napoleon, "is taken from me, it will fall under the power of England, in whose hands it will become a fresh means of establishing a maritime despotism in favour of that power. know well England desires to compel me to limit the number of my vessels of war." "If you pretend,” replied M. de Meerfeldt, "to join to the already vast shores of France, those of Holland, Spain, and Italy, there is no maritime power which could equal yours; it might then be necessary to stipulate for some restriction on your vessels of war; but your Majesty, so justly tenacious on points of honour, will doubtless consent to some territorial sacrifice of countries which you do not require rather than submit to a condition, the very idea of which, I well know, must be to the last degree painful to your mind. Why not abandon Westphalia, Holland, and Italy; you can do so. without the latter falling under the dominion of Austria?" Napoleon professed himself ready to make even these sacrifices, but insisted, as a preliminary, that they should conclude an armistice.* "I will not insist personally on * Meerfeldt gave Sir R. Wilson the following account of Napoleon's conversation: "He proposed, on the condition of an armistice during negotiation, CHAP. XI. 1813. 1 Thiers, xvi. 585-587. that condition; for I know you say an armistice is part of my tactics. But much blood has already been shed, and more will soon be so. Let us, then, all retire a little; the Russians and Prussians behind the Elbe; the Austrians to the Bohemian mountains; the French behind the Saale we shall thus let poor Saxony breathe, and can quietly direct the conditions of peace." "The Allies," replied Meerfeldt, "will never agree to an armistice on these conditions, for they hope this autumn to advance to the Rhine." "Do they expect me to retire to the Rhine?" exclaimed Napoleon; "that I shall never do till I have lost a battle, which I have not yet done. I may possibly do so, for the fate of arms is uncertain; no one knows it better than you do, M. de Meerfeldt, for you came to implore peace from me at Leoben, and after Austerlitz; but that misfortune has not yet happened to me, and until I have lost a battle, I shall not retreat to the Rhine. Depart! I give you your liberty on your parole; it is a favour which I willingly accord to your merit, and to our old relations; and if what I have said to you can be of any service in leading to a negotiation, to evacuate Dantzic, Modlin, Stettin, Cüstrin, Glogau, Dresden, Torgau, and even Wittenberg; but he made some difficulty as to this latter point. He further agreed to go beyond the Saale. He said, as to terms of peace, that if England would make peace and give up colonies, he would give up Hanover, Lubeck, and Hamburg; that if she would agree to the neutrality of the flag, the independence of Holland might be arranged, and Italy be made an independent monarchy. He hesitated as to the restitution of Mantua to the Austrians, and repeated that Italy must be kept entire. Meerfeldt said that the Allies might object if Murat was to be the sovereign. He replied, that it was not necessary to anticipate the arrangements. He again and again, however, declared that he did not believe that England would make peace, or, at least, without a condition to which he would never submit-limitation as to the number of his ships of war. Meerfeldt asked him if he would give up Erfurth at this moment, as well as the other fortresses. He hesitated. Meerfeldt then said that the resignation of the protectorate of the Rhine Confederation was necessary. Buonaparte answered that it was impossible; but on being told that Bavaria had withdrawn from his protection (with which he was unacquainted, the courier from Munich having been taken), and that the other states were negotiating, he said, 'Then the protectorate of the Confederation ceases, de se.' Spain being mentioned, he observed, 'It was a question of dynasty-Je n'y suis plus-thus that question is decided.' He was inquisitive about the point on which the Bavarians were to act. Meerfeldt told him 'On that which would be most injurious to him.'"-WILSON, ii. 171, 172. or, at least, to a suspension of arms, you will find me disposed to enter into negotiations." CHAP. 1813. 41. pension of and the postponed day. These overtures were communicated to Lord Cathcart on the field the same day as the British ambassador, by which leads Meerfeldt's express desire. Sir R. Wilson, who met to no susMeerfeldt as he left the French lines, wrote out, under hostilities, a heavy fire of shot and shell, a summary of the impor- battle is tant intelligence, which he despatched by his aide-de-camp till next to Lord Aberdeen, who not being found, it was delivered to Sir Charles Stewart, who lost no time in communicating it to his Government, by whom he was specially thanked, "for his extreme vigilance and valuable intelligence." + They were laid before Schwartzenberg and the Allied generals, but they were too well aware of the advantages of their position to fall into the snare. They, therefore, returned for answer, that the proposals would be communicated to the Allied powers, and considered by them; but, in the mean time, that no suspension of arms could be granted. These events led to the basis of the negotiations afterwards opened at Frankfort. In the afternoon Schwartzenberg held a council of war in the village of Lestowitz, and after ascertaining that Benningsen could not reach Naunhof till night, that Colloredo had not yet arrived, and that nothing certain had been heard of the Army of the North, it was resolved to postpone the attack till the following day. Colloredo came up at four in the afternoon, and was stationed at Grubern. Benningsen reached Sir George Cathcart gives exactly the same account of the nature of Napoleon's proposals-viz., that he himself should retire behind the Saale, the Russians behind the Elbe, and the Austrians into Bohemia; adding, that he would not retire to the Rhine till he had lost a battle. He concurs, however, with Fain and Odeleben, in making the interview take place on the night of the 16th, and says they were communicated to Lord Cathcart next morning.CATHCART, 320. + Sir R. Wilson was much hurt at this intelligence being sent to England by Sir Charles Stewart, and his being thanked on the occasion instead of himself. But there is no foundation whatever for this complaint; for, as Sir Charles sent on Sir R. Wilson's memorandum in that officer's own handwriting, and initialed by himself, as it appears in his diary, there was, and could be, no concealment of the original source through which the information was derived. See WILSON's Diary, ii. 173, 174. CHAP. XI. 1813. Naunhof that night; and before morning it was known that some cavalry, the advanced-guard of Winzingerode's corps, forming part of the Army of the North, had arrived at Taucha, so as to be in communication with Blucher. Orders were given, therefore, for a general attack on the 319, 320 following day, and messengers were despatched to the Prince Royal and Blucher regarding their co-operation in the enterprise.1 1 Cathcart, Wilson, ii. 173, 174. 42. Prince is at length brought forward. Although, however, the advanced-guard of the Crown The Crown Prince was thus at length approaching the scene of conflict, it was not without very great difficulty, and the united exertions of all around him, that the Army of the North had been brought thus far forward, or put in a position to take any part in the approaching battle. On the night of the 16th he slept at Landsberg, and at two in the following morning, in consequence of the pressing remonstrances of Sir Charles Stewart, he broke up, and, marching slowly, on the night of the 17th he had reached Breitenfeld, still in the rear of Blucher, and about five miles distant from Leipsic. The Prussian general, how zealous soever and desirous to be ever in the front, felt the necessity of committing his lukewarm associate to a more advanced position, and insisted that his troops, fatigued as they were with the battle on the preceding day, were not so well qualified to sustain a conflict as those of the Army of the North, which had not yet fired a shot, and that they should cross the Partha and begin the action to the east of Leipsic. The Crown Prince, however, still maintained that the Army of Silesia should retain its position in the front; and upon this Blucher was so irritated that he declined the proposal of a personal conference. During the course of the day, however, various occurrences took place which altered the Prince Royal's determination. Sir Charles Stewart continued his efforts to bring him forward, and in these endeavours he was zealously seconded by Prince William of Prussia and Count Pozzo di Borgo, the accredited minister of the Emperor of XI. 1813. Russia, and an ardent supporter of his interests. The CHAP. Swedish officers of his own staff, too, whose hearts were warmed by the approach to the field of fame, where the bones of their fathers, the companions of the great Gustavus Adolphus, reposed, and whose imaginations had been fired by the accounts of the desperate passage of arms on the same ground on the preceding day in which they had borne no part, united their efforts to those of the foreign ministers, and implored him to give the Swedes, second to none in Europe for martial spirit, their deserved share in the approaching conflict. Baron Witterstedt and General Adlercreutz were particularly zealous in these representations, and their position, as the heads of the party which had placed him on the steps of the throne, could hardly be disregarded by the Crown Prince. Above all, Bernadotte himself was aware that the battle of Germany had been fought on the preceding day; that the French eagles of necessity must soon retire behind the Rhine, and therefore that there was little worldly wisdom even in irritating the victor in the hour of his triumph. Influenced by these considerations, the Crown Prince at length relented, and agreed to take a part in the ap-590, 591; proaching conflict. Blucher in his turn was, or feigned Lond. 162to be, mollified, and a conference between the two com- Grosse manders took place at nine at night, at which a joint plan 845. of operations for the succeeding day was agreed upon.1 During the whole of the 17th Napoleon remained in 1% "Nous citons le passage suivant de M. de Wolzogen qui peint ce qui se passait aux états-majors de Blucher et de Bernadotte. Les récits de M. de Muffling, témoin oculaire, sont encore plus frappants et plus amers. "Le Prince Guillaume, frère du Roi de Prusse, avait déjà auparavant décidé le Prince qui hésitait, à prendre une part sérieuse à la battaile, et avait amicalement éveillé son attention sur ce point, que l'opinion des troupes Prussiennes et Russes qui se trouvaient dans son armée lui était très-défavorable, et qu'elles allaient même jusqu'à douter de son courage personnel et de sa loyale volonté d'agir efficacement dans l'intérêt de la cause commune des Alliés. Cette confidence, ainsi que les observations du Général Adlercreutz, chef de son étatmajor général, que les Suedois, loin de rester en arrière, désiraient au contraire soutenir leur ancienne renommée sur le champ de bataille où Gustave-Adolphe avait combattu si glorieusement, passent pour avoir exercé une influence décisive sur la resolution de Charles-Jean.'"-THIERS, xvi. 591, note. 1 Thiers, xvi. 170; Die Chron. i. |