CHAP. XI. 1813. 43. Napoleon makes no preparations on the 17th. active, and apparently undecided what course to adopt until he received an answer to his proposals for an armistice, transmitted through Count de Meerfeldt. Strange to say, he made no attempt during the course of the day to throw additional arches over the branches of the Elster, for a retreat though he well knew there was only one bridge over them, leading to a defile, two miles long, across the marshes formed by that river, and that ten such bridges would hardly have sufficed for the retreat of an army of 180,000 men, with 800 guns, and chariots in proportion. This was the more extraordinary, as during the day his position was hourly becoming more critical, and the probability of his being overwhelmed by the increasing masses of the enemy every minute greater. Towards evening heavy columns were seen approaching on the road to Dresden, and Schwartzenberg's lines were visibly dispersing and extending, telling that the reserves of Benningsen and Colloredo were joining the Allied ranks, and would take part in the action on the day following. At eight, large masses were seen approaching Leipsic from the north, and at ten at night news arrived that Bernadotte had reached Breitenfeld, and might be expected to join Blucher next morning. Still the French Emperor made no dispositions whatever to facilitate his retreat through this perilous defile, though 280,000 of the best troops in Europe were soon to be thundering in close pursuit in the event of defeat. Apparently he was awaiting the result of his proposals for an armistice, transmitted 586, 587; through Count de Meerfeldt, and unwilling to take any 212; Bout.' steps indicating an intention to retreat in such critical 128, 129; circumstances. Or, possibly, the mighty conqueror could not bring himself, for the first time in his life, to retire 388-390; after a pitched battle before his enemies, and preferred all the chances of ruin to the open acknowledgment of defeat.1 1 Thiers, xvi. Vaud. i. 211, Jom. iv. 464-466; Plotho, ii. Odel. ii. 30, 31. At length, however, this state of indecision could no longer be persisted in. Midnight came, and still there XI. 1813. 44. Napoleon's sitions for was no answer to his proposals transmitted through Count CHAP. Meerfeldt. Then, and not till then, the Emperor finally resolved upon a retreat; but it was not to be one by stealth, or by gaining a march upon the enemy, but in open day, and in presence of their united hosts. At two final dispoin the morning of the 18th his final dispositions were the battle. made. These were, that the whole army was drawn back about a league from its former position, and arranged in a new one, forming a semicircle around Leipsic about two miles in diameter, having one flank resting on the Partha and the other on the Pleisse, which formed the base, as it were, of the semicircle. This position might be regarded as a great tête-de-pont to cover the bridge of Lindenau over the Pleisse and the Elster, the sole line of retreat to the army, and which must be maintained at all hazards. This new position, which everywhere faced outwards, extended from Connewitz on the extreme right, through Probstheyda and Stötteritz, which were all strongly occupied by Murat's army, to Paunsdorf, Sellershausen, and Schönfeld on the left, which last village was on the Partha, on which side, as well as on the northern suburbs of Leipsic, an attack from the united forces of Blucher and the Crown Prince, who had at last come up, might be expected. Victor's corps, with those of Lauriston and Macdonald, retired in the night from the advanced position, between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz, which they had occupied since the 16th, through Holzhausen, to Stötteritz and Probstheyda, which villages they were enjoined to defend to the last extremity. Augereau and Poniatowski took up the line from Probstheyda to Connewitz. The Guard fell back to the environs of Leipsic. Marmont's corps was drawn back to a narrow front extending from Schönfeld to Sellershausen, while Ney and Reynier, who had now come fully up from the side of Düben, completed the circle by Paunsdorf, where they joined the extreme left of Murat's army. To Bertrand, with 18,000 men supported by two divisions of the Guard, VOL. II. K CHAP. XI. 1813. was intrusted the important duty of clearing the bridge of Lindenau over the Elster, and securing the line of retreat for the army towards Lützen. Dombrowski's division held the line of the Partha from Leipsic to Schönfeld. After deducting the men lost in the battle of the 16th, the French had not more, including those who had since come up, than 160,000 men in line on this eventful day; and of these 6000 were Saxons, upon whose fidelity in the approaching crisis, it was already known, no reliance could be placed. Thirty thousand of this force, moreover, was under Bertrand, or in the two divisions of the Guard supporting him; so that, for the shock on the field, the Emperor could not rely on more than 130,000, with 780 guns. Napoleon's intention was, if the Allies did not attack, to withdraw his army slowly and gradually during the course of the day. The position of the French army around Leipsic, with its flanks secured from being turned by the Elster and the Partha, and its front so contracted as in some degree to compensate its numerical inferiority to the enemy, having the old walls of the town itself as a great tête-de-pont to cover the retreat in its centre, was undoubtedly strong, and hardly capable of being forced, when defended by the force which Napoleon had now collected upon it. But it had one frightful defect, that of having but one line of retreat for the immense number of men, guns, horses, and chariots, collected in so small a space, in the event of disaster. Thus Napoleon, who had Cathcart, achieved brilliant success at Friedland in consequence of Bout. 128, the Russians having fought there with the river Alle, i. 211, 212; traversed by only two bridges, in their rear, committed the same mistake on a greater scale himself, in the decisive battle of Leipsic.1 1 Thiers,xvi. 591-593; 322-325; 129; Vaud. Jom. iv. 464-466. 45. the battle. Schwartzenberg, on his side, made the following disAllied dis- positions. The Allied Grand Army, reinforced now by the positions for entire reserves of Benningsen and Colloredo, about 48,000 strong, was divided into three columns. That on the right, of which Benningsen received the command, composed of his own troops, Ziethen's Prussians, and Klenau's Aus Oct. 18. XI. 1813. trians, mustering in all 35,000 sabres and bayonets, CHAP. received orders to advance from Holzhausen against Murat's left, between Stötteritz and Engelsdorf. The centre, under Barclay de Tolly, which assembled near Gossa, consisted of Kleist's Prussians, with the exception of Ziethen's division, which was in the right wing, Wittgenstein's Russians, and the reserves of the Russian Guard, cavalry and infantry. It consisted of 45,000 effective men, and was to advance on Wachau, and thence to attack Probstheyda, the key of the French position, and where the greatest resistance was to be expected. The left column, composed chiefly of Austrians, under the command of the hereditary Prince of Hesse Homburg, which mustered 25,000 combatants, was to advance along the right bank of the Pleisse upon Dösen and Dolitz, while General Lederer, with an Austrian division, was to advance on Connewitz along the left bank of that river. Thus the attack of the Allied Grand Army was to be made by about 116,000 men. To the north, the armies of the Crown Prince and General Blucher were divided into two wings. The former, under Bernadotte, consisting of his own troops, with Langeron's Russians from Blucher's army, having crossed the Partha, was to advance from Taucha against Ney and Marmont, who covered the approach to Leipsic by the Wittenberg road; while Blucher, with the corps of Sacken and York, was to remain on the north of that river, and drive the enemy before him into the suburbs of Leipsic. Care had been taken to distribute the troops of the different corps and nations in this Cathcart, manner in order to excite mutual emulation, and divide Thiers, xvi. equally either the glory of triumph or the disgrace of defeat. The entire forces of the Allies were 260,000, after taking into account the heavy losses sustained on Flotho, ii. the 16th, which had been not less than 25,000 men; and Jom. iv. 164; Lond. they had the enormous number of 1385 guns-fully 600 169. more than the French, who had only 780.1 At two in the morning, after all his orders had been despatched, Napoleon mounted on horseback, and pro 327, 328; 599-601; Die Grosse Chron. i. 388-390; XI. 1813. 46. Napoleon's nocturnal visit to Ney. CHAP. ceeded towards the north, to have a conference with Marshal Ney, in his quarters at Reudnitz. He found the Marshal asleep in his tent, a trait characteristic of the imperturbable sang froid of the bravest of the brave. The ride to Reudnitz was deeply melancholy; the horizon, on every side except the west, was lighted up by the bright flames of the enemy's bivouacs; they seemed surrounded by a circle of fire. The morning was dark and lowering, with frequent gusts of rain; and already frequent explosions towards Lindenau told that the retreat had begun, and the destruction of the caissons, which could not be brought away, commenced. The Emperor conferred in private with Marshal Ney for an hour, during which he gave him minute directions as to the Grand Park, containing the whole reserve artillery and ammunition, and treasure of the army, which had been left behind between Düben and Leipsic. His orders were, if he could not get it up so as to join in the retreat, to send it back to Torgau. This done, the Emperor passed by the suburbs round Leipsic, and across the bridge of Lindenau to the Weissenfels road, where he saw General Bertrand, and gave him orders to march to Weissenfels, so as to secure the passage there over the Saale. After having made a careful reconnaissance of the bridges immediately behind Leipsic, he returned through the town, and at eight in the morning, before the action commenced, took his station on the Thonberg, near an ancient windmill, around which the Old Guard had bivouacked. Here he remained nearly the whole of this eventful day. But, strange to say, although he had so recently visited the bridge of Lindenau, and evinced his sense of the necessity of retreat by the orders given to Bertrand, he gave no orders for the construction of any additional bridges 324, 325; over the Elster.1 Nay, when Colonel Montfort of the 31; Thiers, engineers, struck with the tremendous danger of fighting with a single line of retreat in the rear, urged upon Berthier the necessity of throwing others above and 1 Cathcart, Odel. ii. 30, xvi. 594, 595. |