ixing the chain of ermike 11 å er on the Europeal swit

uns Turtle and personer m đ Den were mainly insta E mination, with al

1 Europe, not less importar
self in producing

de

in the latter, especialy dig the the immediate cause are Not that he erred in the de fas defensive position as rare mi cther military wrners of radi i on the contrary, in 15down to have been judicious Hose to retain in their allegiance the sures neieracy now ranged under is lanter awar in the heart of Germany, fr

fontiers, and to give him a strog a rom which he might at pleasure issue one of his assailants the sudden

s superior force against in. The the Allies made from deation, A Dresden in the end of Agost proves mis position had been selected by Ezreror. But after this, Lis military constare been a concatenation of the most unac

bed Experon

rs, which at length terminated in unheardsev 3y suspending the pursuit of the Allied army during the retreat to Bohemia, and halting

Caution the be was priticaly seang,

abandon Germany. At 1. Napocull el * menaced Austra deur Bohemia on his right; “NUKCIJUOS Nf the Russians and Prusand hung like a thunder-cloud over Berlin Sua al ze birth of Germany would

HAM, N BASE USLR the ine of the Sasle was not so

me The, being unsupported by was a rims. g turned from Bavaria The was from Bohemia through hap 1 $198, note.

the Young Guard at Pirna, he saved that army from de-
struction, and induced Vandamme's disaster at Culm;
by directing the simultaneous advance of Macdonald on
Liegnitz, and Oudinot on Berlin, he lost all the advan-
tages of his central situation between them, and brought
on the defeats of the Katzbach and Gross Beeren; by
lingering so long on the Elbe after these catastrophes
and that of Dennewitz had evidently rendered the posi-
tion there no longer tenable, he sacrificed 100,000 men,
without any advantages, from fatigue and famine, and
for the first time gave a decisive numerical superiority
to the Allies; by afterwards retaining 170,000 excellent
troops in the beleaguered fortresses, and engaging at
Leipsic with a force now become inferior to that of the
three Allied armies put together, he rendered inevitable
a great defeat, which was converted into total ruin by the
unaccountable mistake of fighting with a broad line of
marshes, traversed only by a single road and bridge, in
his rear.
All these errors arose from the great General
being merged in the imperious Emperor; from undue,
and, as it proved, fatal, confidence in his star; from a
determination to do everything at once, and fascinate the
minds of men by extricating himself out of apparently
hopeless difficulties by a dazzling triumph. So evidently
were these causes mainly instrumental in inducing his fall,
that one is tempted to believe that human folly as well
as greatness is made the instrument of Omnipotence in
working out its designs, and that there is much truth
in the Roman maxim,-“ Quos Deus vult perdere prius
dementat."

CHAP.

XI.

1813.

CHAP.

XL

1513

73. Immense

poleon in

this cam

or Prussia in 1806, in fixing the chains of servitude in a more hopeless manner on the European states.

But if the strenuous virtue and persevering courage of those illustrious men were mainly instrumental in tererrors of Naminating the Imperial domination, with all its host of attendant evils, in Europe, not less important were the errors of Napoleon himself in producing the same results. Indeed, it is in the latter, especially during the Leipsic campaign, that the immediate cause of his overthrow is to be found. Not that he erred in choosing the Elbe as the base of his defensive position, as Sir George Cathcart and several other military writers of much weight have supposed: on the contrary, that line appears, as already shown, to have been judiciously chosen, alike with a view to retain in their allegiance the states of the Rhenish Confederacy now ranged under his banner, to fix the seat of war in the heart of Germany, far from the French frontiers, and to give him a strong central position from which he might at pleasure issue forth and crush any one of his assailants by the sudden direction of a part of his superior force against him. The narrow escape which the Allies made from destruction, after the attack on Dresden in the end of August, proves with what wisdom this position had been selected by the French Emperor. But after this, his military conduct seems to have been a concatenation of the most unaccountable errors, which at length terminated in unheardof disasters. By suspending the pursuit of the Allied Grand Army during the retreat to Bohemia, and halting

"To abandon the Elbe was, politically speaking, to abandon Germany. At Dresden, Napoleon equally menaced Austria through Bohemia on his right; threatened to cut the great line of communications of the Russians and Prussians through Silesia in his front; and hung like a thunder-cloud over Berlin on his left. Had he retired to the Saale, all the north of Germany would have risen. Moreover, as a defensive position, the line of the Saale was not so strong against an attack in front as that of the Elbe, being unsupported by fortresses; while against a flank attack, it was as easily turned from Bavaria through the Thuringian forest, as that of the Elbe was from Bohemia through the Erz Gebirge."—History of Europe, vol. xii. chap. lxxx. § 108, note.

Beeren; by

hese catastrophes
rendered the posi

saed 100,000 men,
fatigue and famine, and
sive numerical superiority
s retaining 170,000 excellent
fortresses, and engaging at
become inferior to that of the
at together, he rendered inevitable
was converted into total ruin by the
ake of fighting with a broad line of
only by a single road and bridge, in
errors arose from the great General
perious Emperor; from undue,
confidence in his star; from a

73ng at once, and fascinate the
g himself out of apparently
adaming triumph. So evidently

DIA LLIT Istrumental in inducing his fall,
du believe that human folly a will

a munca a malf the instrument of Omnipoten in
Besigns and that there is much truth
11. A.zı Halim-Quos Deus vult podere prina

M

CHAP.
XI.

1813.

73.

Immense

poleon in

this cam

paign.

or Prussia in 1806, in fixing the chains of servitude in a more hopeless manner on the European states.

But if the strenuous virtue and persevering courage of those illustrious men were mainly instrumental in tererrors of Na minating the Imperial domination, with all its host of attendant evils, in Europe, not less important were the errors of Napoleon himself in producing the same results. Indeed, it is in the latter, especially during the Leipsic campaign, that the immediate cause of his overthrow is to be found. Not that he erred in choosing the Elbe as the base of his defensive position, as Sir George Cathcart and several other military writers of much weight have supposed: on the contrary, that line appears, as already shown, to have been judiciously chosen, alike with a view to retain in their allegiance the states of the Rhenish Confederacy now ranged under his banner, to fix the seat of war in the heart of Germany, far from the French frontiers, and to give him a strong central position from which he might at pleasure issue forth and crush any one of his assailants by the sudden direction of a part of his superior force against him.* The narrow escape which the Allies made from destruction, after the attack on Dresden in the end of August, proves with what wisdom this position had been selected by the French Emperor. But after this, his military conduct seems to have been a concatenation of the most unaccountable errors, which at length terminated in unheardof disasters. By suspending the pursuit of the Allied Grand Army during the retreat to Bohemia, and halting

* "To abandon the Elbe was, politically speaking, to abandon Germany. At Dresden, Napoleon equally menaced Austria through Bohemia on his right; threatened to cut the great line of communications of the Russians and Prussians through Silesia in his front; and hung like a thunder-cloud over Berlin on his left. Had he retired to the Saale, all the north of Germany would have risen. Moreover, as a defensive position, the line of the Saale was not so strong against an attack in front as that of the Elbe, being unsupported by fortresses; while against a flank attack, it was as easily turned from Bavaria through the Thuringian forest, as that of the Elbe was from Bohemia through the Erz Gebirge."-History of Europe, vol. xii. chap. lxxx. § 108, note.