XII. 1813. CHAP. results, the evils of a government without control. Disenchanted in the illusion of the Emperor's genius, having never had any trust in his prudence, but believing in his invincibility, it had now become discontented with his government, little reassured by his military talents, terrified at the immensity of the masses which were approaching-in a word, with its morale shaken to the foundation; and all that at the very time when it would have stood in need of the whole patriotic enthusiasm of 1792, and of all the trustful admiration of the First Consul which was felt in 1800. Never was mental depression so excessive brought in presence of peril so extreme. Most certainly, if the Allied sovereigns had been aware of a part even of these truths, they would only have arrested their victorious columns on the Rhine as long as was necessary to replenish their bread-carts and cartouch-boxes, and have marched direct on Paris the moment they arrived on the great frontier stream. But the Coalition, fatigued with its efforts, surprised with the very magnitude of the triumph which had concluded two campaigns of extraordinary severity, halted, without any real reason, on xvii. 21, 22. the Rhine; and fortune gave us a last respite before definitively going over to our enemies." 1 1 Thiers, The principal cause which contributed to this pause in military operations, without doubt, was the respect inspired by the halo of the Republican and Imperial victories, and the idea, universally diffused, of the magnitude and difficulty of any attempt to conquer France on its own territory, with which Sir Robert Wilson had been so strongly impressed, and which Lord Castlereagh so strongly contested. Great as had been the success, brilliant the victories of the two preceding campaigns, the Allies were far from being aware of the immensity of the losses sustained in the course of them by the French troops; or that, since their standards crossed the Niemen, above a million of their best soldiers had either perished or been made prisoners by the enemy. It is not surprising that they could not conceive, and would CHAP. XII. 1813. not credit, the reports received of the extent of the enemy's losses, for it far exceeded anything recorded in modern history. Add to this, that the most powerful of the Allied sovereigns were by no means inspired with the same desire to push the war à toute outrance which was felt by the Prussians, still smarting under six years of bondage and interminable contributions, and by the English, who felt the necessity of stripping of his exorbitant strength an enemy at their own door. The Russians, perfectly secured by the results of the campaign of 1812, had been desirous of halting on the Oder, and did not disguise their impression that in advancing to the Rhine, and still more in pushing their conquests beyond that river, they were involving themselves in interminable contests, with which their national interests were very little concerned. The Austrians, exhausted with a war in which they had been engaged at intervals for twentytwo years, and whose finances were in a state of extreme confusion from its effects, felt in the strongest manner the necessity of repose; and their rulers had little desire, now that the enemy were expelled from Germany, to dethrone the daughter of the Cæsars from her elevated position in Europe. Thus the greater Continental powers were strongly inclined to pause before pushing matters to extremities with France; and as it was understood that Napoleon was willing to consent to the restoration of the old dynasty in Spain, no serious opposition to an accommodation from its diplomatists was to be anticipated. The Prussians alone, writhing under the recollection of six years of bondage, were unanimous for the prosecution of the war, and the lesser states of Germany were warmly actuated by the same feelings; but their weight was too inconsiderable to overbalance that of the greater powers. 1 Sir Chas. Nothing is more certain than that by a very slight con- Stewart to cession Napoleon might have concluded a peace at this reagh, Nov. period; and he was never so near being firmly seated MS.; on the throne of France, with the Rhine and Alps for a 22, 23. frontier, as within a few months of his definitive fall.' Lord Castle 16, 1813, Thiers, xvii. CHAP. XII. 1813. Influenced by these considerations, M. de Metternich had no sooner arrived with the Allied sovereigns at Frankfort, than he proposed to them the basis on which 6. the Cabinet of Vienna was disposed to offer peace to the of the Allies French Emperor. The first proposition was that the fort by Met- sovereigns should remain united till the war was con Pacific offers from Frank ternich. Nov. 12, 1813. cluded, and that no proposals for a separate accommodation should be received by any of the powers. The second, that the entire direction of the whole armies should be intrusted to a single general, for which high trust he suggested Prince Schwartzenberg. The third was, that each power should receive, as far as possible, not a share of the joint conquests, but restitution of what it had lost, so as to restore matters as much as possible to the statu quo before 1789. In applying this principle, however, to Prussia and Austria, which had undergone such extreme changes since the war began, some modification was necessary; and what he proposed was, that the condition of each of these monarchies should be taken as it stood in the beginning of 1805, and restored to that level. In the mean time, and till the restitution was complete, the conquered provinces were to be kept in deposit by the whole Allied powers. The future war was to be divided not into campaigns, but periods, for the purpose of diplomatic arrangement. The march to the Rhine from the Vistula was to constitute the first period; the second, the advance from the river to the summit of the Ardennes and Vosges Mountains; the third, if they were con1 Mem, par strained by Napoleon to undertake it, was to terminate only with Paris itself. At the expiry of each of these periods an effort to open negotiations was to be made, on terms increasing, of course, in rigour as the victorious. armies advanced.1 M. de Met ternich, Nov. 16, 1813; Thiers, xvii. 29, 30. These proposals having obtained the assent of the Allied powers, Metternich was not long of finding an intermediate emissary who might form the channel of communication with the French Emperor. The person XII. 7. M. de Saint Nov. 12. selected was M. de Saint Aignan, a brother-in-law of M. CHAP. de Caulaincourt, and who had formerly been the Minister of France at the Court of Weimar, and an able and 1813. intelligent, and withal moderate and conciliating diplo- Proposals matist. Having fallen into the hands of the Allies intrusted to during their advance through Germany, he was brought Aignan, first to Töplitz and ultimately to Frankfort, where Metternich explained to him, in a secret and confidential interview, the intentions and wishes of the Allied sovereigns and their ministers. He assured him that Europe desired nothing so much as peace, and peace on terms honourable and acceptable to all the world; that they were well aware that France, after twenty years of victories, was entitled to be respected, and she should be so; that there was no intention of re-establishing in its full extent the ancient order of things; that Austria, in particular, was not so unreasonable as to insist upon the restitution of all its ancient provinces, but would be contented with a suitable and a respectable position; and that these moderate views were shared by the whole Allied powers. He added that, in proof of the reality of these sentiments, he was charged to offer France the extension of its territory to its natural frontier-viz., the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees-but nothing further; that it was time now to think seriously of peace, for the interests, without doubt, of Europe in the first instance, but not less for those of France itself, and for that of Napoleon most of all; that he had raised up against himself a fearful tempest, the intensity and violence of which was hourly increasing; and that if he looked closely into his own dominions, he would find that these sentiments were shared in an equal degree by his own subjects; and that if matters went on as they now were, he might ere long be as much isolated in his own country as he already was among foreign powers; that the moment had now come, and probably it would be the last, when he had it in his power to negotiate on honourable VOL. IL N XII. CHAP. terms, but that if this moment was allowed to escape, nothing would remain but the chances of a desperate and 1813. implacable war, which could be terminated only by the destruction of one or other of the contending parties; that all hopes of dividing the coalition were vain; that there were no sacrifices the powers were not prepared to make to preserve the union; that the peace they offered was tendered in good faith, and equally at sea as at land; that Russia, Prussia, and England desired it equally with Austria, for the wish to stop the effusion of blood was universal; but that above all things it was necessary to avoid the deplorable fault committed at Prague, where, from not putting trust in Austria, and not taking a decided part in time, by the lapse of a few hours the opporxvii. 31-33. tunity never to be recovered was lost of making peace on 1 Thiers, 8. from Russia and Eng land, and terms pro posed. favourable terms.1 In confirmation of these assurances M. de Metternich Similar introduced successively M. de Nesselrode and Lord Aberassurances of deen, who declared to him, on the part of Russia and pacific intentions Great Britain, that the Allies had no wish to humble or humiliate France; that they did not even desire to deprive her of her natural frontiers, for they were well aware that these were events on which it was in vain to go back; but that they were resolved beyond those limits to accord to her neither territory nor sway, nor even influence, excepting that which great states mutually exercise on each other, when they know how to use their natural advantages without abusing them. After these assurances, so solemnly given by such men, and from so many different quarters, M. de Saint Aignan had not the slightest suspicion of any insincerity, and he replied that he would faithfully recount to his sovereign what he had heard; but that it would be more satisfactory if the substance of it, and the exact terms proposed, were put into Fain, MS. a written form, about which there could be no mistake.2 Pièces Just. To this M. de Metternich agreed, and next day he delivered to M. de Saint Aignan formal written pro 2 Thiers, xvii. 32, 33; de 1814; |