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posals of peace on the basis announced, of leaving CHAP. France its natural limits, but nothing more.* With XII. these proposals the latter set out directly for Paris, where he arrived on the 14th November, and immediately laid them before the Emperor.

1813.

9.

form by

gain time.

poses Mann

seat of a

Nothing could be clearer than that these proposals were not only fair, but eminently favourable to Napoleon. They which are conceded to him, after two campaigns unparalleled for accepted in the disasters in which they had terminated, and the ma- Napoleon to terial losses with which they had been attended, terms and he promore advantageous, a territory larger, and influence greater heim for the than Louis XIV. had ever dreamt of in the plenitude of congress. his power. Nothing but the exaggerated ideas in which he had indulged, and the extravagant expectations he had formed of the dominions which he was to acquire, could have led the Emperor, in the disastrous situation in which he stood, to decline an accommodation on such extremely favourable and even unhoped-for terms. Napoleon, however, feeling that his authority was founded mainly on opinion, and that any return to reasonable propositions would be regarded as a confession of inferiority and the commencement of his fall, was in secret resolved not to accept them, and to hazard all on his favourite maxim, Tout ou Rien. As it was indispensable in the mean.

* Metternich's proposals to M. de Saint Aignan were as follows :— "1. The peace to be universal, as well maritime as Continental, and to embrace all nations.

"2. To be founded on the principle of the independence of all nations in their natural or historical limits.

"3. France to preserve her natural limits-viz., the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees-but to advance no pretensions to anything beyond them.

"4. Holland to be independent, and its frontiers on the side of France to be the subject of future arrangement.

"5. Italy in like manner to be independent, and the arrangement of its frontier on the side of Frioul with Austria, and France with Piedmont, to be afterwards settled.

"6. The old dynasty to be restored in Spain; this was a sine qua non.

"7. England to make certain restitutions of colonial possessions wrested from France beyond the seas, and a general freedom of commerce as it may be fixed by the law of nations, to be accorded to every state."METTERNICH'S Proposals, 12th November 1813; given in THIERS, vol. xvii. pp. 33, 34.

XII.

Nov. 16.

de 1814,

Thiers, xvii.

36, 37.

10. Extreme gloom and

at Paris.

CHAP. time, however, to gain time to recruit his armies, arm and victual his fortresses, and replenish his exchequer, he 1813. resolved to temporise, and amuse the Allies with an ambiguous answer. With this view, after having considered the proposals during the 15th, he returned an answer on the 16th, neither accepting nor rejecting the proffered terms, but suggesting Mannheim as the seat of the proposed conference, and professing a willingness to treat on the footing of the independence of nations both 1 Fain, MS. by sea and land. This answer was forthwith sent to 46-50; Marshal Marmont, who commanded at Mayence, with orders to transmit it without delay to the Allied generals, by whom it was received at Frankfort on the 19th.1 It was absolutely indispensable for Napoleon to go through the form, at least, of acceding to the negotiadepression tions, for the state of public feeling in Paris had become alarming in the extreme. Scarce a family but had to lament the loss of a brother or a son in the terrible wars in which, during the two last years, the empire had been engaged. Hardly anything was talked of in private society but the fearful slaughter on the fields of Leipsic and Vitoria, or the dreadful losses of the Moscow retreat. Great as had been the sacrifice of life on these melancholy occasions, it was if possible exaggerated by the voice of rumour, which, denied any official or authentic information, supplied its place by the darkest inventions of imagination. The Emperor was represented in whispers as a demon insatiate in the thirst for blood, who would, if unrestrained, sacrifice without remorse the whole youth of France to his insatiable ambition, and leave in the country only widows for whom no husbands could be found, or old men incapable of continuing the race from which they sprung. These feelings of horror were augmented by the dismal accounts everywhere received of the violence of the Government functionaries in tearing the conscripts from their families, and the pursuit of the fugitives, like wild beasts, by the movable columns.

CHAP.

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of gendarmes, which scoured the country and ransacked the woods for their apprehension. Nor were the complaints less universal of the endless exactions of the prefects and officers of exchequer charged with the collection of the revenue, by whom justice or right was systematically disregarded, and from whose decision, how iniquitous soever, there was, practically speaking, no appeal. Such was the general consternation that it began to affect the Government functionaries even of the highest grade. Every one, as in a shipwreck, was looking out for his own safety in the crash which was evidently approaching. Two of the highest and most confidential functionaries, Berthier and Cambacérès, made no attempt to conceal their apprehensions; Talleyrand and Fouché were strongly suspected of being involved in some dark intrigue; Macdonald and Marmont, with military frankness, expressed their decided opinion in favour of peace; and Caulaincourt reiterated the sentiments he had so courageously expressed on occasion of the armistice of Pleswitz. The Empress herself, devoured by apprehensions, and not know-1 Thiers, ing whether to attach faith to the assurances of her hus-42; Marband or of those around him, spent most of her time in 5, 8. tears.1

xvii. 29, 31,

mont, vi.

continuing

In the midst of this chaos of unanimity in favour of 11. peace, the Emperor held out firmly for war; and what- Napoleon's ever opinion we may form of the reasonableness of his reasons for opinions, it is impossible to refuse them the praise of for- the war. titude and magnanimity. "It is easy," said he, "to speak of peace, but it is not so easy to conclude it. Europe makes a show of offering it, but it has no sincere intention of coming to an accommodation. It has conceived the hope of destroying us; and this hope, once conceived, will not be abandoned till the impossibility of realising it has been fully demonstrated. You think we might disarm them by humiliating ourselves before them, but you are mistaken. The more accommodating you are, the more will they rise in their demands; and at

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CHAP. length they will insist on terms of peace which you cannot for a moment admit. They offer us now the line of the Rhine and the Alps, and even a part of Piedmontfair proposals, without doubt; but if you appear to agree to them, they will soon demand the frontier of 1790. Could I accept them, I who have received from the Republic the natural frontiers? Possibly there was a time when it would have been well to have been more moderate; but matters have now come to such a pass that any appearance of moderation would be ascribed to fear, and would only remove still further the prospect of a real peace. We must fight again, and fight with desperation; and if we are victorious, we should take advantage of our success to conclude a peace, and rest assured I shall then embrace it with eagerness.'

1 Thiers,

xvii. 43.

12.

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The retention of these ideas by the Emperor was Dismissal of universally ascribed to the influence of the Duke of BasMaret, and other sano (M. Maret), who was the known advocate of warchanges in like measures, and was supposed to encourage his sovetration. reign in such views. The public indignation in conse

the adminis

quence became extreme against him, and his dismissal was loudly called for as an indispensable preliminary to any sincere negotiation. No one knew better than the Emperor that the Duke of Bassano was not really in fault, that he only reflected the thoughts which emanated from the Imperial breast, and that no one could share his pensées intimes who did not hold the same opinions. But the current of public opinion ran with such violence that he felt it was necessary to make some sacrifice in order to appease it; and he determined to abandon the Duke of Bassano in order to effect this object. He was accordingly dismissed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. de Caulaincourt, whose pacific inclinations were well known, as well as his moral courage in asserting them, was substituted in his room. The Duke of Bassano was appointed Secretary to the Council of State, a post of trust and importance, though by no means to the same extent

as the one he had left. M. Daru, who formerly held that office, an able and indefatigable public servant, whose talents have since shone forth in the History of Venice was made War Minister for the materiel of the army in room of M. de Cessac, who retired. In fine, M. de Molé was appointed Minister of Justice in room of the Duke of Massa (Reynier), whose advanced years rendered him no longer equal to the fatigues of that laborious office, and who was transferred to the presidency of the legislative body. These changes were of a pacific tendency, as the new functionaries were all known to incline to a moderate

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policy, and Caulaincourt's appointment had some effect 1 Thiers, in tranquillising the public mind, and inspiring hopes of xvii. 47-49. an accommodation in the Allied sovereigns.1

13.

warlike

and vast

levies

Oct. 29.

The warlike preparations on both sides, however, underwent no diminution, and portended the final struggle Napoleon's between the forces of Revolution and those of Conserva- measures, tism and order. Before quitting Dresden for Leipsic, vi of the Emperor had directed the Empress Marie Louise to men. demand from the Senate 160,000 men of the conscription of 1815, and 120,000 more of those left from those of the years 1812, 1813, and 1814. The Senate voted the whole 280,000 without the slightest difficulty: but it was an easier matter to vote than find them in the country; and as the youths liable to the law of conscription in 1815 were in 1813 mere boys, from sixteen to seventeen years of age, they were wholly unequal to the fatigues of a campaign. Nothing was to be expected from them, therefore, but to undertake garrison duty or guard the depôts in the interior. But as the 120,000 levied on the earlier conscriptions were obviously inadequate to restore the armies to anything like the requisite strength, Napoleon fell on the device of ordering a new conscription of 300,000 men drawn from those who had been liable to the conscription in the ten years preceding 1813! This was immediately voted by the Senate, and with these 580,000 men he hoped to be able to make

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