CHAP.

head against all his enemies. Probably he would have XII. done so, if the men ordered and voted had been really 1813. forthcoming. But this was very far, indeed, from being

the case; and in attempting to enforce it, appeared in the most striking colours the fatal weakness brought upon the country by the insatiable ambition of its chief, and the real cause of its subjugation. The military population was exhausted. This conscription of nearly 600,000 men ordered did not bring 100,000 to his standards, and even they came in in small numbers, and for the most part with feeble boyish constitutions, such as would have caused them to be rejected at once in former times. The conscription for the years 1812, 1813, 1814, and 1815 almost entirely failed, and such as were got were almost all from those liable to serve in the ten preceding years. As they were for the most part married and established in life, the greatest efforts were made to evade the levy, and conceal those liable to it from the public functionaries, and thus it did not produce a third of what had been expected. The reason of this sudden and appalling failure of the conscription at this particular time was that it had now reached those who were conceived in the years 1793 and 1794, when the great levy of 1,200,000 men was made in France to withstand the Allied invasion, and when consequently the young men who should have been fathers in those years were smith's Re- almost all swept off by the scythe of war. This is a very remarkable circumstance, eminently descriptive of one of the chief causes of Napoleon's fall.'

1 Thiers, xvii. 50

52; Gold

cueil, vi. 517-586.

14.

state of the French finances.

To provide for the troops, however, even in the scanty Disastrous number in which they could be brought forward, money was indispensable; and here the weakness of the empire from another cause soon became painfully conspicuous. The expenditure of France during the latter years of the war had assumed gigantic proportions; that of 1813 had amounted to 1,200,000,000 francs (£48,000,000), independent of the cost of collection and the sums levied in name of contributions from the countries in which the

XII.

troops were stationed, which amounted to half as much CHAP. more. But in consequence of the retreat of the French armies from Germany and their expulsion from Spain, 1813. these extraneous sources of supply were at once closed, and the whole supplies for the ensuing campaign required to be raised from the inhabitants of France itself. The real cost of the campaign of 1813, with that of collection, had reached the enormous figure of 1,420,000,000 francs (£56,800,000), and the deficit to be provided for amounted to 442,000,000 francs (£16,800,000), while the credit of Government was so utterly exhausted that it was wholly impossible to raise any money by way of loan. In this extremity Napoleon had conceived and acted upon the idea of providing funds by selling the estates of incorporations and municipalities over all France, and realising the price by means of treasury bills by anticipation. This had been done to a great extent in 1811, 1812, and 1813, but even this resource had now entirely failed. The estates were all sold, and the bills granted for their price were at 20 or 30 per cent discount. Nothing now remained but the private property of the Crown, and it amounted to 135,000,000 fr. (£5,750,000), partly in different foreign banks, partly in gold in the cellars of the Tuileries, the latter of which amounted to 63,000,000 fr. (£2,520,000). This secret fund had been partly accumulated by economy on the Civil List, but for the most part was the produce of the sale of licences to evade the Berlin and Milan decrees against English commerce, for attempting to elude which he was daily exposing vast piles of merchandise to the flames, and sometimes shooting their unfortunate owners! It had been intended not so much as a resource against foreign war, on which side the Emperor anticipated little or no danger, but as a safeguard against domestic revolution, in which respect he was far from feeling the same security. It was all now applied to the exigencies of the state; but even this ample supply proved inadequate to the public necessities, now that the grand resource of foreign contributions was no

XIL

1813.

CHAP. longer available. Other devices, therefore, were indispensable; and the only practicable one was an additional assessment on real property. Thirty per cent was in consequence at once added to the land-tax, which was expected to produce 80,000,000 fr. (£3,200,000); and 120,000,000 fr. were added to the indirect taxes, in the shape of one-fifth on the salt-tax and one-tenth on the customs and excise. These taxes and levies of money were all demanded of the Senate, and voted by that body, in the course of November, without the concurrence of the Legislative body, which stood summoned for the 2d December, and from which a vexatious resistance was apprehended a strange result of a revolution undertaken to establish the constitutional rights, especially in granting or withholding supplies, of the representatives of the people. The levies and sums demanded were voted by the Senate in profound silence, without a word xvii. 53.55. of observation or dissent being uttered in the whole Assembly.1

1 Thiers,

15.

laincourt

tions the

posed at

Frankfort

on Dec. 2.

The intention of the Emperor to make a show only of M. de Cau- entering into negotiations in order to gain time was accepts with clearly evinced in the long delay which he made in sendmany exceping an answer to the Allied Frankfort proposals. They terms pro- reached Paris, brought by M. de Saint Aignan, on the 16th November. Nevertheless, it was not for eighteen days-viz., on 2d December-that a real and definitive answer was transmitted by the French Government. As already mentioned, indeed, an ambiguous answer, committing himself to nothing, had been despatched by Napoleon on the 16th inst., and received by the Allies on the 19th. To this a reply was sent on the 25th by Metternich, demanding a categorical explanation, before any negotiation could be entertained, as to whether the French Emperor did or did not accept the basis laid down by the Allied sovereigns. All this gained time till the 2d December. On that day M. de Caulaincourt sent a reply, accepting in form the basis proposed, of France retaining the fron

XII.

1813.

tier of the Rhine; but he made so many exceptions and CHAP. reservations that they amounted to an entire departure from the principle in form agreed to. This answer was concealed from Lord Aberdeen, and communicated only to the Ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia,—an ominous circumstance, which augured ill of the sincerity of Metternich. But the vigilance of Sir Charles Stewart discovered the underhand negotiation, and he sent off notice of the whole affair to his Government.* In his private instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, whom he had named as his plenipotentiary at Mannheim, the Emperor required concessions in his favour from the Allies, which amounted to an entire departure from the terms proposed, and too clearly revealed the intention to resume at no distant period the career of conquest and domination. He even insisted on the retention of a kingdom in Italy for Prince Eugene, that of Naples for Murat, and of one in Germany for Prince Jerome; on the advance of the French frontier into Piedmont; on the fortresses of Kehl opposite Strasbourg, Cassel fronting Mayence, and Wesel on the right bank of the Rhine, and on a part of Holland to the Waal being still retained by France. There could be no motive for these demands

"Dec. 8.-The answer came from France the day before yesterday (6th). The basis was accepted in the most unequivocal terms; but the sacrifices which France was prepared to make were to be met by sacrifices from England for the re-establishment of Continental and maritime independence and tranquillity. I never read a clearer or more emphatic exposition of intention or views. It made a great impression on all the first council. A messenger was sent off with the advice to Paris of the negotiation being accepted by the Allies, and of a messenger being sent to England with these tidings. At night Pozzo di Borgo was despatched. The whole transaction was concealed from Aberdeen, because it was feared he would communicate with his colleagues, who might object, and throw difficulties in the way of the pacificators. Stewart (Sir Charles) got notice early in the morning, and sent off a messenger to England with the news and copies of Jacobi's and Jerome's instructions, which he had obtained. He afterwards communicated to Lord Aberdeen and Cathcart what he had done, and there was additional strife and contention among the triumvirate. The basis, as I have already said, is the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, with the independence of Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, but without any defined arrangement for these countries."-WILSON'S Private Diary, ii. 265.

+ Caulaincourt's instructions as to what was to be demanded at the Congress

CHAP.
XII.

1813.

but the intention at the next convenient opportunity of resuming the career of conquest beyond the Rhine and the Alps, and re-establishing the French preponderance in Italy and Germany. It was evident that when such xvii. 60-63; were his secret instructions to his plenipotentiary, any show of entering into negotiations was nothing but an artifice to gain time.1

1 Thiers,

Fain, 46

57.

16.

Ruinous

1

In truth, TIME was the one thing indispensable to Napoleon, for such was the state of dilapidation in which the condition of defences of the empire were, from the security engendered fortresses. by a long career of victories, that it seemed hardly possible. to resist the masses of the enemy which threatened to over

the French

of Mannheim, were in these terms :-"En concédant qu'il n'aurait rien au delà du Rhin, il entendait toutefois garder sur la rive droite Kehl vis-à-vis Strasbourg, Cassel vis-à-vis de Mayence, et en outre la ville de Wesel, située tout entière sur la rive droite, mais devenue une sorte de ville Française. Quant à la Hollande, il ne désespérait pas d'en garder une partie en abandonnant les colonies Hollandaises à l'Angleterre. En tout cas il avait le projet de disputer sur les limites qui la sépareraient de la France, et de proposer d'abord l'Yssel, puis le Leck, puis le Wabal, frontière dont il était résolu à ne point se départir, et qui lui assurait ce qu'il avait enlevé de la Hollande au roi Louis. Il entendait de plus que la Hollande ne retournerait pas sous l'autorité de la maison d'Orange, et qu'elle redeviendrait république.

Quant à l'Allemagne, il consentait bien à renoncer à la Confédération du Rhin, mais à la condition qu'aucun lien fédéral ne réunirait les Etats Allemands entre eux, et qu'en rendant à la Prusse Magdebourg, à l'Angleterre le Hanovre, on formerait de la Hesse et du Brunswick un royaume de Westphalie, indépendant de la France, mais destiné au Prince Jérôme. Napoléon voulait qu'Erfurt fût accordé à la Saxe en dédommagement du grand-duché de Varsovie, que la Bavière conservât la ligne de l'Inn, afin de n'être pas forcé de lui céder Wurzbourg, ce qui aurait obligé d'indemniser le Duc de Wurzbourg en Italie.

"En Italie il admettait que l'Autriche eût, outre l'Illyrie, c'est-à-dire Laybach et Trieste, une portion de territoire au delà de l'Isonzo, mais à condition que la France s'avancerait dans le Piémont autant que l'Autriche dans le Frioul. Tout ce que la France avait possédé dans le Milanais, le Piémont, la Toscane, les Etats Romains, constituerait un royaume d'Italie, également indépendant de l'Autriche et de la France, et réservé au Prince Eugène. Le Pape retournerait à Rome, mais sans souveraineté temporelle. Naples resterait à Murat, la Sicile aux Bourbons de Naples. L'ancien roi de Piémont obtiendrait la Sardaigne seulement.

"Les iles Ioniennes feraient retour à l'un des Etats d'Italie, si Malte était cédée à la Sicile. Dans le cas contraire, les îles Ioniennes appartiendraient à la France avec l'ile d'Elbe. L'Espagne serait restituée à Ferdinand VII., le Portugal à la maison de Bragance. Mais l'Angleterre ne retiendrait aucune des colonies de l'Espagne et du Portugal. Le Danemark conserverait la Norvége. Enfin on insérerait un article qui consacrerait d'une manière au moins générale les droits du pavillon neutre."—Instructions Secretes de NAPOLÉON à M. DE CAULAINCOURT, Dec. 4, 1813; THIERS, xvii. 60, 61.