whelm them. CHAP. XII. 1813. The fortresses, both in the first and second line, were for the most part in a very dilapidated condition; and, by a strange perversion, eminently characteristic of the Emperor's tenacious disposition and confidence in his star, while he was surrounding with the most expensive works all the fortresses still in his possession which went to cover or secure his remote conquests, those on his own frontier, which were required to cover the territory of France itself, were allowed to remain in the most ruinous, and in fact almost defenceless, state. Thus vast additional fortifications were erected at an enormous expense around Venice, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Dantzic, Flushing, Osopo, the Texel, and many others equally remote; while those on the frontier of France itself, Huningen, Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Metz, Mézières, Valenciennes, and Lille, were in the most deplorable disrepair. It was the counterpart of the English expending fabulous sums on Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, but leaving Woolwich and London without a mound or a gun to protect them, and Portsmouth and Plymouth in a very insufficient state of security. The scarps were more or less broken down, the ditches dry, the bastions in ruins, the drawbridges incapable of use. In many there was scarce a gun on the ramparts; in all the supply was scandalously inadequate, and for the most part without carriages. Engineers and artificers skilled in their several departments were generally awanting; the officers, both of them and the artillery, were old men beyond the power of enduring active service. The Emperor's first care was to transfer the depôts of regiments from the places in the front line likely to be first assailed, to the second, which would be invested later. The National Guard supplied the place of the depôts which were removed; but the transference was a work of time and difficulty, and in many cases was only in the course xvii. 62-65. of operation when the enemy was upon them.1 But all other evils connected with the defence of France sink into insignificance compared with the dreadful mor 1 Thiers, XII. 1813. Dreadful the army on especially CHAP. tality in the regular army, from the effect of the contagious disorders which they brought with them from the German fortresses. The four corps-viz., the 4th, 12th, 7th, and 17. 16th-which were under Marshal Marmont at Mayence, and mortality in had been raised to 30,000 by the arrival of stragglers and the Rhine, isolated groups of soldiers, who were all directed, as they at Mayence. successively arrived, to that great depôt, were soon reduced to 15,000 by the dreadful mortality which took place in that scene of woe. Horror-struck with so frightful a mortality, which threatened to destroy the whole survivors of the German campaign, Marshal Marmont ordered a general and compulsory evacuation of the hospitals, and the sick into the interior. But this measure, however loudly called for by the military interests of the fortress itself, with which the Marshal was intrusted, augmented in a most alarming degree both the general consternation and the spread of the mortal malady in the adjacent territory of France. It revealed the awful proportions of a pestilence which exceeded anything which imagination itself could have conceived. The continual passage of waggons along the streets and through the gates, each charged with twenty or thirty wretches in the last stage of fever, or actually dying, diffused universal alarm, and produced that general depression of mind which, it is well known, is at once the most powerful agent in predisposing to the reception of the contagion, and the greatest aggravation of the disease when it is actually taken. This terrible disease had assumed, under the multiplication of ills in which it had originated, new and unheard-of features which froze the spectators with horror. Gangrene, even without wounds, of the most virulent kind, generally ensued, especially in the young soldiers; and as the waggons rolled along the streets, the frightful spectacle was exhibited of hands, feet, arms, and even parts of the face, dropping off the unhappy wretches who were huddled in them!1 1 Marmont, v. 2, 5; Thiers, xvii. 66, 67. The Emperor flattered himself that, by the beginning of January 1814, he would have 80,000 men on the Rhine from Bâle to Flanders; but they never, in consequence of CHAP. XII. 1813. 18. for the de fence of Holland, northern the failure of the conscription, and the mortality, amounted to anything like that number. He cast his eyes also in an especial manner on Belgium and Holland, which were likely to be first attacked, the more so as he was no Measures stranger to the disaffected feelings towards his government with which the inhabitants of those countries were inspired. Flanders, General Molitor, with a small local force, was charged with and the the defence of Holland against Bernadotte, who was ap- frontier. proaching with a powerful army, composed of the greater portion of the Allied Army of the North, now in part disengaged by the conclusion of an armistice with Denmark, to be immediately noticed. But a considerable reserve was provided in the corps of Marshal Macdonald, composed of the remains of the 5th and 11th corps, stationed about thirty leagues to his right; but his force, which was not more than 18,000 men, was a feeble counterpoise to the Army of the North, 70,000 strong. Napoleon had hoped to cover this frontier by the garrisons of Dresden and Hamburg, which were, taken together, of equal strength; but the insane policy of retaining everything deprived him of this resource till it was too late, and lost France 70,000 veteran soldiers at a time when the whole armies that could be collected for her defence hardly amounted to a greater force. It will immediately appear how important a part Sir Charles Stewart played in the measures which deprived, Thiers, the Emperor of those powerful reserves, which, if thrown xvii. 69, 70; into the scale at the decisive moment, would probably have 49. altered the whole fate of the war.1 Koch, i. 47 19. tion of the of the Em The principal reliance of Napoleon for resisting the numerous enemies who were preparing to invade his terri- Reorganisatories on all sides was on the Guard, that formidable body Guard, and whose discipline and valour had determined the issue of entire forces so many other battles. But that body itself was almost peror. as much reduced as the other corps of his army; its infantry consisted only of 12,000 men, its cavalry of 3500 -the poor remains of 48,000 of the former, and 12,000 of the latter, which four months before had crowded the CHAP. XII. 1813. banks of the Elbe. The Emperor made the greatest possible efforts to restore its strength, and for that purpose he intrusted its reorganisation mainly to General Drouot, who, with no other formal appointment than the modest one of aide-de-camp, really exercised in reality great part of the duties of war minister for the Guard. His indefatigable energy, calm determination, distinguished military talents, as well as integrity of mind, raised him to that consideration in moments of difficulty with the Emperor, which the simplicity and military frankness of his manners rendered him little capable of securing in the precincts of a court in ordinary times. With the assistance of this able coadjutor, Napoleon expected to raise the Guard, including the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, to 100,000 men; but it never reached a half of the number, and they were procured with extreme difficulty, and only by drafts from the regiments of the line, which went far to destroy their efficiency. The vivid and sanguine temperament of the Emperor led him to hope that he would have 100,000 of the Guard and 200,000 of the line in the field by the beginning of February. He never had, in point of fact, above 90,000; but with these he did such great things that little doubt can remain, that if the force he hoped for had been raised, he would have proved victorious over all his enemies. If the 80,000 old soldiers under Suchet, engulfed in the garrisons of Spain, had been united to the standards of Marshal Soult, and brought up for the defence of the capital, the Allies never would have approached it; if the 90,000 lost in the garrisons of the xvii. 71-79. Elbe had been brought into the field, the French troops would have marched in triumph to Munich and Berlin.1 Sensible, when it was too late, of the enormous fault he Treaty of had committed, when threatened in his vitals by a powerwith Ferdi- ful enemy, in leaving his best troops uselessly scattered in nand VII. blockaded fortresses all over Europe, Napoleon at length brought himself to propose terms of accommodation to two of his enemies whom he had long held in captivity. 1 Thiers, 20. Valençay The XII. 1813. first of these was Ferdinand VII. of Spain, who had been CHAP. retained a prisoner in France, at Valençay, ever since his treacherous seizure, in 1808, by Napoleon, at Bayonne. To that monarch the Emperor, by a secret emissary, proposed terms of peace, which, being regarded as a snare, were at first viewed with extreme suspicion by him; but having at length been convinced of their sincerity, he eagerly embraced terms which promised him restoration to freedom and a throne. There was no difficulty in arranging the terms when the sincerity of the offer was first trusted in. Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos, with all their followers at Valençay, were to be restored to liberty; prisoners were to be restored on both sides; the Spanish armies were to withdraw from France, and the English to be constrained to evacuate Spain. This last condition, which would doubtless have been a great stroke for Napoleon if carried into effect, was rendered nugatory by the Cortes at Cadiz, in whose hands the Government was practically placed, refusing to ratify the treaty so long 1 Thiers, as Ferdinand remained in France. This led to a delay in xvii. 80-92; the negotiation, and before the captive monarch could 89. regain his own territories, Napoleon was overthrown.' Bign. xiii. 21. Pope, and Murat. Shortly after, Napoleon, in the same view of diminishing the number, or abating the rancour, of his enemies, endea- Treaty of Napoleon voured to contract a treaty by which the aged Pontiff of with the Rome was to recover his freedom, and be restored to the of the chair of St Peter; but it came too late, the Holy Father Allies with would not negotiate; nor, if he would have done so, would it have made any material difference in his fortunes. At the same time M. de Metternich entered into a secret correspondence with Murat, the object of which was to induce him to abandon his brother-in-law and protector, and take part with the Allies, who guaranteed him in that event the retention of his throne of Naples. The virtue and honour of Joachim were not proof against so tempting an offer; he did not imitate the example of Eugene, to whom, as already mentioned, a similar offer had been |