XII. 1813. monstrating in the most decided manner against it; and he had authority enough, much against the will of the latter, to get the proceeding stopped. This wise and energetic course had the effect of preventing the convention altogether, and Davoust was ultimately obliged, by the fall of the French empire, to surrender at discretion with all his forces.* Thus was the selfish design of the Crown Prince again thwarted by the intrepid and manly conduct of the British minister, and an auxiliary force wrested from Napoleon, which, if thrown into the scales when they hung, as will immediately appear, almost even 1 Lond. 210, on the plains of Champagne, might have rendered nuga-211; Thiers, tory all the efforts of the Allied powers for the deliver-121. ance of Europe.1 120, to a counter Holland. The important advantage thus gained by the vigour 25. and moral courage of Sir Charles Stewart, was soon Which leads followed by another directly flowing from it of hardly revolution in less importance. Hamburg being blockaded, and the Danes being compelled to submit, Bernadotte had no longer any excuse for retaining his whole forces in inactivity in Westphalia and the north of Germany; and he was constrained to obey his orders to detach a portion, at * The letter addressed by Sir Charles Stewart to the Crown Prince on this occasion was as follows:: " HANOVER, 16 Novembre 1813. "MONSEIGNEUR,-Permettez moi de vous addresser deux lignes au moment même de mon départ; le sujet est selon moi d'une grande importance, et j'ose croire que Votre Altesse Royale me permettra d'exprimer les sentimens de la Grande Bretagne sur une considération militaire dans laquelle elle doit prendre le plus grand intérêt. Selon toutes les probabilités, le Danemarc sera avec nous et le Maréchal Davoust perdu. S'il retournoit en France par aucune capitulation, je prévois la tache la plus funeste à la gloire militaire de l'Armée du Nord: ce serait de transporter ce corps de Davoust d'un endroit fatal où il sera perdu et de le mettre encore en bataille contre les Alliés. Mon Prince ! vous m'avez comblé de bontés; soyez bien persuadé c'est à votre gloire, à vos intérêts personnels, que je pense. Je repondra si de l'opinion de mon pays. C'est avec une peine sensible que je viens d'entendre, d'après la manière que Votre Altesse s'est exprimée envers moi, hier au soir que le Général Walmoden a reçu de nouveaux ordres à cet effet. Pardonnez moi, je vous en supplie, si je me suis porté trop loin. Je n'ai fait que mon devoir en réitérant les opinions de mon gouvernement; et désormais, je laisse tout avec confiance à votre sage et digne décision. J'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre Altesse Royale le plus dévoué des serviteurs, CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-Général.” LOND. MS. XII. 1813. vii. § 57. CHAP. least, of his army towards the Dutch frontier. He was, however, to the last degree reluctant to participate in any actual invasion of the French empire, for fear of injuring the prospects of succeeding to its throne which he had never ceased to cherish since the half promise of being promoted to it on the fall of Napoleon, already mentioned, made to him by the Emperor Alexander 1 Ante, ch. during the conference at Abo in 1812.1 He did not approach the Dutch frontier accordingly with any considerable part of his great army, but merely detached General Bulow with his corps towards it. The mere rumour, however, of the approach of this auxiliary force had the effect of producing a counter-revolution in Holland, attended with the most important results to the Allied cause. General Molitor, who commanded the French forces in that quarter, had only under his orders a motley assemblage of 6000 men, composed of Swiss, Spaniards, Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, with only 3500 French, and little reliance could be placed on the fidelity of the auxiliary force. Unable to face the corps of Bulow, which was greatly superior, in the open country, the French General withdrew his force from Amsterdam, and stationed it at and near Utrecht to guard the important line from Naarden to Gorcum. No sooner did the French troops withdraw than a crowd assembled in the streets, shouting "Orange Boven!" and bearing aloft the flag of that much loved house. In the twinkling of an eye the counter-revolution was effected, the barracks of the douaniers and police burned, and provincial authorities in the Allied interest everywhere established. This example was speedily followed in Leyden, the Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and all the cities of Holland. Everywhere the French authorities were dispossessed and the Dutch ones re-established; and the whole fleet, excepting that of Admiral Missiessy in the Scheldt and Admiral Verhuel in the Texel, hoisted the Dutch colours. Shortly after the Prince of Orange made his entry into Amsterdam, in the midst of the unanimous Nov. 15. CHAP. xvii. 123. XII. transports of the people, who excited unanimous admiration in Europe by their exclaiming after long live the Prince of Orange, the words, "What is past is forgotten 1813. and forgiven." To take advantage of this propitious movement, which he had reason to believe was in a great measure shared in Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and other cities of the Low Countries, Lord Castlereagh proposed to the British Cabinet to send 6000 men, under Sir Thomas Graham, who had recently returned loaded with laurels from the Peninsula, to the Scheldt, which was immediately done, and led to important results. At the same Thiers, time, he transmitted such vigorous remonstrances, at the 120instance of Sir Charles Stewart, to the Emperor Alexander, as to the conduct of Bernadotte, who openly boasted that he was no longer to follow in the wake of the Allies, but would pursue his own designs against Denmark, that the latter sent positive orders to him to abandon his separate hostilities against Denmark, and draw near with his great army to the Low Countries. Bernadotte did not venture to disregard altogether the distinct orders of his patron, by whom he expected to be elevated to the throne of France; and he was obliged to move towards the Flemish frontier. He did this, indeed, as tardily as possible, and with the utmost desire to keep his troops out of action; but still they were, much against his will, brought nearer to the scene of strife, and part of them, as will hereafter appear, being seized upon by the vigour of Lord Castlereagh, interposed with decisive effect in the last stages of the campaign.* As much as the mind of Lord Castlereagh, ardent and "Les nouvelles de la contre révolution en Hollande excitait les passions Britanniques, et fit déterminer le gouvernement Anglais à décisives résolutions. Sur-le-champ on prépara des renforts destinés à la Hollande; on fit donner au Général Graham, aux généraux Prussiens et Russes l'ordre de marcher tous ensemble sur Anvers, et on adressa de vives représentations à Bernadotte, afin qu'il cessât de s'occuper du Danemark, et se portât avec toutes ses forces sur les Pays-Bas, s'en fiant à la coalition du soin de lui assurer la Norvége qu'on lui avait promise. Enfin on adressa à Lord Aberdeen de nouvelles instructions relativement aux bases de la paix future.”—THIERS, xvii. 124. So sensible was the Prussian Government of the vast services rendered to 1813. 26. Castlereagh proposed at CHAP. energetic, but withal calm and reflecting, was charmed XII. with this unlooked-for counter-revolution in Holland, was he disconcerted by the terms proposed by the Allied Dissatisfac- Sovereigns to the French Emperor at Frankfort, and tion of Lord Napoleon's reply discovered and sent to him, as already at the terms mentioned, by Sir Charles Stewart. His objection was Frankfort. founded on one consideration, but it was an all important one, that these terms left ungained the main object of the war, which was "security for the future." By leaving to France the line of the Rhine, which included Antwerp, the Scheldt, and Flushing, as well as the whole of Flanders, the grand object of his ambition was secured to the French Emperor, for he was maintained in a salient point from whence he could at any time menace the independence of Great Britain. It was the same thing to England as it would have been to Russia, if France was left in possession of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, or to Prussia if Saxony and Magdeburg were left in the hands of the French. The instructions to Lord Aberdeen had left him at liberty to adhibit the adhesion of Great Britain to the terms proposed at Frankfort, if they met with the concurrence of the other Allied powers, even though it had been from the first evident that the interests of England had been less consulted than those of the other powers in the terms of accommodation then proposed. But since these terms were offered in the middle of Norember, the march of events had been so rapid as to call for a change in the conditions that were to be insisted on. The long delay of Napoleon, from November 16th to December 2d, in making any answer to the basis proposed by the Allies, sufficiently proved that he was striving only to gain time, and had no real intention of coming to an accommodation. Add to this, the counterthe common cause by Sir C. Stewart in thus bringing forward Bernadotte at so critical a juncture to take part in the important operations on the Rhine, that on December 4th, after he had come up from the Army of the North to Frankfort, agreeably to his orders, Prince Hardenberg transmitted the orders of the black and red eagle of Prussia, with the letter already given. XII. 1813. revolution in Holland, and known ferment in the Belgic CHAP. provinces, which afforded reasonable grounds for the hope that Mr Pitt's favourite project of uniting Flanders either to Prussia or Holland might at length be realised, and its splendid fortresses, instead of being the outworks of France against Europe, might be the barriers of Europe against France. Influenced by these views, Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Lord Aberdeen, his ambassador at Frankfort to the Austrian Court, underwent a considerable modification; and he directed him to urge a continuation of the war, unless France was restricted to the limits of 1790, and the clause proposed regarding the maritime rights was withdrawn. He was instructed, however, to make no demands for the dethronement of Napoleon, or any change either in the dynasty or form of government in France; alleging as a reason, that having once undertaken to treat with Napoleon as Emperor of the French, there would be a dishonourable breach of faith in urging any conditions inconsistent with that position. In the event of the fleet at Antwerp falling into the hands of the Allies, he offered on the part of the British Govern- 1 Lord ment to purchase it from them; and Lord Aberdeen was reagh's ininstructed in particular to assure M. de Metternich of Lord Aberthe disposition of the British Cabinet to support Austria deen, Nov. in every reasonable demand, and in return to press upon MS., and the Cabinet of Vienna the formation of a powerful state ix. 74; in the Low Countries extending from the Texel to Brussels, 125, 126. and including Antwerp. 1 * The result showed that Lord Castlereagh had correctly These important instructions, which had so material an influence on the ultimate issue of the contest, were as follows:-"I trust we may feel assured from the last accounts that Metternich has no idea of a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations, even should a basis be agreed upon. Either of these expedients is deprecated here in the strongest manner. The former is now happily out of the question, by the act of the Dutch nation, to which we are parties; and the offer made by France, in August, to negotiate without a suspension of arms, renders it easy to decline a proposition which would protract discussion till the armies of France were again prepared to take the field. "You will not be surprised to learn after such a tide of success that this nation is likely to view with disfavour any peace which does not confine Castle structions to 13, 1813, Thiers, xvii. |