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CHAP.

XII.

1813.

27.

generally acceded to

divined the "form and pressure of the times," and the disposition of the Allied Cabinets in proposing to them these modifications of the Frankfort proposals. Ideas Which are were much changed since these terms were forwarded by M. de Saint Aignan to the French Emperor. The modifications of the British Foreign Minister soon commanded universal assent. The Emperor Alexander was fired by the idea of entering Paris in triumph and avenging the conflagration of Moscow by the capture of the French capital. Count Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican by birth, and a determined enemy of Napoleon, who had great influ

by the Allied

Cabinets.

France within her ancient limits. Indeed peace with Buonaparte on any terms will be far from popular, distrusting, as the people naturally do, his submitting to his destiny for any length of time; but you will perceive that these opinions have not turned us from ourselves. We still are ready to encounter with our Allies the hazards of peace, if peace can be made on the basis proposed satisfactorily executed; and we are not inclined to go out of our way to interfere in the internal government of France, however much we might desire to see it placed in more pacific hands. But I am satisfied we must not encourage our Allies to patch up an imperfect arrangement. If they will do so we must submit; but it should appear in that case to be their act, not ours. I am aware that the internal difficulties of the Confederacy are great; but once dispersed, to reassemble it will be impossible. We must therefore labour to render it effectual to its purpose now, and your last reports encourage me to hope that such will be the result. The revolution in Holland is itself a new feature in the war, and the fall of Dresden a great accession of strength.

"I must particularly entreat you to keep your attention upon Antwerp. The destruction of that arsenal is essential to our safety. To leave it in the bands of France is little short of imposing on Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war establishment. After all we have done for the Continent, this war they owe it to us and to themselves, to extinguish this fruitful source of danger to both. Press this as a primary object of their operations, and in order to render the value of the fleet, if taken or destroyed, more available for their present expenses, we shall be ready to pay them immediately in credit bills, which they can now realise as advantageously on the Continent as a bill upon the treasury.

"I hope my correspondence has latterly convinced you that we do justice to your exertions, and to the conduct of your Court. When we write, we both naturally take our tone from the circumstances, not as then existing, but as known to us. Thus, when I was fretting about the Elbe, and the apprehended indecision of Austria, the Allies were laying the solid foundation of all their subsequent glory, and Metternich was performing miracles both in negotiations and his armaments. You may assure him that I will not fail him in the long run, however, I may complain when the wheel is not moving. There is no preference in any quarter which ought to give him umbrage, but some management which may keep the Russians more cordially at his back. He has behaved in the most loyal manner to us since we became friends, and he shall see in our arrangement for the ensuing campaign, that we do him justice."—LoRD CASTLEREAGH to LORD ABERDEEN, November 13, 1813. MS.

XII.

1813.

ence with the Czar, did his utmost to inflame these ideas, CHAP. and incessantly asserted that the example of Holland would speedily be followed in Belgium and France if the Allied standards were only advanced into their territories. The Prussians cordially entered into these sentiments, and inflamed by hatred at the French, and burning with the desire to wipe out the disgrace of Jena by planting their standards on Montmartre, their old general, Blucher, openly boasted that if they would give him leave he would penetrate with his single army to Paris. The Austrians, though more reluctantly, at length entered into the same views; and, as nothing was proposed hostile to the reigning dynasty, were not insensible to the advantages which they might derive from the distressed condition of France in regaining their ascendancy in Italy. Influenced by these ideas, the sovereigns unanimously adopted the views of Lord Castlereagh, and resolved to prosecute the war without relaxation, until terms more favourable than those announced in M. de Caulaincourt's tardy acceptance of M. de Saint Aignan's proposals were obtained. M. de Metternich accordingly, on December 10, returned a reply to the answer of M. de Caulaincourt of December 2, stating that France had been very tardy in returning an answer to the Frankfort proposals, but that, nevertheless, he would communicate it to the Allied Cabinets. No mention was made, however, of a suspension of the military movements or the arrest of the advance of the Allied troops, which was soon resumed with vigour at all points. Thus were the Frankfort proposals, which were eminently neglectful of the interests of Great Britain, indefinitely adjourned, and they were not thereafter resumed. This was a most important crisis. in the war, for England now for the first time acquired the lead in the negotiation with France, which she never afterwards lost. It is impossible not to be struck with the important part which the two brothers who form the subject of this biography took in this great struggle, and it is difficult to say to which the palm in winning

CHAP.

XII.

1813.

this important position for their country is to be awarded. For Sir Charles Stewart, by his energy in forcing up Bernadotte with the Army of the North, mainly contributed to the decisive victory of Leipsic and expulsion of the French from Germany. Again, by his stubborn resistance to the capitulation of Hamburg, which would have restored Davoust with 30,000 veterans to Napoleon's ranks, he essentially contributed to weaken the defences of France; and no sooner were these successes gained in the field than Lord Castlereagh took advantage of them in the Cabinet, and by boldly interxvii. 127, posing and throwing the weight of England into the Castlereagh scale, stopped proposals disadvantageous to her interest, and gained the lead in the negotiation, which ultimately ended in the treaty of Paris and overthrow of Napoleon.1

1 Thiers,

129; Lord

to Lord

Aberdeen, 1813, Ms.

Nov. 13,

28.

Forces of

the Allies,

the cam

paign.

The forces with which the Allies could commence this fresh phase in the war, though nominally half a million and plan of of men, were in reality not a half of the number. Independent of the casualties of war and the ravages of typhus, which were in some places nearly as great as those of the French army, an immense force was absorbed in the blockade of the numerous fortresses still in the hands of the French on the Elbe and the Rhine. The army of Prince Schwartzenberg cantoned from Frankfort to Bâle, amounted to 130,000 or 140,000 men, and that of Blucher, which lay between Frankfort and Coblentz, to 70,000 or 80,000 more; and this was but a small force to attempt the invasion of a country defended by such a bulwark of art and nature as the Rhine. Of Blucher's army not more than 50,000 was composed of Russians and Prussians who had gone through the German campaign; the remainder being made up of Wirtemberg, Hesse, and Baden troops, whose steadiness in battle was yet to be proved. Counsels were much divided at Frankfort as to the course which should be pursued in invading France. The Prussians were clearly of opinion that their army should be reinforced from Schwartzenberg's to the

CHAP.

XII.

1813.

extent of 180,000 men, and that the push should be made across the Rhine, between Coblentz and Mayence. From thence, without attempting to reduce any of the fortresses in the triple line which there guarded France, they proposed to advance with the whole force direct on Paris. Schwartzenberg and the Austrian generals were strongly opposed to this course. They represented, and with reason, the extreme danger of getting the main invading army involved in a network of fortresses, none of which could be reduced without a regular siege, and which, nevertheless, absolutely required either to be blockaded or taken if the communications of the army were to be kept up. To direct the invasion in this quarter, they maintained, was, literally speaking, "to take the bull by the horns." They observed that the really defenceless side of France was that from Bâle to Geneva, along the line of the Jura, where, as no hostile incursion had ever been anticipated, no defensive preparations whatever had been made. By throwing the weight of the invading army upon this quarter, and limiting Blucher's operations to a powerful diversion, the whole triple line of fortresses would be turned and taken in rear; and the Allies might advance to Paris without endangering their communications, and without the necessity of observing a single fortress, except Huningen, on their road. These considerations, which were obviously well founded, were sufficiently weighty in themselves; and accordingly they received, though with considerable difficulty, the assent of the Allied sovereigns, and it was resolved to attempt the invasion in this way. No account was taken in these arrangements of any immediate co-operation from Bernadotte's army, as it was thought that it would be sufficiently employed and usefully engaged in completing the counter - revolution in Holland, and reducing the formidable fortresses in the Low Countries which lay between that country and the Thiers, French frontier. The weight of Lord Castlereagh, who xvii. 130, in this particular was entirely in accordance with Sir 137. Charles Stewart, was thrown on these important delibera

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133, 135,

CHAP.

XII.

1813.

29.

Double in

vasion of

Switzerland and Cob

lentz.

tions in favour of the more cautious plan of operations proposed by the Austrian generals; and it was by his influence that the resistance of the Emperor Alexander, who was in favour of the bolder counsels of Marshal Blucher and his own generals, was at length, though not without great difficulty, overcome.

To carry this plan of operations into execution, it was necessary to pass the bridge over the Rhine at Bâle, and France from in so doing violate in a corner the neutrality of the Swiss territory. The Emperor Alexander was very nervous on this subject, both from a respect amounting to veneration for those mountain asylums of freedom inspired in him by his Swiss preceptor, La Harpe, and from a dread, by an act of violence, of weakening the strong current of general feeling now setting in in his favour. He insisted accordingly on everything being done which could soothe the feelings and flatter the just patriotic feelings of the Swiss. These precautions were attended with more than the desired effect. On the 21st December the advanced-guard of Prince Schwartzenberg presented itself before the barriers of the bridge of Bâle, and the Swiss officers in command making a pretence of yielding to irresistible force, abandoned the post, and the Austrian troops poured over in great strength. Immediately upon intelligence being received of this event, a revolution broke out at Berne in favour of the Allies, and the whole low country of Switzerland fronting the Jura was occupied

Dec. 23.

* "Tout en flattant, dans le sein de la coalition, le parti ardent qui voulait détruire jusqu'à la dernière les œuvres de la Révolution Française, il flattait en même temps les Polonais, les libéraux Allemands et Suisses. Il était ainsi contre-révolutionnaire avec les uns, libéral avec les autres, par calcul autant que par mobilité; cependant il penchait alors vers les idées libérales, par opposition au despotisme de Napoléon, et par l'influence de son éducation. Elevé en effet par un Suisse, le Colonel Laharpe, ayant eu à sa cour pour l'éducation de ses sœurs des gouvernantes de même origine, il avait écouté leurs supplications, y avait paru sensible, et avait déclaré qu'il ne laisserait jamais accomplir en Suisse une contre-révolution."-THIERS, xvii. 136. With all his acuteness and impartiality the French historian cannot separate the cause of revolution from that of revolutionary conquest; or see that the same principles which lead to the support of freedom in the outset of its career conduct to the resistance of democratic despotism when it has reached that stage in its close.

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