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CHAP.

X.

1813.

numerical force, for, notwithstanding the losses of the preceding day, they would, when Klenau came up, be above 140,000 strong; but this slight advantage was more than compensated by the distraction arising from three separate commands, the jealousies already beginning with ill success between the armies, the discouragement arising from repeated defeats, and the disadvantage of toiling round a wide circumference, while the enemy's attacks from its centre might be suddenly directed at pleasure against any part of the line. This disadvantage, already sufficiently great, was enhanced by the state of the weather on the following day, which, charged with thick mist, and at intervals heavy rain, at once prevented the movements of the enemy around the walls from being seen till they were close upon the Allied outposts, and Odel. ii. prevented the firearms from going off when the charges of Bout. 29-31; the cuirassiers, emerging through the blue mist, were upon 301, 302. them.1

1Lond. 119;

255, 256;

Thiers, xvi.

of the

24.

The disposition of his troops, made by the Emperor at daybreak on the 27th, was as follows: The right wing, Disposition under Murat, composed of the infantry of Victor and the French cavalry of Latour Maubourg, was stationed in front of the troops. Lobda barrier, in the level meadows, stretching along the banks of the Elbe towards Priesnitz, in a situation admirably adapted for the action of horse; the centre, under the Emperor in person, included the corps of Marmont and St Cyr, with the infantry and cavalry of the Old Guard in reserve; on the left Ney had the command, and under him the four strong divisions of the Young Guard, with Kellermann's horse, were massed on the banks of the Elbe beyond the suburb of Pirna, and completed the concave armament round the city. Napoleon's plan was to act vigorously on either wing, in each of which he had placed 40,000 disposable troops, and to stand on the defensive in the centre, under the shelter of the formidable redoubts, the strength of which had been so severely tried on the preceding day. He had there concentrated the

CHAP.

X.

1813.

1 Thiers, xvi.

303, 304,

Vaudoncourt, i. 114;

St Cyr, iv.

110, 111;

Lond. 114.

25.

whole artillery of the Guard, consisting of a hundred pieces. It was a matter of impossibility, or at least of extreme difficulty, to defeat 120,000 men with 600 guns, under such a leader, and so placed. But in the event of any considerable disaster being incurred, their situation. was perilous in the extreme; for they fought with their backs to the Elbe, traversed only by two bridges, and their faces towards France, having between them and it a mass of 140,000 men occupying their whole communications, and cutting them off at once from all supplies or reinforcements from the Rhine. The Allies, if defeated, were hardly in a less perilous predicament, for they fought, cut off from their magazines and resources, with their faces to the Elbe and the Vistula, and directly in their rear, if they sought to regain Bohemia, was Vandamme with his corps occupying the principal pass through which they had issued, and prepared to offer the most decided resistance to an attempt to get through. Never were two great armies in a more extraordinary situation, and never did two commanders play a great game with more audacity and resolution.1

On their side, the Allies made the following disposiDisposition tions, some of which were faulty in the highest degree: of the Allies. On their extreme right Wittgenstein commanded his Rus

sian veterans, who stood on the road to Pirna. Next to him was Kleist with his Prussians between Gruna and Strehlen. In the centre was Schwartzenberg, with the Austrian corps of Colloredo and Chastellar, and Bianchi's grenadiers in reserve; while beyond the deep ravine of Tharandt, on the extreme left, were placed Giulay's Austrians and Metzko's division of Klenau's men, the only one which had come up. But a fatal error was committed in the latter part of these dispositions. Not only was the left of the line, consisting of level meads, intrusted to Metzko's men, who were the youngest and least effective part of the Austrian army, but there was a vacant space stretching from the foot of the heights of Wolfnitz to Priesnitz,

X.

1813.

which was left wholly unoccupied, being intended for the CHAP. remainder of Klenau's men, who were yet on the march, and must arrive exhausted with fatigue. This was the more reprehensible, that the troops that were placed there were on level ground eminently favourable for the action of cavalry, that they stood in front of the formidable cuirassiers of Latour Maubourg, 12,000, strong, the very best horse in the French army, and that, if they had been drawn back half a mile to the rear, or not pushed across the steep defile of Tharandt, which separated them 1 st Cyr, i. from the main army, they would have been in safety. The entire force of the Allies was 140,000 men; 20,000 having been left in the bourhood of Pirna to watch Vandamme, who had reached 304, 305. that point with nearly 40,000 men.1

111, 112;

perfect Bout. 32 about Vaud. i. 154, 155; Jom. neigh- iv. 390, 391;

Thiers, xvi.

Napoleon was not the man to fail to turn to the best 26.

ment of the

27th.

account the faults of his adversaries and his own advan- Commencetageous position. After supping with the King of Saxony, battle on the he spent the night in the midst of the bivouacs of the Old Guard, seated near a blazing fire, dictating orders to his generals, which were of the most luminous and precise description. The onset was to be made by the two wings, which were strongly reinforced for that purpose, and a cannonade only to be kept up in the centre to engage the enemy's attention and distract it as to the real object of attack. The designs of the French Emperor were seconded to a wish, by the thick mist and drizzling rain which fell all day, and completely concealed the movements of his troops from the enemy. Jomini urged the Allied sovereigns to accumulate their force on the enemy's left, and cut off Poinatowski and Vandamme, who were at Zittau and Pirna, from the rest of the army. But though this measure promised great results, it was contrary to Schwartzenberg's ideas, which were entirely rested on the project of separating the French right from its communications with Torgau and Leipsic. Meanwhile, Klenau's men had only in part come up, and such as had

CHAP.

X.

1813.

done so were excessively fatigued and in very bad order a state of things of all others the most perilous in presence of the enormous mass of French cavalry which lay in their front, concealed by the mist. The better to conceal his designs, Murat caused Victor's infantry to occupy the village of Löbda, in their front, from whence they advanced in columns, supported by a formidable artillery, as if for a direct onset. Meanwhile, when the enemy's attention was fully occupied with this attack, the cavalry turned the Austrian extreme left flank, and drew up almost perpendicularly to their line. Suddenly, when the fire was warmest in front, Murat's horsemen, 12,000 strong, burst through the mist, and enveloped Metzko's division, which was next. Notwithstanding the suddenness of the onset, the Austrians rapidly threw themselves into square, and steadily withstood the repeated charges of the formidable French cuirassiers. Seeing this, Murat ordered a squadron of lancers to form the front of the column and lead the charge. The lancers broke down the line of infantry, and made an aperture through which the cuirassiers, rapidly following, poured 1Thiers, xvi. in and filled the square. The whole division was either Cath. 225 cut down or made prisoners. A brigade of the division 227 Bout of Maurice Lichtenstein, sent up to their support, shared Cyr, iv. 111, the same fate. In a quarter of an hour the whole iv. 391, 392; left wing of the Allies was broken, 30 guns taken, and General Metzko, with 60 officers and above 10,000 privates, were made prisoners.1

313, 314;

32, 33; St

112; Jom.

Marmont, v.

153.

27. Mortal

wound of

the centre.

While this decisive success was gained on the French left, a heavy fire was kept up from the French centre, and Moreau in several charges of cavalry took place with various success, chiefly intended to distract the attention of the enemy, and divert them from the real point of attack. The Austrian batteries, however, placed on the heights of Raecknitz and Scharnitz in a concave semicircle, and on higher ground, replied with advantage to the French fire, and several of their charges of horse were repulsed with great

X.

gallantry by the Russian cavalry of the Guard. One dis- CHAP. charge, however, from a battery of the Guard produced very serious consequences. A French column, supposed 1813. by Jomini to be a part of the Young Guard, but in reality one of St Cyr's divisions, was approaching, and an attack was expected. The rest must be given in the words of an eyewitness. "The Emperor of Russia," says Sir George Cathcart, "in conversation with Lord Cathcart and General Moreau, the one on his right, the other on his left, was riding slowly along the front towards the right, where this intended attack seemed likely to take place, between Raecknitz and Strehlen; they turned directly to the front, attracted by a movement of Russian cavalry. At this instant a cannon-shot struck Moreau, who at the moment might have been half a horse's length in advance of the Emperor, on the right leg, and, passing through the horse, shattered his left knee. The horse plunged forwards about thirty yards and fell dead. reau, though suffering great torture, said to those hastened to extricate him from his wounded horse, the Emperor that I am willing to sacrifice my limbs his service, for his cause is just.'" 1

Mo

who

Cath. 229,

1

230; Thiers,

Tell xvi. 314,

315; Lond.

in 115.

28.

ordered.

The Emperor of Russia rode at once to the spot where Moreau was lying, and caused the Cossacks of his guard A retreat to make a litter for his removal by putting their pikes' through some cloaks. He was then carried off, suffering great pain, which he bore with heroic constancy for some days, when he expired, to the great grief of the Emperor and the whole army. After he was removed, the Emperor turned his horse and proceeded at a slow walk, conversing with Lord Cathcart, to the high ground to the right of Strehlen, to superintend an attack which had been ordered by Barclay de Tolly, with the reserve, on Ney's wing, which, in pressing on through the low grounds between the Gross Garten and the Elbe, had exposed its flank. On his way he met Jomini, who had been sent with the order to Barclay a short time before, and now returned

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