CHAP. XII. 1814. 43. Napoleon Caulain Allied quarters as plenipoten tiary. received at the Allied headquarters, Napoleon, on his part, yielding to the necessities of his situation, and desirous of gaining time to recruit his armies, was taking steps, without awaiting the formalities of a congress, for re-establishing negotiations: His first intention was to sends M. de have sent the Duke of Cadore (M. Champagny), an able court to the diplomatist, well known to the Austrian Government, as headhe had been for several years ambassador at Vienna before he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs in France. Yielding to the same considerations, however, which had induced the British Government to send Lord Castlereagh to the scene of diplomatic action, and well knowing the weight which M. de Caulaincourt's name and understood pacific inclinations would have with the exalted personages there assembled, he determined at length on despatching the foreign minister in person. M. de Caulaincourt accordingly set out on the 5th Janu-Jan. 5. ary for the Allied headquarters, and directed his steps to Luneville, a place already remarkable for the signature of the first treaty which interrupted the revolutionary war between France and Austria. Arrived at the foot of the Vosges mountains, he met the French not encumber ourselves with anything that can bear the appearance of an initiative on such a question on the part of the Allies. I have always felt this as applied to our own interests, and that we cannot press our demands to the utmost if we are, at the same time, mixed in a question which, in so far as relates to the internal government of France, supersedes all terms. He also thinks, for the interest of the Bourbons themselves, that it is a question of doubtful policy, to say the least, whether they would not lose more than gain from showing themselves, in the first instance, in the British camp, or in that of the Allied sovereigns. He seems to dread that great question being ineffectually stirred, and anxious that the Allies should not be encumbered with it, or responsible for it. In other respects I should not despair of his concurring with the other Allied Powers in turning any public effort the French nation may make in this sense to a good account. It is painful and not fair to the Bourbons, that their hands should be tied while Bernadotte's are free; but why should they not pursue their views in some quarter which does not locally and in appearance mix them with us? The Emperor of Russia, in the affairs of Switzerland, influenced by Laharpe, countenances the popular party: Austria is favourable to the ancient order of things, all happily hostile to France. Metternich has the merit of getting over the obstacle of neutrality. It is desirable these tracasseries should transpire as little as possible, at least to the Government of England, and especially the Emperor's égarements about Bernadotte, which I hope to dissipate." - LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD Liverpool, Bâle, 22d January 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 185, 186. CHAP. XII. 1814. Jan. 7. 1 Thiers, xvii. 194196. 44. armies in full retreat. The woeful countenances and pitiful condition of the men; the numerous stragglers and deserters from the ranks, especially among the young conscripts; the alarming diminution of the old soldiers, who were still clustered around the eagles; the growing audacity of the royalists, who appeared in numbers which had never been anticipated-struck him with astonishment and consternation, how much soever habituated to similar scenes during the last German campaign. He lost no time in writing to Napoleon, informing him of all he had seen, communicating the discouragement of the marshals and generals, the evidently hopeless state of affairs, and conjuring him to send him authority to sign terms of peace more likely to be acceptable to the Allied sovereigns than he had hitherto done. At the same time he wrote to M. de Metternich, expressing his astonishment at his silence, so difficult to understand after the acceptance of the basis communicated through M. de Saint Aignan, and announcing that, to cut short all delays, he had come in person to the Allied advanced posts to forward the negotiation, and if possible conclude a peace.1 The receipt of this letter, and the arrival of M. de Embarrass Caulaincourt at Luneville, occasioned no small embarrassde Metter- ment to M. de Metternich; for after the repeated and ment of M. nich and fortunate arrival of Lord Castlereagh, solemn declarations the Allied sovereigns had made of their desire to conclude peace on reasonable terms, they could hardly refuse to enter into negotiations based on the professed acceptance of the Frankfort conditions. To gain time Metternich replied that, as England was now sending its foreign minister to the Allied camp, until his arrival it was impossible to assign any place, or fix any basis, for the opening of negotiations. In reality, however, matters had essentially changed since the Frankfort terms were proposed, and the Allies were far from being unanimous as to the specific terms to be offered in pursuance of the general basis. The rapid and easy entrance of the Allied armies into France by Switzerland, the conquest, without resistance, of nearly a third of France, the dejected state and miserable condition of the wasted armies retiring before the Austrian and Russian standards, the repeated victories of Wellington in the south, had all inflamed the imagination, and seemed to authorise the insisting on very different terms from those proposed when the Allied troops were still behind the Rhine. At the same time opinions were much divided on the details of any proposed arrangement. Alexander, who had never got over the forcible entry into Switzerland, inclined to support the liberal side on every question; while Austria inclined to the aristocratic. The former contended for the cession of Norway to Sweden, and of Saxony to Prussia, which Metternich resisted as an invasion of vested rights. The Tyrolese loudly demanded to be restored to their beloved Kaisar, while Bavaria claimed an indemnity if obliged to cede them; England insisted chiefly on founding a kingdom in the Low Countries, which might shut out France from the Scheldt and Antwerp and Austria hesitated to sanction that erection till secured of England's support of her against Russia. Add to this that the Emperor of Austria, who was sincerely desirous, for the sake of his daughter and grandson, of preserving the throne of France for Napoleon, had lately addressed an autograph letter to the French Empress, conjuring her to intercede with her husband to accede to the terms proposed, and, in the event of his doing so, promising him his entire support in the Allied councils.* Thus, in the moment of general success, and "Chère Louise,--J'ai reçu hier ta lettre du 12 Décembre, et j'ai appris avec plaisir que tu te portes bien. Je te remercie des vœux que tu m'adresses pour la nouvelle année; ils me sont précieux parce que je te connais. Je t'offre les miens de tout mon cœur. Pour ce qui regarde la paix, sois persuadée que je ne la souhaite pas moins que toi, que toute la France, et à ce que j'espère que ton mari. Ce n'est que dans la paix qu'on trouve le bonheur et le salut. Mes vues sont modérées. Je désire tout ce qui peut assurer la durée de la paix, mais dans ce monde il ne suffit pas de vouloir. J'ai de grands devoirs à remplir envers mes alliés, et malheureusement les questions de la paix future, et qui sera prochaine, je l'espère, sont très-embrouillées. Ton pays a boule CHAP. XII. 1814. СНАР. XII. 1814. amidst the greatest apparent triumphs, the Coalition was a singularly fortunate circumstance that at this critical juncture, when the alliance was in such danger, the obstinacy of Napoleon precluded the possibility of negotiation on practicable terms; and the arrival of Lord Castlereagh communicated to the Allied councils the weight 1 Thiers, arising from decision of conduct tempered by suavity of manners, and inflexibility of purpose guided by wisdom of thought.' xvii. 197, 198. 45. Stewart's the opposite armies at this period. The condition of the Allies in a military point of view, Sir Charles at the time when Lord Castlereagh first joined them account of at Bâle on the 18th, is well described in a letter of Sir Charles Stewart to his Lordship, dated Bâle, 17th January 1814: “Marshal Blucher has taken 3000 prisoners and 25 guns since his passage of the Rhine on 1st January. Marshal Marmont has been under the necessity of making the most rapid forced marches to prevent the Silesian army getting into his rear by the Vosges mountains. In his retreat he has broken down all the bridges over the Saone, but Marshal Blucher is pursuing him. The accounts of the confusion and disorder in France are universal. The assembling of the conscripts is very slow; those that are brought together want arms and all equipments. There seems nothing now more certain than that the Allied armies can march to Paris when they will. Two-thirds of the old French soldiers that crossed the Rhine are either dead or gone into the hospitals. All the versé toutes les idées. Quand on en vient à ces questions, on a à combattre de justes plaintes ou des préjugés. La chose n'en est pas moins le vœu le plus ardent de mon cœur, et j'espère que bientôt nous pourrons réconcilier nos gens. En Angleterre il n'y a pas de mauvaise volonté, mais on fait de grands préparatifs. Ceci occasionne nécessairement du retard jusqu'à ce qu'enfin la chose soit en train: alors elle ira, s'il plaît à Dieu. Les nouvelles que tu me donnes de ton fils me rejouissent fort. Tes frères et sœurs allaient bien d'après les dernières nouvelles que j'en ai reçues, ainsi que ma femme. Je suis aussi bien portant. Crois-moi pour toujours, ton tendre père, FRANÇOIS." -THIERS, xvii. 200, 201. XII. 1814. general officers and men of experience say that no resist- CHAP. ance can be made. Prince Schwartzenberg was still at Vesoul on the 15th. The enemy were collecting at Langres, and the Prince Marshal was preparing to attack them if they remained there, which I much doubt. He had made his dipositions for this purpose, and his forces may amount to about 165,000 men. The line he occupies, however, is a very extended one. If the enemy had force to take advantage of it in any one point with collected 1 Sir Chas. means, the main Russian army, under Barclay de Tolly, Stewart to will be ready to support Prince Schwartzenberg's offensive reagh, Bale, movement. Detachments have been left at Geneva and 1814; Fort l'Ecluse. The Simplon and St Bernard are both ix. 173. occupied." 1 Jan. 17, Cast. Cor. amount of forces, and rate situa The sanguine anticipations of Sir Charles Stewart as 46. to the rapid termination of the war, and the ease with Small which an advance might be made to Paris, seemed on the Napoleon's point of realisation by the first events of the war when his despe hostilities were resumed. Having made his first arrange- tion. ments, assembled his last reserves from all the depôts in the interior, and deeming the time come when, by a concentric retreat, he had accumulated forces so in a central position, that he might hazard a blow at his pursuers, he dispatched the Pope to Savona from his place of captivity at Fontainebleau, conferred the regency during his absence on Marie Louise, and after a touching scene in the Tuileries, where he intrusted the Empress and his son to the protection of the National Guard at Paris, set out for the army. He arrived the same evening at Jan. 25. Chalons-sur-Marne, where he encountered the crowds of fugitives who were flying before the approach of the enemy. His reception by them was varied and chilling : some exclaimed, "Vive l'Empereur!" others, "A bas les droits réunis!" (Excise). He hastened to the headquarters of the marshals, whose forces exhibited a woeful picture of the exhaustion and perils of the empire. The united corps of Victor, Marmont, and Ney only presented |