CHAP. XII. 1814. Metternich, and they soon found that their ideas were so consentaneous that the best understanding was established between them. Lord Castlereagh represented to them, that although he feared it would be difficult to have a lasting peace with Napoleon, yet he was decidedly of opinion that they should treat with him, that England had no concern with the questions of dynasty which might arise in France, and that at this very moment she was dissuading the Bourbons from attempting a landing in France; that she would apply herself in good faith to bring about a peace, but that if Napoleon refused the terms offered him, it would become necessary to be done with him, and that, as in that case, the throne of France would become vacant, Austria, guided by a conservative policy, enlightened as to the character of Bernadotte, would prefer the Bourbons to that adventurer who sold so dear services of so little value. Lord Castlereagh met with a cordial response to these views in the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, who hastened to reply that not less than England, Austria was bound in honour to negotiate with Napoleon, and from a regard to her own character would do so; but that if he still resisted and would not listen to reason, they concurred in opinion that it would be necessary to break at once with him; that the proposal of a regency of the Empress Marie-Louise for behoof of the King of Rome appeared an illusion, and not a serious project; that the idea of giving the throne to Bernadotte was only a passing dream of Alexander, and if carried into execution would be a reproach to all the world; and that if Napoleon was overturned, there would nothing remain but the Bourbons. Thus, a complete accord was established between Great tereagh to Britain and Austria, by the wisdom and prudence of Lord Sir Charles Castlereagh, on the most momentous and dangerous topic Feb. 4, under consideration, and all the obstacles to the negotia- and Thiers, tion, and which threatened disunion among the Allied 241. Powers, removed. In effect, Metternich at this period 1 Lord Cas Stewart, 1814, MS., xvii. 238 CHAP. XII. 1814. 57. reagh's pro separate in Great Bri tain, and sion by the Allies. had come to be more afraid of Russia than France, and he was too happy to draw closer the bonds of amity with Great Britain on that account. During these momentous discussions Lord Castlereagh Lord Castle was not unmindful of the separate interests of Great jects for the Britain, and the means of giving her future security, so terests of violently threatened by the results of the revolutionary war. For this purpose he broached, in confidential contheir admis- versation with the Emperor Alexander and M. de Metternich, three projects which tended to the great object of his solicitude, and had instigated him to undertake the Walcheren expedition. The first of these was the creation of a new kingdom in the Low Countries, to embrace the whole united seventeen provinces, which had been severed by the Reformation, and thereby Flanders rendered the battle-field of Europe, and to bestow it on the House of Orange, in return for which Holland was to cede the Cape of Good Hope to Great Britain. The second was a marriage between the Prince of Orange and the Princess Charlotte, heiress of the Crown of England. By this means he hoped that Antwerp and the Scheldt, so essential to the security and independence of Great Britain, would be not only severed from France, but placed under the safeguard of a powerful state of the second order, containing six millions of inhabitants necessarily dependent on England, and now united with it by the closest ties. As this implied a great sacrifice on the part of Austria, to whom the Flemish provinces formerly belonged, he expressed his willingness to concur in the permanent annexation of Venice to that power, ceded to it by Napoleon in 1797 by the treaty of Campo-Formio. The third point upon which he insisted, was silence on the maritime law, and Napoleon's favourite doctrine that the flag should cover the merchandise; a principle which Lord Castlereagh regarded as depriving Great Britain of the chief advantages of her acknowledged maritime superiority. As this last proposal was in direct opposi XII. 1814. 1 Thiers, xvii. 236, tion to the principles of the armed neutrality for which CHAP. Russia and Prussia had contended in 1780 and 1800, it might have been expected that it would meet with a serious opposition from these powers; but such was the ascendancy which Lord Castlereagh had acquired in the Allied Councils, and such the sense entertained of the incalculable services which Great Britain had rendered to the common cause during the war, that the whole proposals were acceded to by the whole Allied Powers, and Feb. 8, became the groundwork on which the treaties of Vienna, Cor. ix. 245. in the next year, were mainly rested.' 237; Lord Castlereagh to E. Thornton, Esq., 1814; Cast. secret effort poleon to fair terms. Passionately desirous of inducing the French Emperor, 58. if possible, to consent to a negotiation on reasonable Metternich's terms, M. de Metternich, before the plenipotentiaries met to get Naat Chatillon, sent forward M. de Floret under pretence of negotiate on procuring lodgings for them in that town, but in reality to explain to M. de Caulaincourt the terrible dangers which Napoleon ran if he let slip this the last opportunity he would ever have of negotiating on fair terms. He enjoined M. de Floret to say, "that if he had not as yet spoken on the subject of an armistice, in answer to the demand for it by the French Emperor, it was because he was sure that no such demand would be listened to by the Allied Powers; that he had kept the secret, therefore, and would keep it for those by whom it had been intrusted to him; that the wish of the Allies was for peace, but that immediately, and on the conditions. which would be offered; that he had no reason to distrust the English, for they were the most moderate of all ; and that it would be well worth his while to show confidence in them, and especially in Lord Aberdeen, who was strongly inclined to pacific measures; that the present occasion for negotiating should not be allowed to escape, for if once lost it would never be regained; that if the terms proposed were rejected, the Allies would abandon themselves to ideas of conquest, to which Austria, even while regretting them, could make no resistance; that CHAP. XII. 1814. 1 Thiers, xvii. 243247. 59. the Emperor Francis in such an event would be in despair for his daughter, but he would not on that account be less faithful to his Allies with whose wishes the great interests of the Austrian empire were wound up, and to whom the Emperor was under great obligations; that he implored his son-in-law to reflect on these things, and resign himself to the sacrifices demanded by circumstances; that in doing so he would be only following the example set to him by the Emperor of Austria, who had been obliged repeatedly to make great sacrifices of late years, but he had done so, and in consequence had now regained the position he had lost; that the Emperor of France might learn from this example that it behoved him to yield to necessity, and so avoid great and irreparable misfortunes." No formal propositions were intrusted to M. de Floret, but the terms of this communication sufficiently proved that the terms of Frankfort were no longer to be adhered to. The Emperor of France paid no regard to this advice, even although the Austrians pressed the Allied Council to halt at Langres to give time for the negotiation to be seriously entered upon. The doubtful issue of the battle of Brienne and the victory of La Rothière, however, put an end to any such projects for an armistice, by proving the determination of Napoleon to put all again upon the hazard of the sword.1 The plenipotentiaries arrived at Chatillon, as agreed Instructions on, upon the 3d and 4th February. The instructions to to the Brit- the British commissioners, precisely in terms of what tentiaries, has been already mentioned, had been agreed on between minary con- the Allied Powers on the advice of Lord Castlereagh, ish plenipo and preli ferences. and the terms agreed on were insisted on by all the commissioners in common.* They were perfectly simple, so far as France was concerned the empire was to be reduced to the limits of 1790, without either influence or *The instructions of Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart, were substantially the same as are contained in his letter to Mr Thornton of February 8, 1614, already given, ante, chap. xii. § 55, note. XII. 1814. dominion beyond it. The real difficulty remained be- CHAP. hind what was to be done with the ample spoil which in that event would remain to the Allied Powers, and how were their rival claims and pretensions regarding it to be adjusted? Before the formal sittings commenced, which was on the 7th February, several meetings of a Feb. 7. social character took place between the commissioners, in the course of which, amidst the most studied respect shown by them all to M. de Caulaincourt, whose noble and intrepid character had inspired them with unfeigned respect, opportunities were found for confidential conversation, especially between him and Lord Castlereagh. The English plenipotentiary on this occasion took the utmost pains to convince M. de Caulaincourt of the sincerity of his desire to come to an amicable arrangement; and, such was the influence of his calm deportment and simplicity of character, with perfect success. "The most reasonable of all," says M. Thiers, "were the English commissioners, above all Lord Aberdeen—a rare model of simplicity, with a mild gravity, the true representative of a free state. Lord Castlereagh, who took no ostensible part in the negotiations, but directed them all as a master, astonished M. de Caulaincourt by his pacific assurances and protestations of sincerity. He insisted so strongly and so often on the resolution taken to treat with Napoleon, that he succeeded at length in persuading M. de Caulaincourt that he was really sincere, and that Great Britain was waging a war for self-preservation and security, not in the interest of the fallen dynasty. Lord Castlereagh repeated incessantly that if they could agree on the basis of the treaty, peace might be concluded in 1 Bign. xiii. half an hour. But he did not specify what this basis 308 Fain, was to be, and his silence in this important particular xvii. 288, was justly regarded by Caulaincourt as of sinister omen ii. 234. for the ultimate fate of the negotiation." Metternich, who soon became strongly impressed with the talents and moderation of Lord Castlereagh, wrote at 327; Thiers, 289; Koch, |