her territory, that the Allies had no intention of curtail- "Count Stadion.-I think our first question is clear. "M. de Caulaincourt now read a note of the manner in which he endeav, oured to explain himself to-day, and observed: I have already said France would make great sacrifices to arrive at peace. I wish to know-1st, Those sacrifices; 2dly, The use they would be put to; 3dly, To accept them, and stop the war. “M. de Humboldt answered these three points in detail, and with ability. "Count Stadion.-We come certainly to make peace. 46 'M. de Caulaincourt.—If I adopt your propositions, will it bring you immediately to peace, and make you state the compensations you will give? "Lord Aberdeen.-We will consider of this. “M. de Caulaincourt.—If you will permit me to adjourn for a few hours to reflect, I shall esteem it as a personal favour. "This was consented to. "The plenipotentiaries met again in the evening at eight o'clock; and M. de Caulaincourt produced a note, and read it, which was as follows :— "Séance du 7 Ferrier, 1814. "Le plénipotentiaire de France renouvelle encore l'engagement déjà pris par sa Cour de faire pour la paix les plus grands sacrifices: quelqu'éloignée que la démande faite dans la séance d'aujourd'hui au nom des Puissances Alliées soit des bases proposées par elles à Frankfort, et fondées sur ce que les Alliés eux-mêmes ont appellé les limites naturelles de la France, quelqu'éloignée qu'elle soit des déclarations que toutes les Cours n'ont cessé de faire à la face de l'Europe, quelqu'éloignées que soient même leurs propositions d'un état de possession analogue au rang que la France a toujours occupé dans le système politique, bases que les plénipotentiaires des Puissances Alliées rappellent encore dans leur proposition de ce jour; enfin, quoique le resultat de cette proposition soit d'appliquer à la France seule un principe que les Puissances Alliées ne parlent point d'adopter pour elles-mêmes, et dont cependant l'application ne peut être juste, si elle n'est point réciproque et impartiale, le plénipotentiaire Français n'hésiterait pas à s'expliquer sans retard de la manière la plus positive sur cette demande, si chaque sacrifice qui peut être fait, et le degré dans lequel il peut l'être, ne dépendaient pas nécessairement de l'espèce et du nombre de ceux qui seront demandés, comme la somme des sacrifices dépend aussi nécessairement de celle des compensations. Toutes les questions d'une telle négociation sont tellement liées et subordonnées les uns aux autres, qu'on ne peut prendre de parti sur aucune avant de les connoître toutes. Il ne peut être indifférent à celui à qui on demande des sacrifices de savoir au CHAP. XII. 1814. CHAP. XII. condition of 1790, should not all the other states at the same time do the same? Should not Austria restore 1814. Venice, and both she and Prussia abandon what they have obtained by the annexation of the lesser ecclesiastical states; and both they and Russia give up what they have since acquired by the last partition of Poland ? Should not England on the same principle surrender the Ionian Islands, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Isle of France? To compel France alone to return profit de qui il les fait, et quel emploi on veut en faire; enfin, si en les faisant on peut mettre tout de suite un terme aux malheurs de la guerre. Un projet qui développerait les vues des Alliés dans tout leur ensemble remplirait ce but. Le plénipotentiaire Français renouvelle donc de la manière la plus instante, la demande, que les plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées veuillent bien s'expliquer positivement sur tous les points précités.' "When, on reading this instrument, they came to the words 'les limites naturelles de la France,' Count Stadion interrupted him, and said, 'I cannot let that pass unnoticed; Prince Metternich never admitted that expression to M. de Saint Aignan.' "M. de Caulaincourt. — Whatever M. de Saint Aignan had heard from Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, and Lord Aberdeen, is on record; M. de Saint Aignan, after the conference, wrote it down. His paper was read and re-read by Prince Metternich, and alterations made in the handwriting of the Prince; I have this document to show. I do not cite it or enter into discussion on it to provoke dispute, but to prove he was justified in using the expression objected to. "Lord Aberdeen said that he had animadverted strongly on these expressions with Prince Metternich; that as to what passed with M. de Saint Aiguan he objected in the strongest manuer to that part of his minute relative to the maritime question; that, however, he thought it a wholly unimportant document, and forbore to alter any part of it, lest such alteration should show that he approved of it; that he would now give in at the next séance a detail of what passed, with his notes, for the French plenipotentiary's information. "M. de Caulaincourt. -I did not bring this forward to embarrass, nor is it my object. I did not cite the basis then, and observe on the different one now proposed, to create discussion; I wished only to establish our text. "Count Razumowski.—I have no knowledge of the document alluded to; there is nothing about it in my instructions. M. de Caulaincourt proceeded to read his paper, which, on some discussion, was agreed to be styled neither a declaration nor a note, but a 'proposition.' "M. de Caulaincourt.-As the Allied paper is to stand on the protocol, I think mine should do so likewise. This was agreed to. "Count Stadion.-The Allied plenipotentiaries will take the French plenipotentiary's paper ad referendum. "M. de Caulaincourt.-I am much surprised we are not now to proceed. When shall we have another conference? "Count Stadion.-We cannot name the time, but we will acquaint you when we know and are ready." -Protocol, Séance, 7 Fevrier, 1814; MS. Castlereagh Papers. The CHAP. XII. 1814. within her ancient limits is not to restore the balance of power, but to destroy it, to serve the purpose of the states which are now coalesced against that power. real strength of France is to be found in the courage, energy, and military spirit of her people; and to deprive her of a large portion of the territory she has acquired, is unnecessarily to insult, but not really to weaken her. Doubtless anything might be demanded in the name of victory, and that argument cuts short all discussion; but in that case you must cast to the winds the insidious words made use of in crossing the Rhine, and openly admit that the conduct of the Allied Powers was to be regulated by force, not reason. France would then know what she had to expect from her invaders, and act accordingly. Nor is this all. Why demand in a mass enormous sacrifices from France, without announcing what is proposed to be done with the territory wrested from her, or determining anything as to the Low Countries, the Rhenish provinces, the Swiss and Italian frontiers, when so many important questions remained to be resolved? How is it possible to demand the cession of such extensive territories without at the same time specifying to whom they were to be conveyed? Would not their being added to a great Power instead of a small one make a material difference in the balance of power? To demand their cession without saying to whom they are to accrue, was an unjustifiable proceeding, which would hardly be justified if the invaders had their feet on the neck of France, and if unhappily this might one day be the case, it was not so as yet. Finally, if it is determined by its representative to make a painful sacrifice, it would only be on condition of an immediate cessation of hostilities—1 Thiers, in fact, to avoid a battle for life or death, and cover xvii. 292, Paris. It is out of the question to propose such sacrifices Feb. 7, unless an assurance is given that, once acceded to, the Cast. Cor. enemy would immediately suspend their advance.1 It could not be denied that there was much force in 293; Prot. 1814, MS. CHAP. 1814. 64. representa tives. these able observations, which made a skilful use of the imprudent declaration of the Allies at Frankfort, relative to the wish of the Allies to leave France great and powerAnswer of ful, and to restore matters to such a state as might be the Allied safe and honourable to all parties. They all felt, though none cared to mention it, that the conquest of one-third of France since those propositions were made, and the advance of the Allied standards into the heart of its territory, justified the Allies in now demanding more rigorous terms than when that barrier stream had not been crossed, nor the real weakness of the empire revealed. It was difficult, however, to state such a consideration without weakening the moral effect arising from the moderation of the Frankfort proposals, and possibly awakening a national resistance in France, which it had gone far to allay. The Allied representatives accordingly answered, through Count Stadion on the part of Austria, and Lord Aberdeen on that of England, that this reference to the Frankfort proposals was beside the question; that they were not to discuss the proposals made then, but those made now at Chatillon; that it was on them, and not the preceding ones, that they were to decide; that they had no power to discuss the proposals now made, but simply were authorised to propose them, and require a categorical answer, yes or no; and if the answer was in the negative, they must prepare for an immediate rupture of the conferences, and a war of life or death. M. de Caulaincourt, finding the Allied commissioners thus 1 Koch, ii. resolute, and that he was required to give either a formal Thiers, xvii, acceptance of the terms proposed, or to announce their 296, 297; unconditional refusal, declared he had not sufficient power to do either the one or the other, and that he must 1814, Ms. be allowed time to confer with the Emperor, which was granted.1 236, 343; Chatillon Protocol, In truth, Caulaincourt, as already shown, did hold full power from Napoleon to accede to the terms proposed by the Allies if there was no other mode of avoiding a XII. 1814. 65. He court endeavours to gain the time and to obtain a sus hostilities. general battle or saving Paris, but he did not venture CHAP. as yet to exercise it; and he thought with reason that the military operations which he knew the Emperor had in contemplation might so far improve his situation as Caulain to enable him to hold out for less rigorous terms. was not on that account, however, the less anxious or less impressed with the gravity of the situation in which pension of France was now placed, or the imminent danger which impended over her, if the terms proposed by the Allies were not immediately acceeded to. Impressed with these ideas, he wrote the same evening to Napoleon for specific instructions as to exercising the carte blanche for signing which he held; and he asked Lord Aberdeen apart whether a suspension of hostilities could be procured on no other terms but on unconditional acceptance of the proposals, to which that nobleman at once replied that on no other condition could his demand be acceded to. His anxiety was redoubled next day, by learning that the Feb. 9. sittings of the congress were in the mean time suspended, without being broken up, to give the Emperor of Russia an opportunity of communicating with the other Allied sovereigns on the present posture of affairs. In his despair he wrote to M. de Metternich to inquire from him. also whether a suspension of arms could be obtained on no other terms than the grievous one of France returning to her ancient limits. Before receiving an answer, he again wrote to Napoleon representing the gravity of affairs, and requiring specific instructions; but he could extract nothing from the Emperor, but that events of importance were in preparation, to gain time, and, 1 Metterabove all, precipitate nothing. Metternich answered nich to Caulaincourt, immediately in a more candid spirit. "It is impossible Feb. 12, to be more united than we are in thoughts, views, and principles.1 If the Emperor Napoleon in the present 306, 327; grave circumstances listens only to the voice of reason-343; Thiers, if he seeks his glory in the happiness of his people, re- 299. nouncing his former ideas of political supremacy-the 1814; Fain, 305, Koch, ii. xvii. 298, |