CHAP. X. 1813. with his answer. Barclay submitted that it would be fruitless, and even inexpedient, to attempt such an attack against the dense masses of the enemy's infantry, under cover of the buildings and works of Dresden; and that if he brought down his guns to support the attack, and was obliged to retire, which might very probably be the case, he would probably lose them, from the extreme wetness of the ground rendering it next to impossible to draw them off. The Emperor saw the justice of this opinion, which, indeed, soon became obvious to all; for the rain came to fall with such violence that hostilities were in a manner, as a matter of necessity, suspended on both sides. The King of Prussia soon after came up with Schwartzenberg, the latter of whom communicated, in a secret conference, the disaster on the left, which was the more alarming that it had put Murat in possession of the Freyberg road; while Vandamme, debouching from Koenigstein, had won that on the right by Pirna, so that there 1 Cath. 231, remained to the army only the centre road by Dippol121; Thiers, diswalde. In these circumstances retreat had become a xvi. 345, 232; Lond. 346. 29. Disasters and difficul matter of necessity; and it was wisely and unanimously agreed to by the Allied sovereigns and generals.1 The extraordinary severity of the rain, which hitherto had been so serious a disadvantage to the Allies, now ties with proved a very great protection to them, for, coupled with which it was the extreme exhaustion of the French troops from the attended. fatigues of the preceding days, it rendered pursuit on that day impossible, and even concealed the movement from the enemy. But for this circumstance the retreat of the Allies by a single road practicable for carriages, that of Dippoldiswalde, with a few mountain paths which could be traversed only by horsemen or foot soldiers, would have been disastrous in the extreme. As it was, the confusion soon became very great, and the losses heavy in proportion. The carriages, caissons, waggons, and artillery belonging the army were little short of 10,000 in number, drawn by above 30,000 horses, besides the cavalry, who were X. 1813. 20,000 more, and how to get this enormous multitude of CHAP. vehicles and animals over the mountains by a single road, with a powerful enemy thundering in pursuit, seemed a task of the most appalling difficulty. The losses during the next three days, especially in guns and materiel, were very considerable, but hardly so great as might have been expected, owing to the severity of the weather and the extreme fatigue of the French troops, which rendered an active pursuit almost impossible. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, with Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, slept the first night at Dippoldiswalde, while Napoleon returned to Dresden. The ill-fated Moreau, who had both his legs amputated, was borne in a litter on men's shoulders for three or four days, when death put a period to his sufferings. By the retreat the first evening the Allies gained a march upon the enemy, which, in the circumstances, was a great advantage. Next day, however, an active pursuit was commenced, and Murat's cavalry, with the corps of Victor, St Cyr, and Marmont, were ordered to the front. The confusion on the line of retreat by Dippoldiswalde and Altenberg soon became extreme; Cath. 233, and although the rearguard made a gallant resistance, it v. 156-171; was impossible to prevent thirty guns and seven hundred 122; Thiers, waggons falling into the hands of the enemy, besides 320. some thousand prisoners.1 1 Lond. 120 xvi. 317 30. couragement in the and their The extreme pressure and confusion on the Dippoldiswalde road, which soon got blocked up with broken-down Great disguns, dead horses, and ruined vehicles, ere long taught the Allied sovereigns that it was indispensable, at all Allied army, hazards, to open up other lines of retreat. That by losses. Pirna and Peterswalde was already seized and commanded by Vandamme, who, having issued, as already mentioned, during the battle of the 27th from Koenigstein, had driven Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, to whom it had been intrusted, from the important pass by the camp of Pirna. It was indispensable, at any cost, to reopen this important defile, and the duty of doing so CHAP. X. 1813. was intrusted to Count Ostermann Tolstoy with the Russian Guards; while Barclay de Tolly, with the main body of their army and Kleist's Prussians was to follow that road, the Austrians were to retire by the middle road by which they had come, by Dippoldiswalde, Altenberg, and Zinwald to Töplitz, and Klenau's men were to force their way the best way they could by Freyberg to Marienberg and the great road from Leipsic to Prague. Following these directions, Barclay, who was with the head of the Russian column, soon came in sight, on the Peterswalde road, of a fearful scene of confusion, where the retiring baggage-waggons and guns were brought to a stand by Vandamme's columns, which appeared directly in their front. Seeing this, and knowing that every instant was precious, he took upon himself to order his Russians to turn by a cross hill-road to the right, which led into the central chaussée by Altenberg, leaving Prince Eugene of Würtemberg to retire alone by the Peterswalde road. The execution of this order by Ostermann brought on a warm altercation between him and Prince Eugene, as the latter anticipated, with reason, total destruction if he were left alone to defile by Pirna, having Vandamme either on his flank or rear the whole way. He represented that if Vandamme were left alone he would march straight to Töplitz and block up the retreat of the whole Allied army. Yielding assent to these considerations, which were obviously well founded, Ostermann Tolstoy, who, in addition to the most undaunted personal courage, possessed the rarer gift of moral resolution, took upon himself to disregard Barclay's orders and advance along with his gallant comrades on the Peterswalde road. He wrote to Barclay explaining the reason of his conduct, which he was well aware induced certain dangers, but was likely to shun others still more formidable. His resolution met with deserved success. The two chiefs, with their respective corps, advanced side by side. Prince Eugene stormed and occupied in force the Kohlberg, a lofty eminence CHAP. X. 1813. 1 Thiers, xvi. Marm. v. overhanging and commanding the road occupied by Vandamme's men, who had not been able, owing to the heavy rains and dreadful state of the roads, to bring up their heavy artillery. Secured by this success on their flank, Ostermann, with the Russian Guards, passed on and got 322, 323; through the perilous strait, keeping the road to Peters- 157, 158; walde and Töplitz. These movements were of the highest importance, and deserve to be carefully studied, for they 119-122; immediately induced events of the utmost moment, which 111, 114; commenced the long series of calamities that led to the 250. fall of Napoleon.1 loss of at The total cut off in Cath. 234, 235; Lond. St Cvr, iv. Wilson, ii. vantages of the Allies. The French Emperor had now gained a very great 31. advantage; so great, indeed, as to have wellnigh com- Great adpensated all his disasters, and entirely reinstated his thus gained affairs. Since the recommencement of hostilities, he had on, and disbeen successful in every operation where he commanded couragement in person; had repulsed Blucher with serious loss, and defeated the Grand Allied Army, with the least 40,000 men, and eighty pieces of cannon. loss of the Allies in Bohemia, including those the battle of Culm and during the retreat, was little, if at all, less than 80,000.* Their vast army, still 120,000 strong, was driven to a disastrous retreat, attended with the most serious losses; prisoners and stragglers by the thousand, were daily brought in; guns abandoned, caissons blown up, and baggage captured at every step. On the other hand, the losses of the French in these encounters, taken together, had not exceeded 15,000 men; and while despair and recrimination pervaded the Allied ranks, the prestige of victory, the confidence of success, had passed over to the other side. "Every one," says Sir Charles Stewart, "endeavoured to divert the storm of blame from himself, and no one would own the project Sir R. Wilson makes their loss still greater. "Sept. 20th-Last night we were making a calculation of the loss of the Allied army which formed in Bohemia; and it appears that there is a deficiency of 36,000 Austrians, 40,000 Russians, and very near 30,000 Prussians up to yesterday, including killed, wounded, and prisoners of all descriptions."-WILSON's Private Diary, ii. 136. CHAP. X. that had just failed. Much of the difficulty arose from the perplexing state in which the chief commands were 1813. held, which was so divided between the Emperor and Prince Schwartzenberg, that it was difficult to say with whom responsibility really rested. The latter was called upon to give explanations of the orders he had given, when he should have been forming fresh combinations. Only half his plans, with those of the Emperor, who was aided by Moreau till he was disabled by his wounds, were adopted; and where they were so, much delay always occurred in communicating them to the generals in command of the armies of different nations. The officers round the Emperor depreciated Prince Schwartzenberg's abilities, and were jealous of his direction. He himself said with truth, it was no easy matter to command an army when Emperors and Kings were at headquarters. Responsibility apparently resided nowhere. No one could tell why the whole mortars of the army were not brought to the front to bombard it during the assault, or how the troops were sent forward without scaling-ladders 1 Sir Chas. to enable them to surmount the ramparts. The moveLord Castle- ments beyond the passes, and the attack on Dresden, were reagh, Sept. undertaken against the advice of General Moreau, whose MS.; and heroism, after he received his wound, was the theme of 122; Vaud. universal admiration. From the general complexion of iv. 397; affairs, it appeared that if Buonaparte persevered in 322, 323. making propositions, there was great probability they would be listened to."1 Stewart to 3, 1813, Lond. 120 i. 127; Jom. Thiers, xvi. Such was the prosperous situation of the French Emperor's affairs, when their face was entirely changed, and he was precipitated from one misfortune to another, which at length drove him from the throne of Charlemagne to the rock of St Helena. They all originated in his own faults, and the undue ascendancy of an imperious and overbearing disposition. To understand how this came about, it is to be recollected that, as already mentioned, Napoleon's plan of the |