1814.

CHAP. Emperor Francis will look back with satisfaction to the XII. moment when he confided to him the daughter of his heart. If a fatal blindness renders your master deaf to the unanimous voice of his people and to the peace of Europe, the Emperor of Austria will deplore the fate of his daughter, but not swerve from his path."

of the

66.

Allied armies, of

which Naresolves to

poleon

take advantage.

In truth, the French Emperor had in his pensée inSeparation time no intention of acceding to the demands of the Allies, but was desirous only to gain time to commence the important military operations which he had in contemplation, and on the issue of which he had staked his kingdom and his life. The Allies, misled by a false confidence, and underrating the resources which were still at his disposal, had adopted a resolution, after the victory of La Rothière, which at length presented him the opportunity for which he had so long been looking, of interposing between their armies, and from a central point striking first at one and then at the other. Pressed by the difficulty of getting supplies for such an enormous multitude of carriages and horses, or even moving them along a single road, where 170,000 men were accumulated together or in close communication, the Allied generals resolved, in a council of war held on the 4th February at Brienne, to separate their armies, and advance by different though converging lines upon Paris. Schwartzenberg was to advance on the great road from Troyes, down the valley of the Seine; while Blucher, with the Army of Silesia, moved by Lesmont upon Vitry, forming a junction with the corps of D'York, which had now reached St Dizier, and that of Kleist, which was approaching from the Rhine, and was then to march by the valley of the Marne on the French capital. The two armies, it was true, would be separated by these movements, and a considerable space, especially at first, lie between them. But this was no more than had been the case in the campaign of Dresden, which, nevertheless, had led at Leipsic to the happiest results, and by repeating

CHAP.

XII.

the same system now, and moving mutually to each other's support when threatened by the enemy, it was confidently expected that similar advantages might be 1814. gained. Probably they were right in the abstract in these views, and in the circumstances the separation of the armies was unavoidable. But in carrying them into 1 Lond. 269, execution, grievous faults were committed, of which Na- 270; Burgh. poleon speedily took advantage, and which brought the Dan. 74,75. fortunes of the Coalition to the very brink of ruin.1

120-124;

error of

Marshal Blucher was a very great general, and he has 67. rendered such services to the cause of European inde- Serious pendence that it is painful to be obliged to say anything Blucher at which may serve to derogate from his reputation; but the this period. event proved that he erred, and erred grievously, by his conduct on this occasion. Already, on 30th January, the very day of the battle of Brienne, the vigilant military eye of Lord Castlereagh had discovered that he was extending his columns too much*-an error which brought him into danger, averted only by heroic courage in that hard-fought action against very superior numbers. The danger thus run, and only averted by the concentration of both the Allied armies on the field of La Rothière, had no effect in impressing the necessity of a more cautious conduct on the Prussian hero. The following judicious criticism on his conduct was written at the time by Sir Charles Stewart: "A too confident sentiment has of late prevailed, and because Napoleon has been defeated in an open battle, it is supposed he can no longer maintain an effective resistance. Little calculation is placed on the considerable

"Blucher, by a dash in advance of our own line, has opened Nancy too much. A letter from Berthier, dated 27th January from Vitry, has been intercepted, which says, Buonaparte is advancing with une belle et bonne armée sur les derrières de l'ennemi.' Blucher is a true hero, but he may sometimes err. A retreat now would be very inconvenient. I am confident our advantages are solid with management; but we must not undervalue our difficulties, with a line of waggons rolling day and night in our rear, from Berlin, Bohemia, and Hungary, which a small corps of cavalry thrown round our flanks might at once arrest, if strength is thrown too rapidly in advance."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD LIVERPOOL, Langres, January 30, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 213.

XII.

CHAP. reinforcements that the French empire continues to pour out on all sides, and each of the Allied armies thinks itself 1814. capable of meeting the enemy unaided by the other; whereas nothing but their union, and a joint operation of the whole collected force, can ever insure success. Both the Grand Army and the Army of Silesia are eager to have the eclat of first entering Paris. To this absurd desire many of the misfortunes of Marshal Blucher, in his march forward, are to be attributed. It has led him to advance far too rashly, and separate himself too widely from the support of Prince Schwartzenberg; and when he experienced a check, it became the more serious from the Silesian Army having no succours or reserves to fall back upon. Prince Schwartzenberg's marches were more measured; but there was a want of concert, which nothing but an undue sanguine expectation as to the ultimate result can account for."1

1 Sir Chas.

Stewart to

Lord Liver

pool, Feb.

27, 1814, MS., and

Lond. 270,

271.

68.

project of

Blucher

Master of a central position between the two armies Napoleon's of the Allies, and possessed of an interior line of comattacking munication, Napoleon was not the man to let the opin detail. portunity slip of striking the important blow for which he had long and anxiously been looking. He was the more inclined to hazard the attempt, that the two Allied armies were now separated by a considerable distance from each other; their generals were known to be on far from cordial terms; and the disposition of the Prussian commander, ardent, bold, and often rash, was too much in contrast with the slow and methodical temperament of the Austrian generalissimo, to anticipate any very rapid or cordial co-operation between them. Within a week of the battle of La Rothière, the muchwished-for opportunity presented itself. York, after driving Macdonald from Chalons, was following him down the Marne to Chateau-Thierry; while Blucher, moving rapidly on a line equidistant from the Marne and the Aube towards Paris, had sent Sacken forward by Montmirail, followed by Olsoofief, while he himself was to bring

up

Kleist's corps as soon as it arrived from the rear. On the 9th February, D'York, with 18,000 Prussians, was at Chateau-Thierry on the Marne; Sacken with 20,000 Russians on the road to Montmirail; while Olsoofief, with 6000, was at Champaubert; and Blucher himself was at Vertus, awaiting the hourly expected arrival of Kleist, with 10,000 Prussians, and Kaptsevitch, with 8000 Russians of Laugeron's corps from the Rhine. Thus, 60,000 men, of the very best quality indeed, but fearfully scattered, were spread over a space forty miles broad, from Chalons to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. And by a singular

CHAP.

XII.

1814.

piece of good fortune for the French Emperor, the post of Champaubert, which commanded the road from Nogent, where Napoleon now lay, to Montmirail, in the very centre of the enemy's scattered position, was only occupied by Olsoofief, with 6000 men. Instantly seeing his advantage, Napoleon was not slow in making the most of it. On February 7th, he moved forward Marmont with his cavalry and part of his infantry to Sezanne from No-Thiers, gent, and on the two following days he followed in person 301; with the Young, and a part of the Old Guard, under Ney Fain, ii. 92; and Mortier, in all, 30,000 men; a small force, but which 179. wellnigh changed the fate of the world.1*

* Napoleon's designs at this period are fully detailed in a very interesting letter which he wrote to Joseph at Paris, on 9th February: "I start to-morrow for Sezanne, and I hope then to attack the Army of Silesia. Sacken is in Montmirail with 15,000 men. I shall debouch upon him by Sezanne and Champaubert. If this operation prove entirely successful, it will decide the campaign. If I am successful in two or three days in crushing the Army of Silesia (Blucher), I shall then return upon Montereau. With your reserves, I shall have 80,000 men, and with them I may give affairs an unexpected turn. On the right the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot) has 25,000 men; in the centre the Duke of Belluno (Victor) has 14,000; I myself, with the left, have 30,000, making in all 60,000 or 70,000 men, including the engineers and artillery. I calculate, in the first instance, on having to deal with 45,000 of the Army of Silesia, and 15,000 of Schwartzenberg's, including Bubna and the Cossacks. So that, if I beat the Army of Silesia, aud put it for some days hors de combat, I shall be able to turn upon Schwartzenberg with 60,000 or 70,000 men, including the reinforcements you will send me from Paris; and I do not think he will be able to oppose to me more than 110,000 or 120,000 men. If I do not find myself strong enough to attack him, I shall at least be able to keep him in check for fifteen or twenty days; and this will give time for new combinations. As to-morrow I shall attack the enemy in rear, you need be under

xvii. 300, 301; Koch,

i. 208;

Plotho, iii.

CHAP.
XII.

1814.

69.

March on,

of, Champaubert. Feb. 10.

The difficulties of the cross-march from Nogent to Champaubert, through execrable unpaved roads, rendered almost impassable by a rapid thaw, were such that it was next to impossible to get the guns through. They stuck and victory fast in the mud near Chapton; and Marmont, who led the advance, reported to the Emperor that the roads were impassable, and the enterprise must be abandoned. The army, at the same time, crushed by suffering, fell into the most frightful disorder, against which Napoleon issued a severe and menacing proclamation.* All authority seemed at an end; murmurs were universal in the ranks; the soldiers openly said the Emperor had gone mad. Still, however, he held on; large bodies of peasants were harnessed to the guns, and, after great efforts, got them through. Such constancy was not long of meeting with its reward. The heads of Marmont's columns came in sight, on entering the defile of St Gond, of Olsoofief's men, posted on the summit of the plateau of Baye, at its extremity; but the latter were so little prepared, that they were cooking their dinner. The Russian generals could not be persuaded anything serious was at hand; they said it was merely a small marauding column, and sent forward some Cossacks to drive them back. They soon discovered their mistake. Baye was speedily carried, the summit of the plateau won, and Champaubert itself attacked. Marmont's cavalry, supported by two squadrons of the Guard, advanced at a rapid pace on the right, while his infantry moved forward direct against the village. The sight of the uniforms of the Guard revealed the danger; the Russians knew at once the Emperor was

no alarm should he push forward to La Ferté or Meaux."-NAPOLEON to JOSEPH, Nogent, 9th February 1814; BIGNON, xiii. 288, 289.

* "The Emperor has to express to the army his displeasure at the excesses to which it abandons itself. Such disorders are always hurtful; but they become criminal when committed in our native country. From this day forth, the chiefs of corps and generals shall be held responsible for the conduct of their troops. The inhabitants are flying on every side, and the troops, instead of being their country's defenders, have become its scourge.”—Proclamation, 9th February 1814; DANILEFSKY, 95.