CHAP. XII. 1814. 74. zenberg to Paris. While Napoleon in person was gaining these astonishing successes over the detached columns of Blucher's army, Prince Schwartzenberg, relieved for the time from the Movements pressure of the Emperor, was moving with more rapidity of Schwart than usual on the two banks of the Seine, by Fontainebleau, wards Melun, and Provins, on Paris. The chivalrous and ardent soul of Alexander was preoccupied with the idea of entering Paris at the head of his magnificent Guards, and avenging the ashes of his own capital by sparing that of his prostrate enemy. It was, literally speaking, a race between him and Blucher which should first reach the capital-the former by the valley of the Seine, the latter by that of the Marne. Victor and Oudinot, who, with less than 30,000 men, were charged with the defence of the metropolis against Schwartzenberg's army, were wholly unable to oppose any serious obstacle to its advance. The whole course of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau was inundated by troops; Sens and Fontainebleau on the left, Provins and Nangis on the right bank, were occupied in great strength, and every one expected to be in the French capital in a few days. Alexander having shared to the very full these sanguine expectations, and having asked General Reynier-who, having been exchanged, was on his way to the French capital-when he thought he would tice, in accordance with Caulaincourt's request, and negotiate on the principle of the ancient limits-"What! do you urge me to sign such a treaty, and trample under foot my coronation oath to preserve inviolate the territory of the Republic? Disasters unheard-of might perhaps compel me to relinquish the conquests I myself have made; but to abandon also those made before me-to betray the trust made over to me with such confidence-to leave France, after so much blood has been shed and such victories gained, smaller than evernever could I do so without treachery, without disgrace! You are fearful of a continuation of the war. I am not insensible to that, but dread, still more, dangers yet more certain, which you do not perceive. If we renounce the frontier of the Rhine, it is not merely France which recedes, but Austria and Prussia which advance. France has need of peace, but such a one as they seek to impose upon it would be more dangerous than the most inveterate war. What would I be to the French if I were to sign their humiliation? What could I answer to the Republicans in the Senate or the Chambers when they came to ask me for the frontier of the Rhine? God preserve me from such affronts! Write to Caulaincourt; but tell him that I reject the treaty. I prefer to run the greatest risks of war."-FAIN, 87-89. XII. 1814. be in Paris, the latter replied, "By the 14th or 15th of Feb- CHAP ruary." "Not till then!" replied the Emperor; "Blucher will be there before you. Napoleon has humiliated me, I will humiliate him; and so little do I make war on France, that, if he were killed, I would make peace to-morrow." "It is then for the Bourbons that your Majesty is making war?" replied Reynier. "The Bourbons," resumed Alexander, "I care not a straw for them; choose a chief among the generals who have contributed so much to the glory of France, and we are willing to accept him." Continuing the subject, Alexander then revealed to him the strange project which he had long entertained, of putting Bernadotte on the throne of France, as his predecessor Catherine had, forty years before, put Poniatowski on that of Poland. There was something both flattering to his vanity, and not a little advantageous in a political point of view to the Czar, in the project of thus putting an old French, but now a foreign, general on the throne of a country from which he had suffered so much, and establishing a lasting influence over the most formidable of the Western Powers. This strange project of Alexander which, if successful, would have defeated the main object of the war, which was security to Europe from military domination was not the least of the many difficulties with which Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart had to contend throughout the whole campaign; and it more than once, by causing Bernadotte to hold back when his aid was required, brought the fortunes of the Coalition to the very brink of ruin. Reynier, however, disconcerted Koch, 1. the Czar not a little by representing in strong terms the Dan. 94, contempt felt in France for the military talents and vain, 123, 124; versatile character of the Crown Prince; and in that way, 327, 328. for the first time, shook his views on the subject.1 * See THIERS, xvii. 327, 328. Reynier, a Swiss by birth, but who had been long in the French service, had been made prisoner, and had resisted all the offers of service from the Allies. He was sent back by Alexander to Paris, and Le immediately offered his services to Napoleon-an offer, in the present state of the Emperor's fortunes, not a little honourable to the general. He laid 1 279-282; i. 95; Burgh. Thiers, xvii. CHAP. XII. 75. Czar and tlereagh Metternich as to resum ing hostilities. Influenced by these considerations, and animated by an inextinguishable desire of personal vengeance on 1814. Napoleon, Alexander no sooner learned that CaulainDivision be- court had not at once, and without conditions, accepted tween the the basis offered him at Chatillon, than he declared his Lord Cas- resolution to break off the congress and march at once to and Prince Paris, and despatched orders to that effect to his plenipotentiary. Lord Castlereagh, in conjunction with M. de Metternich, opposed this extreme resolution in the strongest manner. M. de Caulaincourt had written to the latter a secret letter, in which he asked whether, if the proposed base were unconditionally accepted, it would lead to a suspension of hostilities. Resting on this document, the British Minister insisted with all his might that the whole object of the war-security for the future -was about to be gained without any further risk or effusion of human blood; and that this being the case, it would be the height of imprudence to break off the conferences, and cast all again on the doubtful issue of the sword, the more especially as, from the accounts just received of Blucher's disasters, there was too much reason to apprehend that fortune was about to change sides, and that the terms now about to be accepted might ere long be no longer within their power. So resolute, however, was Alexander to resume the offensive and march direct on Paris, that all that Castlereagh and Metternich by their united efforts could obtain was the resumption of the congress, and the despatch of a fresh project to the plenipotentiaries at Chatillon, containing the terms on which alone hostilities would be suspended.1 Meanwhile the orders he sent to Prince Schwartzenberg Feb. 13. 1 Thiers, xvii. 328, 330, 331; Koch, i. 267-269; Claus. vii. 458. before the French Government a detail of these strange and confidential conferences with Alexander, which is still preserved in the French archives, and worthy of entire credit, as well from the upright character of its author, as from its entire coincidence with many passages in the Castlereagh Correspondence, and the important revelations lately made in Sir R. Wilson's Memoirs as to what passed at the conferences at Abo, in 1812, between Alexander and Bernadotte. - Vide ante, chap. vii. § 57. XII. 1814. 76. the Allies, pend. were to prosecute without an hour's delay his advance. CHAP. The intelligence which soon after arrived of Blucher's successive and very serious defeats rather confirmed the Czar in his determination to push the war à tout outrance; he had now no doubt he would enter Paris before him.* The fresh conditions on which the Allies proposed on the 17th February to suspend hostilities were as follows, Proposals of and it was on their unconditional acceptance that the sus-on which a pension was to depend: "1. France was to re-enter her suspension ancient limits, with the exception of some rectifications on was to dethe frontiers, which were in nowise to derogate from the general principle. 2. France was not to intermingle with the disposal of the ceded territories, nor in general in the regulation of European affairs. 3. Germany should be erected into a federative state; and Holland, with the addition of Belgium, formed into an independent kingdom. 4. Italy would be independent of France, and some provinces in it, to be afterwards determined on, ceded to Austria. 5. Continental Spain should be restored to Ferdinand VII. 6. In return for these concessions, England agreed to restore Martinique and Guadaloupe to France, provided Sweden agreed to the transfer of the latter; but the Cape, with the Isles of France and Bourbon and Malta, were to remain definitively annexed to the British empire." These conditions seem hard towards France, from the number and magnitude of the cessions demanded from that power; but that arose entirely from the immensity of acquisitions, both in terri * The following confidential letter from Sir Charles Stewart at this time will show us on what a slender thread the fortunes of the alliance now hung suspended: "A part is playing here in a high quarter I don't approve still, I am silenced by superior judgment. How much I extricated our commencement and entanglement God only knows!-once in a strong degree committed, without an unexpected convulsion, how depart? It is not sound to do so on slight or feigned pretences. I think C. [Castlereagh] set out with this; but I believe your despatch from England, with L. [Liverpool] and B.'s [Bathurst] longings for things as they were, have made him rather wink at what is the evident driving in another quarter. A. [Aberdeen] is for pressing; R. [Razumowski] for holding. We are a little passive. . . . I don't care how soon things are at an end here."-SIR CHARLES STEWART to EDWARD COOKE, Esq., Chatillon, February 6, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 243. XII. 1814. CHAP. tory and influence, made by her during the course of the revolutionary war, and which she was now required to abandon. France, as now proposed to be reduced to her ancient limits, was still a more extensive and powerful monarchy than that which Louis XIV. ruled, and which the experience alike of past and subsequent times 1814, MS.; has proved to be stronger than any single power in Europe, and capable of being kept within bounds only by a general coalition.1 1 Protocol, Séance Feb. 17, Thiers, xvii. 368. 77. Caulain court's ad poleon re garding This, accordingly, was the decided opinion of M. de Caulaincourt, who, when the proposals were read out, vice to Na- testified neither surprise nor indignation at them, as the protocol of the proceedings proves.* He asked only for these terms. time to communicate them to his master, which was acceded to. On the evening of the same day Caulaincourt wrote to Napoleon as follows: "The proposed conditions, I admit, are not such as could be desired, but means may probably be found to modify them. You will never Count Stadion.-We now come to the most essential part-our conferences suspended. The letter addressed by the Duke [of Cadore] to Prince Metternich, in which the armistice was proposed, and an offer made to put certain fortresses into the hands of the Allies, has been communicated to the Allied Courts. They have consulted; and, in order to extend the idea of an armistice into a more general notion, the Allied Courts have resolved on a proposal for a preliminary treaty with the same view. "M. de Caulaincourt.—I am well satisfied; this will shortly bring us to a conclusion. I request to have a copy of it. It appears, then, that you demand the renunciation both of the title and of the kingdom of Italy. What is meant to be done with the King of Saxony, the King of Westphalia, and the Viceroy of Italy? We cannot abandon the King of Saxony, who is the only friend who remained faithful to us. -“Count Stadion.-An answer will be given, and regulated by a definitive treaty. "M. de Caulaincourt.-Do you mean to restore his kingdom to the King of Saxony and to the King of Westphalia? The King of Westphalia has been recognised; he must consequently have an indemnity. If the Allies do something in his favour, France will make greater sacrifices; in the contrary case, France will have to make a double sacrifice-first of her own interests, and then of her friends. "Count Stadion.-If you put this question positively, I might answer you, but it will be better to leave it for another conference. M. de Caulaincourt.—It is of great importance to us to know whether the Viceroy will be included. "Count Stadion.-I refer that question also to the next conference.”—Protócal, Séance, February 17, 1814, MS; and Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 550. |