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XII.

1814.

again obtain the terms offered at Frankfort until you CHAP. have driven the Allies into the Rhine; but by making a skilful use of the advantages now gained, you may obtain by way of compromise, if England is satisfied, something more than the limits of 1790, though never what is understood by the phrase 'natural limits.' It would be possible, in fact, by abandoning Spain, Italy, Germany, Holland, Belgium, to obtain Mayence, Coblentz, Colognein a word, the line of the Rhine without that of the Scheldt. Certes, such a peace would be well worth the concluding if not for Napoleon, at least for France. One victory more would insure such terms; it is well now to take them into consideration. I supplicate your Majesty, therefore, not to show yourself as unbending as heretofore, Caulain -to recollect that your recent victories do not entitle you poleon, to assume the high ground of the Frankfort proposals, 1814; although by proposing a moderate counter-project you may 369. make an approximation to them." 1

1
court to Na-

Feb. 17,

Thiers, xvii.

indignant

answer.

Very different was the temper of mind with which Na- 78. poleon received this communication. "I consider you as Napoleon's in a secluded charter-house, knowing nothing whatever of t my affairs, and entirely guided by the impostures with which you are surrounded. As soon as I arrive at Troyes I will send you a contre projet, which you will have to lay before the congress. I return thanks to Heaven for having received that note, for there is not a Frenchman whose blood it will not cause to boil with indignation. It is for that reason that I wish myself to make my ultimatum. I am displeased that you have not represented in a note, that to render France as strong as she was in 1789 she must have her natural limits, as a compensation for the division of Poland, the destruction of the republic of Venice, the secularisation of the clergy in Germany-in fine, the great acquisitions made by the English in India. Tell them that you await the orders. of your Government, and that you must have a considerable time to receive them, since they oblige your couriers

CHAP.

XII.

1814.

to Caulain

court, Sur

ville, Feb.

19, 1814;

to make a detour of seventy-two hours, and that three are already missing. I have, in reprisal, ordered the arrest of the English couriers. I am so moved by the infamous proposals which you have sent me, that I consider myself already dishonoured by having put myself in a situation where they could venture to propose them. I will make you acquainted from Troyes or Chatillon with my inten

1 Napoleon tions; but I feel that I would rather lose Paris than submit such proposals to the French people. You always speak of the Bourbons; I would rather see the Bourbons in France with reasonable terms, than subscribe the infamous proposals you have sent to me.”1 *

Thiers, xvii. 369, 370.

79.

secret letter

to the Em

peror of Austria. Feb. 19.

The counter-proposals transmitted by Napoleon to the Napoleon's conference demanded the natural limits as far as Dusseldorf, and beyond that the line of the Meuse; in Italy, an indemnity for Prince Eugene, and a fair share of influence to France in the adjustment of European affairs. Along with this official communication, however, he transmitted two private letters, one from himself to his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, and one from Berthier to Prince

*The following important letter from Napoleon to Caulaincourt, recalling the full powers formerly sent him to save Paris, was written at Nangis on the morning of the 18th, the day after the meeting at Chatillon, and on its road on the 19th, when the above despatch was sent off :—“I gave you a carte blanche only to save Paris and avoid a battle, which was then the sole hope of the nation. That battle has now taken place. Providence has blessed our arms. I have made 30,000 or 40,000 prisoners, taken 200 pieces of cannon and a great number of generals, all without a serious or doubtful encounter. Yesterday I cut up the army of Prince Schwartzenberg, and I hope to destroy it before it has repassed the frontiers. Your attitude should continue the same, nevertheless; do everything to procure peace; but my intention now is that you should sign nothing without my authority, because I alone know my position. Generally speaking, I will only consent to an honourable peace, such as on the basis proposed at Frankfort. My position is undeniably better now than it was at that time. They could then set me at defiance: I had gained no advantage over them, and they were on the verge of my territories. Now I have gained immense advantages over them-so great, indeed, that a military career of twenty years, attended with no small celebrity, can exhibit no parallel to them. Still I am willing to cease hostilities, and to allow the enemy to retire peaceably, if they will conclude peace on the basis of Frankfort." At the end of this letter, which was dictated to Baron Fain, these words were added in the handwriting of Napoleon, "Ne signez rien, ne signez rien."-NAPOLEON to CAULAINCOURT, February 18, 1814; FAIN, 297, 298; Pièces Just.

XII.

1814.

Schwartzenberg. In the former, which was drawn up with CHAP. infinite care, he said, "Called by Victory, she has pronounced her decision. My armies are as good as ever, and will soon be as numerous. I have every confidence in the result of the campaign, if it shall be prolonged. At this moment I am marching on Troyes; the next battle will be between a French and an Austrian army; I believe I shall be victorious, and no one can be surprised at such a result. But having experienced the hazards of war, I am willing to consider that matter as doubtful, and to reason the matter upon a double hypothesis. If I am victorious, the Coalition is annihilated; and in that event I shall be found as imperious and exacting as ever, for I shall then be authorised to become so by my dangers and my triumphs. If, on the contrary, I am defeated, the balance of power in Europe will be more seriously affected than it has yet been; but it will be to the advantage of Russia, and at the expense of Austria. You will speedily, in such an event, find yourself more galled than you have hitherto been by a haughty rival. What have you in reality to gain by such a battle, as in the one case it will cause you to lose all the advantage you have gained by the battle of Leipsic, and in the other will render you more dependent than ever on Russia? France is willing to offer you immediately, without the hazard of a battle, all that you desire. In Italy, for example, she will immediately repass the Alps. Thus, without refer-Napoleon ring to bonds of consanguinity, which, after all, are not to Francis, be despised, the true interest of Austria is to conclude 1814; peace, and on the terms which she herself has offered at 371, 372. Frankfort."1

to Emperor

March 19,

Thiers, xvii.

after the

This very specious, and in many respects just letter, 80. was received by Prince Metternich, as well as the one at Napoleon, the same time sent to Prince Schwartzenberg; and, as a victory of Vauchamps, proof of the entire fidelity of Austria to her engagements, turns on they were both immediately sent at once to the council Schwartzenof the Allied sovereigns. This was by no means what the

berg.

XII.

1514.

French Emperor had intended, and it contributed not a little to strengthen the bonds of the Grand Alliance. This was the more important, as the military successes gained by him during the last few days had gone far to loosen them, and, in fact, brought the Coalition to hang together only by a thread. The very day after the battle of Vauclamps, instead of taking any repose to himself or gring it to his wearied troops, he moved back in order on Schwartzenberg, who, like Blucher, had been mpted by the difficulty of getting supplies for the imTHEN Amy wich he commanded, to scatter his columns in a way to the last degree perilous in presence of such a geras Napoleon, lying in a manner on his flank, and VIC 12 20portunity to strike a blow at some of his i-arted corps. The Young and Old Guards, Leval's à sua vith the superb cavalry of St Germain, just some om Spain arrived by a forced march that very night då La Ferté-sons-Jocarre, while he himself pushed mx Noun where he joined the weakened corps of haimadi via had received some reinforcements, and KIS 10017 12.00 song. He moved the next day from Lanes 2 Gages, in the valley of the Seine, close w whed pona Tater and Cadinot were in position, beVRÀ DE SILLÄ SC of the Yeres, striving to arrest the seslermei að Schwartzenberg's army. By concenDangal 18 mays in that neighbourhood, and drawing STONE sicer and barco from Paris and all the alacere avis, he succeeded in collecting 60,000 men PAP is mmožaz writes, the largest body he had ever 28. land she de 40s Lad crossed the Rhine. As fex el concised the entire Guards, my and Ch the corps of Macdonald, Victor, and hoe any and Leval's division, he con not day to stack the corps of WittMa storsed by that of Wrede at

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were moving on, totally unconscious of the danger which CHAP. was impending.

XII.

81.

Villeneuve.

The Russian advanced-guard, under Count Pahlen, con- 1814. sisting of 3000 infantry and 1500 horse, which lay at Combats of Movmant, on the road from Guignes to Nangis, was the Nangis and first to be assailed. Finding himself completely outnumbered, Pahlen commenced a retreat, which was at first conducted in good order, in square, with the guns at the angles and the cavalry in the rear. But ere long the attacks of the incomparable horse just come up from Spain became so impetuous that the cavalry were driven off and dispersed, the guns taken, and the infantry left exposed. Charged with the utmost fury on three sides at once, the squares were at length broken, and one regiment, that of Revel, totally annihilated. Wittgenstein himself, who had hurried to the front when the firing began, was swept away by the torrent, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner. In this disastrous affair the Allies lost 3000 men, of whom 2100 were made prisoners, and eleven guns. On arriving at Nangis, Napoleon divided his forces. Oudinot and Kellermann pursued Wittgenstein by Provins towards Nogent, Macdonald pressed back Wrede's Bavarians by Donnemavie on Bray, and Victor was ordered to march with all expedition by Villeneuve upon Montereau, to seize the bridge over the Seine there. In the course of this movement Victor came upon a Bavarian division near Valjouan, which threw itself into square, and endeavoured to effect its retreat. a sharp conflict it was broken and driven back, with the 315 318: loss of 2500 men, of whom 1500 were made prisoners. Burgh. 141, Nothing but the neglect of General L'Heritier to charge iii. 212-214 the fugitives, when first thrown into disorder, with his 340, 341. horse, preserved the division from total ruin.1

After Koch, i.

The advantage already gained was very great, but it was as nothing to what the Emperor had designed. His intention was to have pushed Victor on to the bridge of Montereau, forming one of the main lines of retreat for

Vaud. i.315;

142; Plotho,

Thiers, xvii.

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