CHAP. XII. 1814. the Allies over the Seine, and by seizing which he would have intercepted the communications of all the troops who had passed that point on their way down the left 82. bank of the river, and then fallen in succession on their Napoleon to columns retiring from Fontainebleau and the neighbourwhere he is hood, which would have placed 15,000 or 20,000 men in proposal for his power. But such was the fatigue which the Marshal Advance of Montereau, met by the an armis tice from Schwartzenberg. Feb. 18. and his followers had undergone during the long marches of the preceding days, that they were unable to comply with the order he had received to push on without halting a moment to Montereau and seize the bridge, and were compelled to halt at Salins, some miles from it, during the night. Napoleon was highly indignant when he heard of this deviation from his orders, which had the effect of enabling a part of the enemy's forces to get back in safety during the night; and at three in the morning he sent positive orders to Victor instantly to rise, and, whatever state he was in, pursue his march without a moment's delay to Montereau. He himself followed in the same direction with the whole Guards and cuirassiers, and directed Oudinot on Nogent and Macdonald on Bray, with orders, if they could not carry 315, 316; the bridges at those points, to converge also on Montereau. Burgh. 141 On arriving at Nangis he had received the most decisive 341-343; proof of the reality and magnitude of his successes by the 212, 213. arrival of a messenger from Schwartzenberg with proposals for AN ARMISTICE.1 Vaud. i. Koch, i.315; Thiers, xvii. Plotho, iii. 83. tion at the Austrian head quarters. To understand how this great change came about, it Consterna- must be premised that the Allied counsels at the headquarters of Prince Schwartzenberg were far from being unanimous; nor were the sovereigns there assembled by any means actuated by the spirit of concord which their plenipotentiaries exhibited at Chatillon to Caulaincourt, who said they acted as one man. On the contrary, the usual passions which first divide, and in the end so often dissolve, confederacies, were in full activity, and threatened the most alarming results. The Confederacy, already XII. sufficiently divided by the question of the settlement of CHAP. the throne of France, which was thought to be at its disposal, were still more violently distracted by the yet 1814. stronger passion of fear, when the successes of Napoleon had destroyed half of Blucher's army, and threatened ere long to do the same to that of Schwartzenberg. The Austrian generals were at first very imperfectly informed of the disasters of the Army of Silesia; and as long as they were confined to that host they made light of them, and abated nothing of their haughty bearing at Chatillon. But when the tempest fell on themselves, and every hour was bringing in advices of the defeat or capture of detached corps of the Grand Army, scattered over a space twenty leagues broad, they speedily came to view matters in a very different light. Passing at once, as irresolute characters generally do, from the extreme of confidence to that of depression, they were seized with consternation, and suddenly became as anxious to hasten as they had previously been to avert a pacification. In vain the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh strenuously insisted on the bolder course, and urged the immediate concentration of the army and giving battle, rather than give Napoleon the immense moral advantage of boasting that his enemies, recently so haughty, were now suing for a cessation of hostilities. Their representations produced no sort of effect. The proverb held good, that in pre-1 Thiers, sence of real danger a counsel of war never fights. The xvii. 342, 343; Burgh. obvious danger of Schwartzenberg's detached columns 144. being cut up in detail as those of Blucher's had been, Everybody seems in ill-humour, not exempt from anxiety. General Knesebeck's opinion is, that there will be a great battle in this neighbourhood: others think Buonaparte is not strong enough to risk an attack, or even to oppose the junction of Blucher with this army. I am very anxious to know how your besogne goes on, and whether late success will make Buonaparte rise in his pretensions. I don't think this retreat ought to do so; because, however discouraging the moral effect may be on the public mind, he, viewing it as a military man, cannot but feel that the situation of the Allies is very much strengthened by it."-MR GEORGE JACKSON to SIR CHARLES STEWART, Troyes, February 19, 1814, midnight; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 282, 283. CHAP. Overpowered every other consideration, and it was deXII. termined by a great majority to send Schwartzenberg's 1814. aide-de-camp, Count Parr, to Napoleon's headquarters to solicit an armistice.* 84. Montereau. Battle of Count Parr arrived with the letter of Prince Schwartzenberg at Napoleon's headquarters at Nangis on the evening of the 17th, when he was giving his orders for a grand attack on Montereau the next morning. Concealing his joy under an affectation of indifference, he refused to admit the messenger into his presence, but received the Austrian general's letter, which he coolly put in his pocket after reading, and sent word to the envoy that he would answer it at his leisure. Meanwhile, instead of suspending, he set out the next morning for Montereau, and continued with more activity than ever his orders and preparations for an attack. On arriving on the northern heights overlooking the town, as the guns of the Guard came up, the Emperor took his station in the midst of them, and himself directed the pointing and elevation of those next to him; returning thus in the close of his career to his old occupation of a gunner, in which he had commenced it at the siege of Toulon twenty-one years before! So irritated was he at Marshal Victor for not having advanced to seize the bridge the night before, that in a fit of passion he * "I found the headquarters on the move at Troyes [on the 19th], and thought it best to keep near them till we saw daylight. Two propositions of armistice, proceeding from us, which I cannot too much condemn, and a retreat, perhaps not unwise if boldly and candidly avowed, have materially injured our authority, and produced nothing but two very haughty and insulting letters from Buonaparte and Berthier to the Emperor Francis and his General. We are now falling back towards Langres, not, as far as I can learn, much pushed by the enemy. Indeed, I doubt the possibility of his advancing boldly, leaving Blucher, now with 80,000 men, on his left flank, which army will in a few days be equal to Buonaparte's own. If he turns on Blucher, we shall turn on him. The political question has been miserably prejudiced by opposite extremes of management; at one time too proud to listen to anything, at another so impatient to be delivered from the presence of our enemy as to make our prolongation at Chatillon almost ludicrous. I hope we have yet more of equanimity in our counsels than a bystander would predicate. I shall not leave the headquarters at present.”— LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD ABERDEEN, Chaumont, February 25, 1814; Costlereagh Correspondence, ix. 289-291. XII. 1814. deprived him of the command of his corps, which he CHAP. bestowed on General Gerard, though, when the first transports were over, he gave him the command of two divisions of the Young Guard, so as to have his old companionin-arms near his person. The descent from where Napoleon was to the bridge, the grand object of contention between the two parties, was strongly occupied by the Wurtembergers, who lined all the walls and enclosures by which the sunny slopes were intersected. Led by General Chataux, the French made a vigorous attack on this strong position, striving to drive the enemy down the slope, and to cross the bridge with them. But if the onset was fierce, the resistance was not less determined, under the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, who evinced on that trying occasion the courage of a grenadier united to the coolness of a general. He long kept the enemy at bay, and replied with fatal effect from his guns to the concentrated fire of the artillery of the Guard; but at length, seeing his flank about to be turned by the advance of the cavalry of the Guard under Pajol, he was forced to retire towards the bridge. His retreat was that of the lion, however; but he was so closely followed by the victorious French that he narrowly escaped being made prisoner by them when crossing the bridge, which fell, with the whole town, into the hands of the victors. In this well-fought action the French lost 3000 of their best. troops, who were struck down in the fight; but the Allies lost an equal number in killed and wounded, besides as many prisoners, and six guns and four standards. Napoleon testified the greatest joy at this glorious success, which promised the most important results. Courage," xvii. 349said he to his friends, when standing among the guns ex-146; Fain, posed to the enemy's fire; "the ball is not yet cast which 107, 108;. is to kill me." My heart is relieved," said he, as he 324; Volcrossed the bridge of Montereau, surrounded by Guards; "I have saved the capital of my empire."' 66 66 "Thiers, 351; Burgh. Koch, i.323, derndorf, his iv. 127. Such was the Emperor's exultation at these important XII. 1814. 85. Counter orders sent to Prince Eugene to retain Lom bardy. CHAP. triumphs, that he openly boasted that "he was nearer Munich than the Allies were to Paris." This day he wrote two letters which had a material influence on his future destiny. The first of these was the letter already quoted, addressed to Caulaincourt, in which he recalled the full powers previously given as to signing at Chatillon any terms which might be necessary to prevent Paris 1 Ante, ch. being taken.' The second was a letter, hardly less important, to Eugene Beauharnais, recalling in like manner a conditional order to evacuate Italy and fall back on Lyons as soon as Murat declared himself, which he had sent to the Viceroy in the middle of January, but which, owing to Murat having not openly done so, Eugene had not yet acted on. He now recalled that order, and enjoined Eugene to defend Italy to the last extremity.* These let xii. § 78, note. On the 18th February, directly after the battle of Montereau, Napoleon wrote to Eugene :-" J'ai reçu votre lettre du 9 Fevrier. J'ai vu avec plaisir les avantages que vous avez obtenus; s'ils avaient été un peu plus decisifs et que l'ennemi y fut compromis, nous aurions pu garder l'Italie. Tascher vous fera connaitre l'état des choses ici. J'ai détruit l'Armée de Silésie, composée des Russes et des Prussiens; j'ai commencé hier abattre Schwartzenberg; j'ai dans quatre jours fait 30,000 à 40,000 prisonniers, puis une vingtième des généraux, 500 à 600 officiers, 150 à 200 pièces de canon, et une immense quantité des bagages; et je n'ai perdu presq' personne. La cavalerie ennemie est à bas, les chevaux sont morts de fatigue: ils sont beaucoup diminués, d'ailleurs ils se sont trop etendus. Il est donc possible, si la fortune continue à nous sourire, que l'ennemi soit poussé en grande désordre hors de notres frontières, et que nous poussions alors conserver l'Italie. Dans cette supposition le Roi de Naples changerait probablement son parti.”—NAPOLÉON au VICE-ROI D'ITALIE, Montereau, 18 Ferrier 1814. On the 19th February Napoleon said to the aide-de-camp, Tascher, who was to carry his orders to Prince Eugene :-" Tascher, tu vas partir de suite pour l'Italie, Tu ne t'arrêterais pas à Paris que quelques heures pour y voir ta femme. Tu diras à Eugene que j'ai été vainqueur à Champaubert et Montmirail des meilleures troupes de la Coalition; que Schwartzenberg m'a demandé cette nuit par un de ces aides-de-camp un armistice, mais que je ne suis pas dupé, car c'est pour me leurrer et gagner du temps. Tu lui diras aussi que si les ordres que j'ai donné dès hier au Maréchal Victor de se porter sur Melun et Montereau il en serait resulté la perte des corps Bavarois et des Wirtembergeois pris au dépourvu par ce mouvement; et qu'alors n'ayant devant lui que les Autrichiens, qui sont des mauvais soldats et des canaille, il les aurait mené à corps de fouet déporté; mais que rien de ce qui avait été ordonné n'ayant été fait, il fallait recourir à des nouvelles chances. Tu diras à Eugene que je lui donne l'ordre de garder l'Italie le plus longtemps qu'il pourra de s'y défendre; qu'il ne s'occupe pas de l'armée Napolitaine, composée de mauvais soldats, et du Roi de Naples qui est un fou, un ingrat. En cas qu'il soit obligé de céder de |