CHAP. XII. 1814. ters, given below, from Prince Eugene's Memoirs, are very important, both as indicating how set Napoleon was on the retention of his external conquests, and how readily he reverted to them with the first gleam of returning success, and as affording decisive evidence that the charges brought against that noble character by Marshal Marmont and others, of having ruined the Emperor by disobeying his orders to recross the Alps and concentrate with him for the last struggle, were unfounded. The next day Napoleon received from Caulaincourt the Allied ultimatum offered at Chatillon on the 17th. He instantly, as before mentioned, wrote back in terms of the strongest indignation rejecting it, but directing Caulaincourt to gain time, continue the negotiation, and contend for the line of the Thiers, Rhine down to Dusseldorf, and thence that of the Meuse xvii. 360, to the sea. The same day he sent back Schwartzenberg's de Prince aide-de-camp, Count Parr, with the letters above given 100-110. to the Emperor of Austria and the Prince Marshal.1 and Mem. Eugene, x. 86. instructions as to an Setting out on the 21st from Montereau, he arrived, as will be hereafter explained, before Troyes on the 23d. Napoleon's He was met on the march by Prince Wenceslas de Lich- to M. de tenstein, the bearer from Schwartzenberg of a renewed Flahault proposal for an armistice on the part of the Allied sove- armistice. reigns. After expressing great indignation at the reported countenance given to the Bourbons by the Allies, and receiving the strongest assurances from Prince Lichtenstein of Austria's having no participation therein, he terrain, de ne laisser dans les places fortes qu'il sera forcé d'abandonner que juste les soldats Italiens necessaire pour en faire le service; de ne perdre de terrain que pied à pied en se defendant; et qu'enfin s'il était serré, de trop près, de réunir tous ces moyens, de se rétirer sous les murs de Milan d'y livrer bataille. Que s'il est vaincu d'opérer sa retraite sur les Alpes comme il pourra ; ne céder la terrain qu'à la dernier extrémité. Dis à Eugene que je suis content de lui; qu'il témoigne ma satisfaction à l'armée d'Italie; et que sur toute la ligne il fasse tirer cent coups de canon en réjouissance des victoires de Champaubert et Montmirail. A Turin tu diras au Prince Borghese de contremander l'évacuation de la Toscane s'il en est encore temps, mais dans le cas contraire d'arrêter les troupes dans leur mouvement, et de défendre les différents positions en avant de la ville de Gene, de mettre cette ville dans un état imposant de défense, et de donner connaissance de ses dispositions au Vice-Roi."-Mémoires du PRINCE EUGENE, vi. 100-110. VOL. II. U Feb. 24. CHAP. XII. 1814. deferred his answer till the next day. In virtue of a verbal convention, he entered Troyes that night without resistance, and the next morning sent an envoy to the Allied posts, as agreed on. The unbounded feeling of confidence with which the Emperor was inspired by this brilliant succession of victories, was clearly evinced by the instructions which he gave to M. de Flahault, the envoy whom he sent to meet those of the Allies M. Schouvaloff on the part of Russia, De Rauch on that of Prussia, and Langenau on that of Austria-at Lusigny, to arrange the terms on which an armistice was to be concluded. It was obviously for the interest of France to continue hostilities, and take advantage of the marvellous succession of victories which had recently signalised their arms. Napoleon was desirous, however, of keeping up the shadow of a negotiation, in order to enable him to profit immediately by any successes that might be gained. He sent M. de Flahault, therefore, to the place of conference, but with instructions which he was well aware would prevent the negotiation coming to any pacific result. They were, They were, "to decline any proposal for a suspension of hostilities during the parleying; to insist on the offers of Frankfort being made the basis of any armnistice; and to treat of the line of demarcation between the two armies, in the event of this basis being acceded to, in such a way as should leave France in possession of Mayence and Antwerp." These terms were proposed by Flahault to the Allied commissioners at Lusigny on the Feb. 24. day after Napoleon entered Troyes. The Allied commissioners, whose instructions were to conclude no armistice on the Frankfort basis, but only on condition of France re-entering her ancient limits, refused these terms, upon which M. de Flahault, after a reference to Napoleon, altered his proposals. He now made no mention of the Frankfort basis, but offered a suspension of arms upon conditions that left the French in possession of Antwerp in the Low Countries, Mayence on the Rhine, and Cham 1814. bery in Savoy. The meaning of this was sufficiently clear, CHAP. and ominous of the fate of the conferences which were XII. still going on at Chatillon. By the possession of Chambery, and consequently of the pass over Mont Cenis, he secured an entrance into Italy, and the communication with Eugene's forces in Lombardy. By the possession of Mayence he held in his hands the keys of Germany, and could at any time renew his schemes of conquest in that country; while by means of Antwerp he retained the command of the Low Countries, and could at a moment's xvii. 402warning revive his long-cherished projects of aggression 122,123. from that stronghold against this country.1 1 Thiers, 405; Fain, project of which Na It was not to be expected that the Allies would agree 87. to a line of demarcation pointing so clearly as this did to Counterfuture and indefinite projects of external conquest. It the Allies, was accordingly immediately and unanimously rejected polcon reby them, and a counter-project proposed, founded very jects. much on the principle of uti possidetis. The line they proposed was to advance in the Low Countries as far as Lille, which, of course, left Antwerp in its present blockaded state; it consented to recede a little in Champagne and Burgundy; was to leave Chaumont and Langres open for discussion; but they absolutely insisted on retaining Chambery in Savoy. Thus the Allies, in their line, evinced as clearly as Napoleon on what object they were set, and left no solution of the matters in dispute possible but by the sword. Napoleon, as a matter of course, rejected the Allied line; and it might have been expected that after this, as the views of both parties were clearly declared and utterly irreconcilable, the negotiations, both at Lusigny and Chatillon, would have been broken up. They were continued, however, though both well knew they could come to nothing, because it was for the interest of both parties to keep up the semblance of a negotiation, in order to be able to take immediate advan- 2 Thiers, xvii. 406, tage of any military success either might gain, and which 407. both were sanguine enough to anticipate." CHAP. 1814. 88. Caulain fic and ear to Napoleon. Although Napoleon's confidence in his star was entirely restored by the recent victories which he had gained, and he repeatedly said to those around him "that he was nearer Munich than the Allies were to Paris," the court's paci- case was very different with Caulaincourt, whose mind nest advice was of a less sanguine temperament than that of his imperial master, and who, in contact at Chatillon with the Allied plenipotentiaries, who seemed to be so united, was in better condition than his sovereign to judge of the force which would be brought against him, and the real influences of any partial successes upon the ultimate issue of the contest.* He was altogether desperate at not receiving again full powers from Napoleon, and wrote to him in the most earnest manner, entreating him to prevent the negotiations being broken off, and pointing out the imminence of the danger which threatened him if hostilities were not suspended.† "After dinner, on 22d February, Caulaincourt began by observing to me that the Emperor had transferred his headquarters to Bar-sur-Aube. I told him that I had heard the report. He went on to enlarge on the successes of Napoleon. He may have exaggerated the amount, but, on the whole, was sufficiently accurate. He said that if Napoleon had lost military reputation, it must be confessed that he had now regained it; that everything had been done by his personal interference, and in consequence of his individual exertions. He said that for his own (Caulaincourt's) part, he thought it made no difference in the state of the war, but that, by saving the amour propre of Buonaparte, it gave him a good opportunity of concluding peace with some degree of credit. He continued to say, that though he was ready to make the same sacrifices for peace as when he first came to Chatillon, we had done everything in our power by the form of the projet to make it difficult. He said that he must be supposed to know his own master, and that he was satisfied, if it had been possible to see you for an hour, he might have so changed the form with out altering the substance as to make it palatable to Buonaparte, instead of being revolting."-LORD ABERDEEN to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Chatillon, February 23, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 287, 288. † “The question about to be decided is so important, it may have at the moment consequences so fatal, that I regard it as a paramount duty to recur again, even at the risk of incurring your Majesty's displeasure, to what I have already so frequently insisted on. There is no weakness, Sire, in my opinion; but I see the dangers which menace France and the throne of your Majesty, and I conjure you to prevent them. We must make sacrifices, and we must do so immediately: if we do not take care, the opportunity of doing so will escape us, as at Prague: the circumstances of this moment have a clearer resemblance to those which then occurred than your Majesty may be aware. At Prague, peace was not concluded, and Austria declared against us because we would not believe that the time fixed for the closing of the Congress would be CHAP. XII. 1814. The great difficulty with which Caulaincourt had to contend was the impossibility of extracting a definite answer or specific instructions from Napoleon, who was determined to keep everything open in diplomacy, and make his terms or answers entirely dependent on his position in the field. Such was the agony which that able plenipotentiary underwent on this account, that he has, himself told us the only surprising thing is that it did Fain, 302 not make him go mad, and that the Emperor's power156 Hard. of evading the most precise demand for instructions was 257. one of the most remarkable features in his mind.1* 1 Lond. 277; Burgh, 155, xii. 355, 89. the Allied But the truth is, that on this occasion Napoleon was, unknown to himself, nearer the truth than his diplomatist; Extreme and his words were literally true, that he was nearer Munich division in than they were to Paris. This arose neither from his councils. military strength, nor their military weakness, but solely from their divisions. The Austrian statesmen, who all along had been reluctant to push matters to extremities with the son-in-law of their Emperor, and who in secret were not a little jealous and apprehensive of the rising power and grandeur of Russia, were seized with the rigorously enforced. Here the negotiations are on the point of being broken off because we cannot believe that a question of such immense importance may depend on the answer we may make before a certain day. The more I consider what has passed, the more I am convinced that if we do not go into the contre projets demanded, but insist upon modifications on the basis of Frankfort, all is closed. I venture to say this because I feel that neither the glory of your Majesty nor the power of France depends on the possession of Antwerp, or on any other of our new frontiers."-CAULAINCOURT to NAPOLEON, March 6, 1814; FAIN, 301, 302; Pièces Just. * "Pendant ces négociations (à Châtillon) je ne conçois pas comment je ne suis pas devenu fou. Le temps des illusions était passé. L'actualité était dévorante; et à mes lettres je ne recevais que des réponses évasives, alors qu'il eût fallut traiter à tout prix. L'avenir nous restait : à présent il ne nous reste qu'un tombeau. Mes lettres n'étaient qu'une pâle copie de ce que je disais à l'Empereur dans nos entretiens particuliers. J'insistais pour qu'il me donnât son ultimatum sincère, afin que je fusse en mésure de terminer invariablement avec les plénipotentiaires Alliés, qui avaient reçu certainement des instructions positives. Il me faut être vrai, car ceci est devenu de l'histoire : l'Empereur ne répondait jamais catégoriquement à cette demande. Il éludait, avec une merveilleuse adresse, de livrer le secret de sa pensée intime; cette manière est un des traits saillants de son genre d'esprit.”—Souvenirs de CaʊLAINCOURT, i. 302, 329, 330. |