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CHAP.

XII.

1814.

that it seemed scarcely possible for them any longer to act together as a united force. The Russian and Prussian generals even at headquarters openly accused the Austrian Government of treachery to the common cause, their generals of incapacity and pusillanimity. "Where," it was asked, "is this retreat to end? Are we to abandon all our conquests and recross the Rhine merely because a few detached corps have been maltreated?" Blucher became perfectly furious when he heard of the retreat of Schwartzenberg from Troyes; he forthwith wrote on a torn sheet of paper a letter to the Emperor Alexander, declaring his readiness to march direct on Paris and compel Napoleon to give up the pursuit of the Grand Army to defend his capital. He added these important observations: "The retreat of the Grand Army will cause the whole French nation to take up arms, and those of them who have declared for the good cause will suffer. Our victorious armies will lose heart. We shall be obliged to retreat into a country utterly exhausted, where we can expect no supplies, and where the inhabitants, being forced to give up their last morsel, will be reduced to despair. The Emperor of the French will recover from the consternation into which he had been thrown, and will, as before, regain the confidence of the nation. Most heartily do I thank your Majesty for the permission you have given me to resume the offensive; I flatter myself I shall do so with the best hopes of success, Blucher to if your Majesty will give positive orders to Generals Win- Feb. 21, zingerode and Bulow to place themselves under my com- 104, 105. mand. Joined to them, I shall march on Paris, fearing lui, ils exigeraient naturellement des garanties et des suretés, qui les missent en mesure de ne le plus craindre, et que par là même une telle paix serait plus difficile d'obtenir; que si la nation, lasse des malheurs que la domination de Napoléon a attirée sur elle, se déciderait à s'y soustraire, et se choisit tel autre chef, les Alliés mettraient toutes les facilités à conclure la paix, et la feraient plus avantageuse pour la France, à raison de ce qu'ils n'auraient plus à se défier de l'ambition de Napoléon; et enfin que si les Français rappellaient leurs anciens Maîtres, il y avait sur-le-champ cessation d'hostilités et paix immédiate."-Secret Despatch from COUNT LIEVEN to COUNT NESSELRODE, Jansary 26, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 268-271.

Alexander,

1814; Dan.

CHAP.

XII.

1814.

93. Council at Bar-surAube.

Feb. 25.

neither Napoleon nor his marshals, if they should come forth to meet me."

Matters had now come to such a pass at the Allied headquarters that the Coalition was on the verge of dissolution, and Napoleon on the point of being again invested with supreme dominion in Europe. dominion in Europe. But in this crisis the peculiar character of Lord Castlereagh appeared with the brightest lustre, and by its ascendancy in the Allied counsels determined the fate of Europe. Calm in appearance, but decided in thought, uniting the highest graces of demeanour to the greatest wisdom in conduct, he won the assent of the sovereigns who sat at the council-board by the charm of his manner, while he commanded the confidence of their followers by the resolution with which he took the lead, and the decision of the course which he recommended. To Metternich in particular he represented in the strongest manner that he should unite with him and the Emperor Alexander in supporting vigorous measures, for that any hesitation now would not only occasion the immediate loss of all their conquests, but would at once lead to the re-establishment of the tyranny of France over the whole of continental Europe. In consequence of the gravity of affairs, a council of war was held at Bar-sur-Aube on the 25th February, in the house of General Knesebek, who, from illness, could not 1 Hard. xii. leave his room. There were present, besides the three xvii. 409, sovereigns, Prince Volkonsky, Baron Diebitch, Count Nesselrode, Prince Schwartzenberg, Prince Metternich, Lord Castle Count Radetzky, Prince Hardenberg, and Lord CastleLord Aber- reagh. The proceedings which occurred are well worthy of attention; the destinies of the world hung upon the decision of that council.1

422; Thiers,

412; Cast.

Cor. ix. 289;

reagh to

deen, Feb. 25, 1814.

at it.

94.

Alexander opened the discussion by deprecating any Proceedings further retreat, and strongly urging that Blucher's army, which had been raised up again by reinforcements, chiefly of Germans from the rear, to 48,000 men, should be joined, agreeably to his wish, by the corps of Winzin

gerode and Bulow, drawn from that of Bernadotte, which would raise it to nearly 100,000 combatants, and that it should immediately move on Paris. But here a difficulty, apparently insurmountable, presented itself. It was impossible for Blucher to begin active operations unless he were reinforced by these two corps, as he was sure to have Napoleon, with 60,000 men, immediately on his hands, for whom his present army was no sufficient match; but these corps were part of Bernadotte's army, which was still far in the rear,* and he was very discontented at the want of attention exhibited to him by the Allied generals, and beyond measure desirous to avoid personally, or by his army, any share in the subjugation of France.†

* On crossing the Rhine at Cologne, which he did not do till 12th February, Bernadotte issued the following proclamation to the French people, parts of which reveal his secret views for the conciliation of that people, whom he hoped one day to govern :—“ Français ! j'ai pris les armes par ordre de mon roi pour défendre les droits du peuple Suèdois. Après avoir vengé les affronts qu'il avait reçu et concouru à la déliverance de l'Allemagne, j'ai passé le Rhin. Revoyant les bords de ce fleuve où j'ai si souvent et si heureusement combattu pour vous, j'éprouve le besoin de vous faire connaitre ma pensée. Votre Gouvernement a constamment essayé de tout avilir, pour avoir le droit de tous méprises; il est tems que le système change. Tous les hommes éclairés formaient des voeux pour la conservation de la France; ils désirent seulement qu'elle ne soit plus le fléau de la terre. Les souverains ne sont pas coalisés pour faire la guerre aux nations, mais pour forcer votre Gouvernement à reconnaitre l'indépendance des Etats; telles sont leurs intentions, et je suis auprès de vous garant de leur sincerité. Fils adoptif de Charles XIII., placé par l'election d'un peuple libre sur les marches du trône des grands Gustaves, je ne puis desormais avoir d'autre ambition que celle de travailler à la prosperité de la presqu'ile Scandinave. Puis-je en remplissant ce devoir sacré envers ma nouvelle patrie, contribuer en même tems au bonheur de mes anciens compatriotes. --Donné à mon quartier-général de Cologne, le 12 Fevrier 1814.--CHARLES JEAN."

+"I beg you, on every account, to make Lord Castlereagh sensible how necessary it is to have some management of the Prince Royal, especially in what appears to touch himself. He imagines-and it is not for me to say the contrary, for I sometimes believe the same thing-that the exclusion of Sweden from the preliminary conferences [at Chatillon] has been done for the sole purpose of degrading him in the eyes of Sweden, and perhaps of France; at any rate, of humiliating him, and of weakening the opinion which may exist in the world of his influence in the councils of the Allies. Some explanation

on this head may do away much of the feeling, which is, however, deep, and may become bitter. . . . If it is intended to follow up these preliminary conferences by positive negotiations for peace, and that peace is to be made for Sweden without her having any part in it, and by the negotiations of the four principal powers, you may depend upon it that it will not be consented to, and

CHAP.

XII.

1814.

XII.

1814.

1 Thiers,

CHAP. The Emperor of Russia, throughout aware of the importance of strengthening Blucher by Winzingerode and Bulow's corps, yet was so apprehensive of irritating Bernadotte still more, that he declared it impossible to detach these corps from the army of the Crown Prince. As this would be fatal to any active operation on the part of the Prussian general, the majority of the council recommended a retreat for the Grand Army. The fortunes of the war hung by a thread: were this resolution persevered in, the French armies in three months would be at Vienna and Berlin.1

xvii. 414, 415; Lord

Ripon to Sir Chas. Stewart, July 6, 1839; Cast. Cor. i. 72.

95.

reagh's decision de

termines the

Allies to

give Blucher two of Bernadotte's corps. Feb. 25.

Then it was that Lord Castlereagh rose; and what folLord Castle-lowed must be given in the words of the French historian of this memorable scene: "The bad humour of the new Swede, who would willingly have become again a Frenchman to reign over France, had lately become visible on every occasion when he met with the least contradiction. He was not an object indeed of fear; but nevertheless any disturbance in the Coalition, when its forces were. entirely occupied with Napoleon in front, might draw after it grave consequences, and they were seriously apprehended if Bernadotte were deprived of the most considerable part of his army. Alexander, like the rest, was restrained by this apprehension, and declared the thing impossible. Then Lord Castlereagh suddenly rose, and, acting as a sort of providence which disposed of all, asked the military officers present if they really regarded the junction of the corps of Winzingerode and Bulow as

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that some desperate resolution will be taken, for which we shall all be sorry,
because we shall be in the wrong and the Crown Prince in the right. He de-
clares that he will hold Guadaloupe even against England by the form of the
treaty.
He entered with approbation into Lord Castlereagh's view of
excluding every intermediate government between the Bourbons or Buona-
parte, though he professed his doubts that this would inevitably be the case if
something were not determined speedily one way or other; for he says that
Soult, and many other of the military chiefs, are beginning to entertain their
own views, and that there is talk among them of dividing France by a sort
of federative system among different chiefs."-EDWARD THORNTON, Esq., to
SIR CHARLES STEWART, February 19, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix.
277-279.

"1

XII.

1814.

necessary. They having answered in the affirmative, he CHAP. at once declared that he took upon himself the whole responsibility of the proceeding, and that he would remove all difficulties with the Prince Royal of Sweden. Upon this all objections were hushed, and it was decided that Blucher should be reinforced by the entire corps of Winzingerode and Bulow, and then move forward between the Seine and the Marne, in the way which he might deem most conformable to the general interests." So over- Thiers, joyed was Alexander at this solution of his difficulties, 415. that he forthwith wrote a note in pencil in the councilroom, ordering these generals to place themselves under Blucher's orders, and gave it to his envoy, who instantly returned in the highest spirits to this ardent general. It is not going too far to assert that to the effects of this resolution, and the moral courage of the minister who brought it about, the fall of Napoleon is immediately to Dan. 129. be ascribed.2

2*

* Lord Ripon, who was with Lord Castlereagh at that time, though not a member of the council, gives exactly the same account of this memorable conference :-"From Napoleon's central position between the armies of Blucher and Schwartzenberg, he was enabled to fall with his main strength upon each of them separately, and experience had proved that neither of them was able singly to withstand his concentrated efforts. Blucher's army was much inferior in numbers to Schwartzenberg's, and the thing to be done was to reinforce Blucher to such an extent as to insure the success of his movements. But where were the reinforcements to be found? There was nothing immediately at hand but a body of Russians under St Priest, who were on their march to Kheims to join the corps to which they belonged in Blucher's army, and they were manifestly insufficient for the purpose. But there were two other strong corps, one of Prussians under Bulow, and one of Russians under Winzingerode, who were on their march from Flanders, and might be brought forward with decisive effect. They, however, belonged to the army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, who had not at that time crossed the Rhine; they were under his orders, and he was very tenacious of his authority over them; and when it was suggested that the only mode of adequately reinforcing Blucher was by placing these corps at his disposal without a moment's delay, the difficulty of withdrawing them from Bernadotte's command, without a previous and probably tedious discussion with him, was represented by a great authority [Alexander] as insurmountable. Lord Castlereagh was present at the council when this matter was discussed; and the moment he understood that, militarily speaking, the proposed plan was indispensable to success, he took his line. He stated that in that case the plan must be adopted, and the necessary orders immediately given-that England had a right to expect that her allies would not be deterred from a decisive course by any such difficulties as had been urged ; and

xvii. 414,

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