CHAP. XII. 1814. 96. reagh's measures to nadotte. To reconcile the Crown Prince to this rude though unavoidable invasion of his authority was the next care of Lord Castlereagh, and he did this in the most effectual way. Lord Castle- Independent of the sway which he necessarily possessed as the distributor of the subsidies which maintained the pacify Ber- Allied armies, and of which the Crown Prince received £100,000 monthly, his personal influence was still greater. He possessed in the highest degree that rare quality which so often gives the lead in arduous affairs, a clear perception of the inevitable, and a firm determination to accept its responsibilities, and work out its necessities. In addition to this he had at his command a most effectual means, of which he made skilful use, of allaying the jealousy and gratifying the vanity of the Crown Prince. By great exertions, powerfully aided by the loyalty and patriotic spirit of the inhabitants, Lord Castlereagh had succeeded in forming a very considerable army in Hanover and the north of Germany. Twenty-five thousand men had been raised in Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick alone. Seven thousand English were under Sir Thomas Graham in the Low Countries; the Dutch contingent already amounted to 10,000; and even the distant Danes, whom necessity had compelled to join the Coalition, were expected to furnish 8000 or 9000 men. All these troops were in the pay of England. Thus an army of 50,000 men was at the disposal of Great Britain; and this great force Lord Castlereagh proposed to put under the command of the Crown Prince to supply the chasm occasioned by the abstraction of Winzingerode and Bulow's corps. This offer was accompanied by the flattering observation, that the formation of a powerful army in the he boldly took upon himself all the responsibility of any consequences that might arise as regarded the Crown Prince of Sweden. His advice prevailed; Blucher's ariny was reinforced in time; the battle of Laon was fought successfully, and no further efforts of Buonaparte could oppose the march of the Allies on Paris, and their triumphant occupation of that city. It is not, then, too much to say that the vigour and energy displayed by Lord Castlereagh in this crisis decided the fate of the campaign."-EARL OF RIPON to MARQUESS LONDONDERRY, July 6, 1839; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 129, 130. XII. 1814. rear was in conformity with the military advice of the CHAP, Crown Prince to secure the conquests of the Coalition as they were made, and to leave no strongholds in the hands of the enemy in their rear. In conformity with this plan, the army of Bernadotte, which would by these means be again raised to 80,000 men, was to be intrusted with the reduction of the fortresses still in the enemy's possession in Flanders and the Rhenish provinces. Bernadotte was too happy to close with this compromise, as it relieved him from the necessity, of which he was so apprehensive, of marring his prospects in France by openly taking part in its invasion. He in consequence accepted Cast. Cor. without objection the proposed arrangement, and acqui-ix. 293; esced in the transference of Bulow's and Winzingerode's 445, 446. men to the ranks of Blucher.1 * * "I have had a full explanation with Baron Wetterstedt and Count Löwenhjelm, who approve the considerations which have led to the decision regarding the army under the command of the Crown Prince. The object is, at least partially, to return to the Prince Royal's advice-namely, to consolidate more regularly as we proceed the fruits of our victories, and not to pour all our strength prematurely into France. The natural course to effect this is to incorporate all the force now advanced on the Nancy and Chalons line into one powerful army, and to assemble everything in the rear into a great army in the Low Countries, to complete the conquest of the fortresses on the side of Holland, and so to organise itself for active service in the field as to form a rampart upon which the more advanced may retire in case of need. It is the wish of the Allied sovereigns to confide this important command to the Prince Royal, if his Royal Highness will undertake it heartily and cordially, in the spirit of the political views which have been opened to him, and which have already received his Royal Highness's sanction and approbation. Our intentions, with respect to the compensations to be given for the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet in the Scheldt, have already been declared. "My wish is that the troops naturally connected with Great Britain should be placed under Sir Thomas Graham, as the corps hitherto connected with Hanover have been under General Walmoden. Including the troops in the north of Germany, to the command of which you will observe the Prince Regent is entitled to nominate, there will be ample means of forming two powerful divisions, in which may be incorporated the Danish corps which Great Britain is to subsidise. The Swedes will then form a third division under their own commander, and the Dutch army will constitute the fourth corps d'armée. I shall write to Lord Clancarty to submit the whole arrangement to the favourable consideration of the Prince of Orange, and shall use my good offices to prevail on his Royal Highness to concur in the general wish entertained by the Allied sovereigns at headquarters that the Prince Royal should be invited to charge himself with the command of the whole as generalissimo; and that, with this view, all the troops acting in advance of the Meuse should be placed VOL. II. X Thiers, xvii. CHAP. XII. Division of the Allies, and Lord Castlereagh's efforts to unite them. "Our military position," wrote Lord Aberdeen at this time to Lord Castlereagh, "is good; and I trust that a 1814. speedy success will be the means of restoring to us all we 97. have lost. On this part of the subject I have never had dr any serious apprehensions: the enemy is, in my view, a source of danger much less to be dreaded than disunion among ourselves. I cannot too often represent to you the real state of the minds of those weak men by whom Europe is governed. The seeming agreement at Langres covered distrust and hate. A little success will cement them again; but if they are to be severely tried in adversity, their dissolution is certain. Your presence has done much, and I have no doubt would continue to sustain them in misfortune, but without it they could not exist. It is not a bystander who speaks, but one who knows what their real feelings are, and who knows that 1 Lord Aber- they are actuated by feelings more than principle. In deen to all events, I am heartily glad that you are in a situation reagh, Cha to see and judge for yourself in all things. It will do you no harm to see and know the interior of a Coalition. iz. 297, 298. I trust there is no chance that the endeavours of Buonaparte to disunite us should produce any effect."1 Lord Castle tillon, Feb. 28, 1814, Cast. Cor. 98. reagh urges the Allies new alli to form a No one felt more strongly than Lord Castlereagh the Lord Castle- extreme danger which the Coalition ran from these divisions, which were equally liable to be brought to an alarming height by victory or defeat. For if the latter awakened again the strong instinct of self-preservation and the prestige of Napoleon's invincibility, the former threatened to bring the three great Powers directly into collision Alexander desiring to put Bernadotte as his ance. ... under his Royal Highness's orders, as soon as it is ascertained that the Prince Royal accedes to the views of the Allies. . . With respect to the reception of his minister in the Allied councils at Chatillon, we are all very sincerely disposed to put ourselves into his hands. If, upon reflection, his Royal Highness persists in claiming it, we are of opinion it cannot be refused; but we must decline, in that case, the odium of excluding the other lesser Powers. The alternative then practically is, whether this tentative for peace shall be made by four Powers or by four-and-twenty."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR THORNTON, February 27, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 293, 294. XII. 1814. military lieutenant on the throne of France, the Prince CHAP. Regent being inspired with a chivalrous desire to restore his decrowned guest, Louis XVIII., to the throne of his ancestors, and the Emperor of Austria to establish a regency, of which Marie Louise might be the head during the minority of his grandson, the young Napoleon. He felt the greatest anxiety, therefore, to take advantage of the apprehensions and spirit of concord which Napoleon's late successes had produced, to form a lasting alliance between the great Powers, which might oppose a permanent barrier to the ambition of France. In this endeavour he was cordially and generously supported by the Emperor Alexander, who, overjoyed at the decisive support he had received from Lord Castlereagh in the important matter of transferring the two corps from Bernadotte's army to Blucher's, was again restored to even more than his former cordiality with the English minister. The result was the TREATY OF CHAUMONT, which Lord Castlereagh drew up, and which was signed by the four great Powers on March 1st. It remains a durable monument of his 1 Fain, 301, wisdom and foresight, for it led to the overthrow of 302; Thiers, Napoleon's power, and gave peace and unexampled pros- 417. perity to Europe for forty years.1 By this treaty the four great Powers-viz., Russia, "The discussions at Troyes were necessarily painful, and gave to my intercourse with the Emperor [of Russia] a more controversial character than I could have wished; and I had reason to know that he was not a little impatient of the opposition he had met with from me: but this is all gone by, and bis Imperial Majesty now encourages me to come to him without form. I see him almost every day, and he receives me with great kindness, and converses with me freely on all subjects. . . I don't know that the negotiation [for an armistice], as it has turned out, has had any effect whatever upon the operations, however it may, from the extraordinary circumstances under which it was brought forward, have tempted the enemy to presume upon the Allies politically; and in ending so, I hope we have so managed as to recover our position of authority, which has restored harmony and confidence amongst ourBelves. The Austrian reserves are now arriving daily; and as Winzingerode, Bulow, St Priest, and the Saxons, are all either up or at hand, our military position is essentially improved. I know of no other defect in it than the difficulty of bringing the two armies into more close connection, Buonaparte having the advantage of the central position.”—-LORD CASTLEREAGH to Lord LIVERPOOL, Chatillon, March 5, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 312. xvii. 416, CHAP. Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain-bound themselves, XII. in the event of France refusing the terms proposed of 1814. retiring within her ancient limits, to form an alliance 99. Treaty of offensive and defensive, for the support of which each was to maintain 150,000 men in the field. As it was known that England could not maintain so large a force of native troops, the difference was to be made up by Continental forces in her pay. To enable the other Powers to maintain forces so considerable, England bound herself to pay annually, during the whole continuance of the war, a subsidy of £5,000,000 sterling, in addition to the payment of her own contingent, to be divided equally between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. If she preferred making good any part of her contingent in money instead of men, she was to pay £20 annually for every foot-soldier, and £30 for every horseman. The trophies of war were to be equally divided, and no peace made by any Power, except of common consent; the treaty was to last for twenty years certain, with power to renew it within that time if the contracting parties deemed it advisable. After peace was concluded, each of the Allies was to furnish a contingent of 60,000 men, including 10,000 horse, to assist any one which might be attacked by France, besides additional troops, if rendered necessary. By this treaty England took her place, as a great military power, on level with the greatest on the Continent. Amazing and decisive was the preponderance in Continental affairs which this alliance gave to her. "She was to contribute," says Thiers, "in men and money, double that furnished by any of the other Powers, triple if her navy were taken into account, 1 Schoell, x. which gave her a decisive superiority over any of the tens, i. 683; other Powers, and rendered it a matter of certainty that any future peace would have no other base but her desires." 1 317; Mar Thiers, xvii. 419. In addition to those stipulations which composed the public treaty, there were secret articles agreed to, of the |