XII. 1814. 100. ticles of the treaty. utmost moment for the future distribution of power in CHAP. Europe, and the preservation of its balance. It was agreed, 1st, That the old Germanic Empire should be restored, but in the form of a federal union, to be gov- Secret arerned, so far as its common concerns went, by a Diet, chosen by the Powers composing it, in proportions to be afterwards fixed; 2d, Switzerland was to be independent under the guarantee of the great Powers, Italy divided into independent states, and Spain restored to its ancient sovereigns and limits; 3d, Holland was to be enlarged in territory by the union with Belgium, and to form a monarchy under the house of Orange; 4th, Power was reserved to Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the Prince of Orange, to accede to this treaty; 5th, "Considering the necessity which might exist, even after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, to keep in the field during a certain time forces adequate to carry into effect the arrangements which the Allied Powers might agree upon for confirming the peace of Europe, the high contracting Powers agree to concert among themselves the requisite provisions, not only regarding the necessity, but the importance and distribution of the forces requisite for this purpose; but under this limitation, that none of the Powers should be obliged to keep such forces for this end on foot more than a year without their express consent." Lord Castlereagh gives the following curious account of the circumstances attending the final signature of this memorable treaty :-"I send you my treaty, which I hope you will approve. We four ministers, when signing, happened to be sitting at a whist-table. It was agreed that never were the stakes so high at any former party. My modesty would have prevented me from offering it; but as they chose to make us a military power, I was determined not to play a second fiddle. The fact is, that upon the face of the treaty this year our engagement is equivalent to theirs united. We give 150,000 men, and £5,000,000, equal to as many more - total 300,000. They give 450,000, of which we, however, supply 150,000, leaving their own number 300,000. The fact, however, is that, sick, lame, and lazy, they pay a great number more. On the other hand, we give to the value of 125,000 men beyond the 300,000. What an extraordinary display of power! This, I trust, will put an end to any doubts as to the claim we have to an opinion on Continental matters."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR HAMILTON, Chaumont, March 10, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 336. CHAP. 1814. 1 Hard. xii. 353; Schoell, x. 421. 101. a virtual This secret treaty, which was the basis on which the whole subsequent arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were formed, was a complete development of the views of Lord Castlereagh, which he had in part inherited from Mr Pitt, for the settlement of the affairs of Europe on such a basis as might serve as a guarantee in future against the encroachments of French ambition.1 The signature of this treaty was a virtual dissoluWhich was tion both of the Congress of Chatillon and the Conferdissolution ences of Lusigny, because it bound the Allied Powers to of the Con- demand conditions, as a basis either of armistice or paciChatillon. fication, which were so utterly at variance with any in gress of which Napoleon would concur, that neither a cessation of hostilities nor a peace was practicable till the sword had determined the points in dispute between them. In fact, so determined was Napoleon to agree to no peace which did not secure to him an easy entrance, at any future period, into Holland, Germany, and Italy, that he wrote to Caulaincourt on 19th March, after the Congress had been broken up, directing him to enter into no engagement which should embrace the cession of the fortresses of Antwerp, Mayence, and Alessandria, and declaring that even if he (Caulaincourt) had been obliged to agree to such a cession, and he himself had ratified, he would still be regulated by his military situation as to whether he should carry it into execution. When the 2 Sir Chas. minds of both parties were thus decisively made up, the Lord Castle- continued sitting of the Congress was evidently a vain. tillon, formality, prolonged for no other reason than from the 1814, desire of each to throw upon the other the odium of breakix. 323; and ing off negotiations, and gain time for additional preLord Aber- parations. So frivolous and unmeaning, indeed, were the Lord Castle- proceedings of the Congress after this time, that they justified the caustic observation of Sir Charles Stewart, Ibid. 325. that "if they were all sick, their laquais de place could do their duties just as well as themselves." 2* The in"It appears to me, as instructions stand, that if we were all sick, our Stewart to reagh, Cha March 8, Cast. Cor. deen to reagh, March 8, 1814, XII. structions of the Allied sovereigns to their commissioners CHAP. were to take every proposal or contre-projet of the French plenipotentiary ad referendum; which, by necessarily occasioning a delay of several days for each, seemed to afford the means of prolonging the conferences without any result for an indefinite time. gress of the and chang On the 25th February, the day on which the import- 102. ant orders for the dislocation of Bernadotte's army were Slow progiven, instructions of a more peremptory kind were sent negotiation, to the Allied plenipotentiaries, enjoining an immediate inst rupture of the negotiations if the basis proposed by the tions to the Allies was not accepted within the time necessary for tiaries communicating with the French headquarters. The re * laquais de place could just as well do our duties here; everything is to be taken ad referendum; and in the letter of this day it is rather curiously argued that the delay of twenty-four hours can make no essential difference in the determination that may be taken by France. Now this is entirely in the teeth of all our former doctrines; for inasmuch as we have laid down that the events of the war must necessarily alter our terms, so in justice must France have the same advantage, and a battle gained by Buonaparte during the reference to headquarters might entirely change Caulaincourt's answer. My impression on this is, that you must fix your general ideas better, and give us some more extended discretion, if you mean we should be an efficient Congress for peace or war. If, on the contrary, you like to train on the things left us, we should know your drift. You have certainly so distinctly stated that every rejoinder that comes from the French plenipotentiary should be taken ad referendum, that the only possible case where we should be puzzled would be the acceptance of our projet by Caulaincourt, and the request from him on our part to sign the preliminaries. Now, though I admit this is very improbable, still it is on the cards by a great defeat of Buonaparte by Blucher, and a sudden order sent here to close on the projet. As negotiators, how should we stand if we delayed accepting the terms we have laid down? And still, according to your orders, we must even in such case refer. It is most probable that Caulaincourt will accompany his projet, if he comes near our conditions, by a direct proposition for an armistice, yielding very likely to your line of demarcation. He has appeared very much cast down that this has fallen to the ground. As events stand now, twenty-four hours may make the whole difference, and the Allies should not play so very changeable and undefined a game. I am told, if we do nothing here, and all breaks off, the armies and some of their chiefs will be again as clamorous for armistice, to change the theatre of the war, to give repose, &c., as they have been before. It is only the hope of our doing something that has reconciled them to the breaking off of the armistice."-SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, March 8, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 322, 323. * "Vous vous concerterez avec le négociateur Français à l'égard du tems indispensablement nécessaire pour communiquer avec son Gouvernement par la route la plus directe, et vous declarerez là dessus que, si à telle époque une réponse conforme en substance à la base établie dans le projet des Alliés instruc plenipoten Feb. 28. XII. 1814. CHAP. solution, however, was afterwards departed from by the Allies, evidently to gain time to see what the junction of Bulow and Winzingerode's corps to the army of Blucher might produce; and at the meeting of the Congress on the 28th February, the 10th March was fixed on as the final period within which the French answer was to be received. Yet even in the event of none coming, the Congress was not to be ipso facto dissolved, but that fact to be reported to the Allied headquarters.* 103. proposed on Feb. 17. The detailed terms, finally proposed by the Allied Final terms Sovereigns to the French plenipotentiary on the 17th February, were as follows: France reduced to its old limits as in 1790; the abandonment of the titles of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of Switzerland, and King of Italy; the construction of all the countries adjoining France in an independent form ; the organisation of Germany in the form of a federal union; of Italy in independent states, between the Austrian possessions and the French frontier; the independence of Switzerland as a separate republic; the formation of a kingdom in Holland for the Prince of Orange, augmented by Flanders; finally, the restoration of the Peninsular thrones to the houses of Braganza and Bourbon. In return for these demands, the British Government consented to restore the whole French colonies conquered by them during the war, with the exception of the Cape and the islands of Bourbon and the Mauritius in the East, and those of Saintes and Tobago in the West Indies; Malta to remain in the hands of the English, but Sweden and Portugal to restore respectively n'était point arrivée, la négociation serait regardée comme terminée, et que les plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées retourneraient au quartier-général.”—Instructions, February 25, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 323, 324. * "Dans le cas, peu probable au reste, où le plénipotentiaire Français laisserait écouler la journée du dix sans réponse quelconque, votre Excellence voudra bien dès la matinée du onze lui remettre conjointement avec Messieurs ses collègues une note pour lui annoncer que ce fait a été porté à la connoissance des Cours Alliées."-Instructions, March 7, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 324. XII. 1814. Guadaloupe and Cayenne. It is worthy of especial notice, CHAP. that in these proposals the whole cessions on the Allied side were on the part of Great Britain, which had contended the longest, and been most triumphant in the struggle; and that nothing was demanded from France but the abandonment of her conquests since the Revolution, without the cession of a village in her ancient territory. How different had been the conduct of Napoleon in similar circumstances, when in 1805 he insisted on the cession by Austria of a fourth of her territory, 1 See Projet and in 1809 of a fourth of what remained, and in 1806 des Alliées, spoliated Prussia by the seizure of half her territories 236-243; and the imposition of a war contribution of £24,000,000 Bign. xiii. sterling, equivalent to at least double the sum in this xvii. 367. country!1 Koch, ii. Fain, 327; 306; Thiers, court's an swer and counter To these proposals, which were put forward by the 104. Allies rather to vindicate their own consistency than from Caulainany idea that they would be acceded to by the French Emperor, it was answered by Caulaincourt at the meeting project. of the Congress on the 10th March-the very last day March 10. the Allies would allow him to give in an answer: "The three Powers have declared, only three months ago, at Frankfort, that they wished to establish an equilibrium of power in Europe. They profess the same desire now, and France concurs in that wish. But Europe does not resemble at this time what she was twenty years ago. Then the kingdom of Poland, already partitioned, disappeared entirely; the immense empire of Russia received vast and rich provinces; 6,000,000 of men were added to dominions already more extensive than any in Europe, while 9,000,000 fell to the lot of Austria and Prussia. Soon after, the position of Germany was changed. The ecclesiastical states, and most of the free cities, were divided among the secular princes; Austria and Prussia received the greater part of them. The ancient republic of Venice became a province of Austria; 2,000,000 of subjects, with new territories and new resources, were |