XII. CHAP. given to Russia by the treaty of Tilsit, by that of Vienna, of Jassy, and of Abo. On her side, during the same 1814. period, England has not only acquired the Dutch possessions of Ceylon and Trinidad, but she has doubled her territories in India, and gained an empire there which the greatest monarchies in Europe could hardly equal. If the population of that empire cannot be considered an addition to the inhabitants of Great Britain, she has at least gained by their sovereignty an immense addition of riches, the other great element of power. Russia and England have preserved all that they have acquired; and Austria and Prussia have, it is true, sustained losses, but do they abandon all thoughts of repairing them, or will they now be contented with the possessions they enjoyed before the war? When all has thus changed around France, can it maintain the same relative power if it is reduced to its original limits? Replaced in its original state, it would be far from enjoying the same influence or security when the power of its neighbours has so immensely increased. England can only be attacked by sea; Russia, backed by the pole, and flanked on either side by inaccessible and boundless solitudes, can be invaded, since the acquisition of Finland, only on one side. France, half commercial and March 10, half territorial, is open to attack on all sides, both by land and sea, on both of which elements she is brought in contact immediately with valiant nations.”1 1 ContreProjet de Caulain court, 1814; Fain, 335. 105. Contreprojet at The Allied plenipotentiaries, upon receiving at the eleventh hour this professed contre-projet, declared that the memoir (for such it was) was no answer to their ultisented by matum, and that the conference need not any longer be prolonged.* Upon this, Caulaincourt, finding himself length pre Caulain court. "M. de Caulaincourt reads his observations [given above]. "Count Stadion.-Is this your answer to our projet? I suppose we are to take it as a refusal. "M. de Caulaincourt.-It is not a refusal; they are only observations. I request you to examine them. "Count Stadion.-After waiting so long, we expected to have had a precise answer. "M. de Caulaincourt.-I refuse nothing. You perceive the objects upon 66 XII. 1814. driven to the wall, and the conference on the point of CHAP. breaking up, drew from his breast a real contre-projet of proposals on the part of the French Emperor, which was only announced by him as verbal, and was to this effect: The French plenipotentiary, on the part of the French Emperor, declares verbally that he is ready to renounce all expressions tending to convey the idea of supremacy, protection, or constitutional influence, in countries beyond the limits of France; to recognise the independence of Spain in its ancient limits, under the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII.; the independence of Italy; the independence of Switzerland under the guarantee of the great Powers; the independence of Holland under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange; and, to render peace more durable between France and England, he declares his readiness to make cessions beyond sea, such as may be deemed necessary in consideration of a reasonable 1 Protocol, equivalent." When this projet was read, Lord Cathcart March 10, asked "what colonies France had to cede?" "None," Cast. Cor. replied M. de Caulaincourt; "but the French colonies you Fain, 335. possess are by conquest, not by cession." 1 1814; ix. 559-561; 106. the Allies. Caulaincourt was well aware that this contre-projet could not be considered as satisfactory by the Allies, for Rejected by it was silent on the fundamental article of the extent of March 13. France, whether within the ancient limits or as she now stood—that is, extending to the Alps and the Rhine, and so including Antwerp, Mayence, and Chambery. The Allied plenipotentiaries, however, in conformity with their instructions, took the contre-projet ad referendum; and, on the 13th a long conference took place regarding it. The Allied plenipotentiaries here met Caulaincourt's verbal which the observations particularly apply. I request you to consider them. tion to give us an answer-an acceptance or a refusal ? Is it your inten "Baron Humboldt.-We have orders to demand an answer. Our conference must break up; we cannot discuss upon nothing. "Count Stadion.-We cannot continue the conference."-Protocol, March 10, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 557-559. XII. 1814. CHAP. contre-projet by a declaration that they considered, in consequence of it, the negotiations broken off by the French Government. Notwithstanding the peremptory tenor of their rejoinder, however, the Congress still continued to sit, and was not finally broken up till the 19th. The anxiety of the French Emperor to prolong the conferences in order to gain time for military successes, was the cause of this otherwise inexplicable delay. The general tenor of the discussion was that the Allies insisted for the ancient limits, and Caulaincourt contended for the Frankfort basis, which undoubtedly recognised the frontiers of the Rhine. At last, at his earnest request, Caulaincourt The got the conference on the 13th adjourned first for twenty55,5; four hours, and, after its expiry, for a longer period, to March 10 give the French plenipotentiary time to consult the Em1814, Cast. peror. During the interval, in conformity with Napoleon's final instructions, he drew up a detailed series of proposals, which he gave in writing at a conference on the 15th.1 1 Fain, 389; Protocol, and 13. Cor. ix. 559 568. 107. Final pro These were, that France should retain Antwerp, Flanders, and the frontier of the Rhine, but withdraw posals of Napoleon, from Westphalia, Holland, Spain, Illyria, and Italy. and rupture Holland was to be restored to the Prince of Orange, of the Con March 15, Spain to Ferdinand VII. The Pope was to return to Rome; Germany to be reconstituted as an independent confederation; Italy also to be independent, but Prince Eugene and the Princess Eliza to have states assigned * "Sir C. Stewart.-Are we to understand from you that you will give no other contre-projet than what you call the Frankfort basis? "M. de Caulaincourt.—I give you this as a premier contre-projet. "Count Stadion.-We reject it entirely-we have our instructions. "M. de Caulaincourt.-If this is the case, I ask that the conference may be adjourned for two hours, or until the evening. "This was agreed to."-Protocol, March 13, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 563. "Nous avons l'ordre de déclarer que la négociation est rompue par le Gouvernement Français; que nous exécutons cet ordre en faisant cette déclaration; que nous ne refusons pas au plénipotentiaire Français l'envoi d'un courier à son maître, accompagné d'un officier au quartier-général des souverains Alliés; mais qu'à moins de recevoir des ordres nous ne pouvons agir qu'en conformité de la déclaration ci-dessus."-Protocol, March 13, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 566. them therein. England was to retain Malta, but restore most of her colonies to France. This contre-projet was read by Caulaincourt, and taken ad referendum by the Allied plenipotentiaries. At the next meeting of the conference, three days afterwards (18th), Count Stadion read a formal answer on the part of the Allies peremptorily rejecting it, and declaring the Congress dissolved.* A final meeting of the plenipotentiaries took place the “Europe, allied against the French Government, desires only the establishment of a general peace, Continental and maritime. Such a peace can alone give the world the repose of which it stands so much in need; but that peace cannot subsist without a due partition of force among the different Powers. No views of ambition have dictated the proposals on the part of the Allies in the sitting of 17th February last. France, even when restored to her limits of 1792, is still, from her central situation, the riches of her soil, the strength of her frontiers, the number and distribution of her fortified places, on a level with the greatest Power on the Continent. The other Powers, in consenting to their own reconstruction on a proportionate scale, and to the establishment of intermediate independent secondary states, give the best proof of the principles which animate them. England restores to France her colonies, and with them her commerce and marine. She does more in denuding herself of the many conquests which she has made during so many years, she does not advance any pretension inconsistent with the freedom of the seas, or any right inconsistent with the free enjoyment of commerce by others. Inspired with a spirit of justice and liberality worthy of a great people, England throws into the balance of the Continent acquisitions beyond the sea, of which the possession would secure for her for long the exclusive dominion of it. In making these sacrifices to purchase not a merely nominal but a real equilibrium in Europe, the British Government is entitled to expect that they shall afford her a guarantee that these concessions have not been a pure loss on her part, that they will not be turned against Europe and herself. "The contre-projet of the French plenipotentiary proceeds on entirely different principles. According to it, France will retain a territory more extensive than experience has shown to be consistent with the peace of Europe. She will retain those salient points and offensive positions by the aid of which she has already overturned so many of the adjoining states. The cessions she proposes to make are seeming, not real. The principles still announced by the actual ruler of France, and the dear-bought experience of many years, have proved that adjoining secondary states possessed by members of his family can be independent only in name. Were they to deviate from the principles on which their projet rests, the Allied sovereigns would have done nothing for the peace or safety of Europe; the efforts of so many sovereigns, leagued together for one end, would be lost; the weakness of their Cabinets would turn at once against themselves and their subjects. Europe, and France itself, would soon become the victims of fresh convulsions; Europe would not conclude peace-she would only disarm. The Allied Courts, therefore, considering the contre-projets of France essentially at variance not merely with the details, but with the spirit of the basis proposed by them; regarding further prolongation of the Congress of Chatillon as useless and dangerous-useless, because the proposals of France are at variance with the conditions which the Allies con XIL 1814. CHAP. 1 Thiers, xvii. 506 next day (19th), to receive and record Caulaincourt's reply to the Allied declaration. When this form was 1814. complied with, Count Stadion rose and said, in a solemn voice, "We have only now to express our regret that we have not been more successful;" to which M. de tocol, March Caulaincourt replied, "You cannot doubt how much I 1814: Cast. regret it also. Je le sens dans toutes les manières." With that they separated, and the most momentous Congress of modern times came to an end.1 508; Pro 15, 18, 19, Cor. ix. 562-573. 108. letter to So great was Metternich's anxiety to get the French Metternich's plenipotentiary to come to an arrangement, that he reCaulain peatedly, during the sitting of the Congress, wrote to cart, urg- Caulaincourt, urging, in the strongest terms, the acceptance acceptance of the Allies' proposals, and pointing out, in particular, of the Allies, the great sacrifices England was prepared to make to ing the of the terms effect an accommodation.* On the 18th March, the very day before the Congress broke up at Chatillon, he wrote to Caulaincourt in these terms: "The day when peace may be finally concluded, under the necessary sacrifices, has at length arrived. Try to conclude it, but without contending for inadmissible objects. Matters have now come to such a pass that you can no longer write romances without the greatest risk to the Emperor Napoleon. What sider necessary to the equilibrium of Europe, and to the reconstruction of the social edifice to which they are determined to consecrate the whole forces with which Providence has intrusted them-dangerous, because the prolongation of sterile negotiations would only inspire the people of Europe with vain expectations of peace, the Allied Powers, therefore, with regret regard the Congress of Chatillon as dissolved: and they cannot separate without declaring that they make no war on France; that they regard the proper dimensions of that empire as one of the first conditions of a proper balance of power; but they will not lay down their arms until their principles have been recognised and admitted by its Government."-FAIN, 357-361; KocH, ii. 360-363. "I will always hold to you the same language; it should be appreciated by men of sense, who really desire the good of their country. We have but one wish, that of peace; but that peace is impossible if you will not make the necessary sacrifices to regain your possessions beyond the seas. To arrive at that peace it is necessary to be equally prepared for the means by which it is to be obtained, and not to forget that England disposes alone of all the compensations possible, and that, in agreeing to denude herself in favour of France of almost the whole of her conquests, she is entitled to insist that she shall be replaced on a level with the other great Powers on the Continent, and not above them."-METTERNICH to CAULAINCOURT, March 18, 1814; FAIN, 305, 306. |