XII.

risks, on the other hand, do the Allies run? None but CHAP. being obliged to evacuate the territory of old France; and what would that avail the Emperor Napoleon? The whole left bank of the Rhine will speedily be raised against him. Savoy is in arms. Attacks, purely personal, will soon be made on the Emperor, without the possibility of arresting them. I speak to you with sincerity. I am always on the same path. You know my views, my principles, my wishes. The first are entirely European, and therefore not alien to France; the second point to retaining Austria interested in the wellbeing of France; the third are in favour of a dynasty so intimately united to our own. I speak to you, my dear Duke, in the most entire confidence. To put an end to the dangers which menace France, all that is required is for your master to make peace. Matters, if he does not do so, will ere long be beyond his reach. The throne of Louis XIV., with the additions of Louis XV., is too high a stake to put upon a single throw. I will do my utmost to retain Lord Castlereagh for a few days; the moment he has gone, all hope of peace has vanished.” Caulaincourt replied on the 20th: "If it depended on me, your hopes would speedily be realised. I should have Metternich no doubt they would, if I were sure that yourself and to Caulain Lord Castlereagh were to be the instruments of this work, March 18, as desirable as it is glorious." But it was all in vain. CaulainNapoleon would neither recede from his demands nor 20, 1814; accede to those of the Allies, and everything was left to 313. the arbitrament of the sword.1

court,

1814;

court, March

Fain, 311,

109.

resolution

don Ant

It was Napoleon's determination not to relinquish Antwerp, Mayence, and Alessandria, and with them his Napoleon's designs against Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, which not to aban was the immediate cause of the rupture of the Congress and of Chatillon. Down to the very last he adhered to this Mantua led resolution. All Caulaincourt's entreaties, and they were, many and earnest, could not prevail on him to abandon off. these great offensive strongholds. Of all three, it was on Antwerp that his affections were most strongly set.

So

to the conferences

being broken

XII.

1814.

March 17.

CHAP. determined was he to hold by this important fortress, that on the 17th March, ten days before the Congress of Chatillon broke up, Maret, by his orders, wrote to Caulaincourt from Rheims, urging him to hold by Antwerp and the basis of Frankfort, so far as Italy was concerned.* March 19. And on the 19th, the day when it was finally dissolved, he wrote to Caulaincourt not only positively forbidding any engagement for the cession of Antwerp, Mayence, and Alessandria, but declaring that, even if he had entered into such an engagement, and he himself had ratified it, it would depend on his military position whether or not he would carry it into execution. Nor were these merely the views of the French Emperor when heated in the conflict, and when a single considerable military success might have entirely changed his political position. They were adhered to by him years afterwards in the solitude of St Helena. Antwerp," said he there to Las Cases, "was to me a province in itself; it was the principal cause of my exile to St Helena, for it was the required cession 1 Las Cas. of that fortress which made me refuse the terms offered at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace

vii. 43-46, 56, 57.

would have been concluded."1

Although the Congress of Chatillon was brought to this prosperous conclusion, so far as the unanimity of the Allies was concerned, yet it was with the utmost diffi

* "The abandonment of all their conquests by the English is a real concession, which his Majesty approves, especially if it can be combined with leaving us Antwerp. If the negotiation is to be broken off, let it be on the demand for the cession of our strongholds, and the evacuation of our territory. If you are pushed to abandon Antwerp, insist on the restitution of all our colonies, including the Isle of France, and the adherence to the basis of Frankfort so far as regards Italy."-MARET to CAULAINCOURT, Rheims, March 17, 1814; FAIN, 307, 308.

"L'Empereur desire que vous ne preniez aucune engagement positif à l'égard de tout ce qui concerne la remise des forteresses d'Anvers, de Mayence, et d'Alexandrie, si vous êtes obligé de consentir à leur cession. Son intention étant même dans le cas où il aurait ratifié le traité de se regler sur les circonstances militaires. Attendez jusqu'au dernier moment. En un mot S. M. desire se trouver après le traité encore même de pouvoir tirer parti des circonstances jusqu'au dernier moment."-NAPOLÉON à CAULAINCOURT, 19 Mars 1814; SCHOELL'S Recueil, v. 129.

XII.

1814.

110.

favour, and

culty that they were held together, and the causes of CHAP. division among them were so many and urgent, that by the concurring testimony of all who had the best sources of information as to the secret views of the Allied Courts, Chances in had it not been for the mingled firmness and moderation Napoleon's of Lord Castlereagh, the charm of his high-bred and great imchivalrous manners, and the sway which his decision of Lord Castlecharacter had acquired even over the greatest potentates, the Confederacy would have been broken up, and Napoleon would have emerged victorious out of all his dangers.* The great peril which it required all the firm

"In one's born days there never was such gross mismanagement. When the great headquarters arrived at Troyes, the left of Schwartzenberg's corps was extended beyond Osray and Montereau; a desperate cannonade was heard for two days in the direction of Blucher on the right, but the Grand Army was incapable of marching to his support, having extended so much to the left; and thus, not liking to come back again till they knew there was a great necessity, they remained at Troyes, and extended along the Seine several days, doing nothing. In the mean time, Napoleon with the same troops (the Guards and cavalry from Spain) marched from right to left, and from left to right, and successively squeezed Olsoofief (by the by, he suffocated him in his embrace), Sacken, D'York, Blucher, Wittgenstein, and the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg.

"After all this bitter folly on our part, concentration was determined on, and these conquerors found that they may outmanoeuvre themselves, and that simple uncomplicated movements with all your forces together, and in hand, is the way for unlettered generals to succeed. Had our Leipsic plan been persevered in-had each army been together-Blucher, collected, would have retired, and Schwartzenberg would have been on Buonaparte if he had followed him, but we must e'en manœuvre and alarm ourselves, right, left, and centre. Our total loss exceeds, I should think, 35,000 and 60 or 70 pieces of cannon. However, I am not sure but this will in the end be of advantage. I am clear our military position is better now than it has ever been, if turned with judgment to profit. We have suffered perhaps a moral defeat, but in every other respect we are more powerful than ever. The reserves of the Grand Army are all within a few days' march, and they are very numerous; and Blucher, joined by Bulow, Strogonoff, Winzingerode, and Woronzow, will have an army of 100,000 men, on that side alone, stronger than the French.

"With respect to our marche politique, at one time Bourbonists, at another grasping at any probability of peace-no fixed system of action at all. What Castlereagh has achieved is really wonderful; but for him, I believe all would fall. It might be judicious to keep Caulaincourt a little in play until you entered France, and saw what spirit you could actually rouse. Whatever of bad happens to us we richly deserve, for whatever is good we must thank Providence and Castlereagh. As to our work here, Caulaincourt individually wishes and works tooth and nail for peace, so far as depends on him. He dreads Buonaparte's successes even more than ours, lest they should make him more impracticable. Since the turn of affairs Napoleon has taken our disorder. He talks now of VOL. II. Y

portance of

reagh's pre

sence.

CHAP.

XII.

1814.

ness and address of Lord Castlereagh to avert, was that Austria would draw off and conclude a separate pacification with Napoleon, in which case the Russian and Prussian armies, left alone in the heart of the enemy's country, would have been forced to retreat, and surrender the whole objects of the war. Her conduct in the campaign had been so dilatory and backward that it could not be ascribed to timidity or military incapacity, but obviously arose from a desire to avoid pushing matters to extremities, and leaving time to Napoleon to conclude a peace on such terms as might secure the throne of France to himself, or at all events the regency to the Empress Marie-Louise, and the succession to his son. It has been seen that, so late as the 18th March, the very day before the Congress finally broke up, Metternich was strenuously urging Caulaincourt to conclude peace on those terms, which would have left Europe exposed to a renewal, at no distant date, of all the dangers from which they were on the point of escaping. We have Lord Castlereagh's own authority for the assertion, that indecision to a painful degree pervaded the Allied councils at this time; and

successes altering terms. We must go back to the Frankfort basis. He cannot treat until we are out of France, &c."-SIR CHARLES STEWART to EDWARD COOKE, Esq., Chatillon, February 28, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 554, 556.

"Caulaincourt came up to me before dinner to-day, and asked if there was any hope of your (Castlereagh's) return. I professed ignorance of your intentions. He said, 'For the love of God, engage him to return. If he were but here, and would listen to my propositions, so that we might understand one another, we should speedily conclude the affair. How is it possible to conclude matters at a public conference? Neither party can easily be brought to declare the last word, but I am confident, if we could discuss the points separately, there would be no material difference.""-LORD ABERDEEN to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Chatillon, March 10, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 335.

"I heartily congratulate the world that you are upon the spot to keep all things well together."-LORD CLANCARTY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Hague, March 7, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 319.

"How fortunate that you should be on the spot, to endeavour to keep all the horses of the great waggon at steady work, notwithstanding the obstacles they had to encounter, and the kicking, curveting, and fibbing propensities of some of them! Your letter to Metternich is an admirable piece, and the answer does honour to his sovereign."-LORD CLANCARTY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, The Hague, March 1, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 300.

indeed, considering the great interests Austria had at stake in the issue, adverse to that of the other Powers, the only wonderful thing is how they ever were reconciled. But for Lord Castlereagh's address and authority, and the terror inspired by Napoleon's victories, the prodigy never could have been effected.*

CHAP.

XII.

1814.

divisions

Poland, and

it.

In addition to those causes of division among the 111. Allies, arising from the difficulty in the disposal of the Source of throne of France in the event of success, another source regarding of disunion was already felt, and was daily becoming more Alexander's serious, regarding Poland. The Emperor Alexander's views on intention was no longer disguised, to incorporate that great country with his already vast dominions. It was evident that such a design could not fail of rousing in the highest degree the jealousy of the other Continental Powers- especially Austria — and widening the coolness already existing between them arising from the French question; but the Czar and his army were both so set upon the acquisition, and their position in regard to it was so commanding, that it was more than doubtful whether it could be prevented. Sir Charles Stewart, who was highly esteemed, and enjoyed the entire confidence of the Czar, has left the following precious account of a conversation he had with him on the subject during the

"The political question has been miserably prejudiced by opposite extremes of management: at one time too proud to listen to anything; at another, so impatient to be delivered from the presence of the enemy as to make our prolongation at Chatillon almost ludicrous. I hope, however, we have yet more of equanimity in our counsels than a bystander could predicate. You will see, from the instructions sent this night to Count Stadion, that the Allies, without wishing to give to their démarche the appearance of seeking a rupture, are decided upon bringing this negotiation to a short issue; and that whatever may be the turn of the war, they are determined to support the cause of Europe, as the only hope of real peace, firmly and perseveringly against Napoleon, till he shall substantially acquiesce in the terms proposed to him. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia have determined, in the absence of the Prince Royal, to place Winzingerode, including Woronzow and Strogonoff, together with Bulow, absolutely under Marshal Blucher's orders. He will thus have a very formidable force daily increasing, while this army is also falling back on its reserves. In fact, we are only inferior in unity of council." -LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD ABERDEEN, Chaumont, February 25, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix, 290.