X. 1813. 32. rations. campaign originally was to accumulate an imposing force CHAP. of 130,000 men in the neighbourhood of Pirna, wherewith to strike at the communications of the Allies with their base of operations in Bohemia, while St Cyr, with Napoleon's 25,000, made head against them under cover of the plan of operamparts and palisades of Dresden. When the advance. of the Allies in great force to Dresden rendered it necessary for him to fly to the assistance of the menaced capital, he by no means abandoned his favourite project of striking at the enemy's communications-he only changed the party by whom the blow was to be struck. His plan, a very obvious and reasonable one, now was to intrust Vandamme with stopping the return of the Allies, and himself, with 100,000 men, to assail them in rear when entangled in the passes of the mountains and overwhelmed with an enormous and unmanageable mass of artillery and baggage. Before setting out to relieve Dresden, he sent for General Haxo, and thus addressed him "Vandamme is beyond the Elbe, near Pirna; he will find himself on the rear of the enemy, whose anxiety to get possession of Dresden is evidently extreme. My design was to have followed up that movement by my whole army: it would perhaps have been the most effectual way to have brought matters to a speedy issue with the enemy; but I am anxious for Dresden - I cannot bring myself to sacrifice that town. must elapse before I can reach it; but I have decided, not without regret, to change my plan, and to march to its relief. Vandamme is in sufficient strength to play an important part in that general movement, and inflict an essential injury on the enemy. Let him advance from Pirna to Gieshübel, and gain the heights of Peterswalde; let him maintain himself there, occupy all the defiles, and from that impregnable post wait the issue of events before Dresden. To him is destined the lot of receiving the sword of the vanquished; but he will 259, 260. require sang froid: above all, he must not be imposed VOL. II. 1 Some hours C 1 Fain, ii. ink, when they came Treat danger then at Pirna 52 batt they mustered 20 Imperor put under : division of St C eau's cavalry, wil "Immediately aft was advanced to Pi Strong distant alon 2. ioL. to support hin same time, issue Murat. t red drive them Tandamme wools dome be hid h Vard to 17 DEUS BOT NE centre, pressed the rear of their columns; and Mortier, CHAP. with the Guard on the left road, could advance unop- X. posed to Vandamme's support. They might thus be ex- 1813. posed to almost certain ruin when attacked in rear and blocked up in front, while entangled with many thousand carriages among those narrow defiles and inhospitable ridges. On the other hand, if the French under Vandamme were defeated by the retiring masses of the Allied Grand Army, who would of necessity fight with the energy of despair to force their way through, a still greater catastrophe might be apprehended by Napoleon, as he would then be entirely cut off from the Elbe, and obliged to lay down his arms in the Bohemian plains. Thus both parties had equal motives for exertion; both saw clearly the vital importance of the contest; and the meanest soldier in the ranks was as strongly impressed with this as his chief. Vandamme was well aware of the perils with which his mission was attended, but he was a man of resolution, calm, experienced, and gifted with coup d'œil in danger: he knew that the Young Guard Jo was close in his rear at Pirna, and, never doubting that Fain, 312, he would be supported by that important body, he boldly 40, 41; set out, hoping to win his marshal's baton under the walls 328, 329. of Culm.' 1 Jom. iv. 398, 399; 313; Bout. Thiers, xvi. Culm, and extreme terror at In the race to Töplitz, however, the Allied generals 35. outstripped Vandamme. He did not receive intelligence Advance to of the result of the battle on the 27th till mid-day on the 28th, and it was too late then to occupy the pass in force, Teplitz. or do more than seize the heights overhanging it on the Aug. 29. eastern side, from whence, as already mentioned, he was driven by a vigorous effort on the part of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, supported by Ostermann Tolstoy's grenadiers. Thus the pass was opened in time to let the Russian general get through into the neighbourhood of Töplitz. But his force was considerably reduced by that rude encounter, and still more by the extreme fatigue they had undergone during the preceding week, insomuch that they CHAP. upon by a rabble of fugitives. Explain fully my intenX. tions to Vandamme: tell him what I expect from him. 1813. Never can he have a finer opportunity of earning his marshal's baton." 33. These orders placed Vandamme, when they came to Forces under be executed, in a situation of great danger though of Vandamme. the utmost importance. He had at Pirna 52 battalions, 29 squadrons, and 80 guns; and they mustered 27,000 infantry and 3000 horse. The Emperor put under him, in addition to his own corps, a division of St Cyr's corps, a brigade of Victor and Corbineau's cavalry, which brought up his force to fully 40,000. Immediately after the battle of Dresden, Mortier was advanced to Pirna with the Young Guard, 32,000 strong, distant about eight leagues from the scene of action, to support him if necessary. The Emperor, at the same time, issued orders to St Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat, to follow close on the enemy's footsteps, and drive them 1 St Cyr, iv. on towards Töplitz, where he expected Vandamme would 128, 129; Thiers, xvi. be ready to receive them. This done, he halted the Young Guard at Pirna, leaving Vandamme to prosecute, alone and unsupported, his perilous movement into the rear of the Allied army at Töplitz.1 Aug. 29. 327, 328; Bout. 40, 41; Vaud. i. 158. 34. Great im portance of sion of Töplitz. That village was thus destined to become the theatre of events not less important in their consequences than the posses the victory of Platæa, or the battle of the Metaurus. All the roads from Saxony into Bohemia over the Erzgebirge range lead to, and intersect each other in, Töplitz, which lies at the foot of the mountains on the southern side in the Bohemian plain. If, therefore, Vandamme could, in obedience to his orders, make himself master of that important point before the Allies reached it, he would be in a situation to prevent their retiring columns, detached from each other and toiling through the passes, from debouching from the mountains; while Murat, at the head of his redoubtable horse, and Victor, on the right road, and Marmont and St Cyr in the X. 1813. centre, pressed the rear of their columns; and Mortier, CHAP. with the Guard on the left road, could advance unopposed to Vandamme's support. They might thus be exposed to almost certain ruin when attacked in rear and blocked up in front, while entangled with many thousand carriages among those narrow defiles and inhospitable ridges. On the other hand, if the French under Vandamme were defeated by the retiring masses of the Allied Grand Army, who would of necessity fight with the energy of despair to force their way through, a still greater catastrophe might be apprehended by Napoleon, as he would then be entirely cut off from the Elbe, and obliged to lay down his arms in the Bohemian plains. Thus both parties had equal motives for exertion; both saw clearly the vital importance of the contest; and the meanest soldier in the ranks was as strongly impressed with this as his chief. Vandamme was well aware of the perils with which his mission was attended, but he was a man of resolution, calm, experienced, and gifted with coup d'œil in danger he knew that the Young Guard was close in his rear at Pirna, and, never doubting that Fain, .312, he would be supported by that important body, he boldly 40, 41; set out, hoping to win his marshal's baton under the walls 328, 329. of Culm.1 1 Jom. iv. 398, 399; 313; Bout. Thiers, xvi. Culm, and extreme terror at In the race to Töplitz, however, the Allied generals 35. outstripped Vandamme. He did not receive intelligence Advance to of the result of the battle on the 27th till mid-day on the 28th, and it was too late then to in force, Teplitz. the Occupy pass or do more than seize the heights overhanging it on the Aug. 29. eastern side, from whence, as already mentioned, he was driven by a vigorous effort on the part of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, supported by Ostermann Tolstoy's grenadiers. Thus the pass was opened in time to let the Russian general get through into the neighbourhood of Töplitz. But his force was considerably reduced by that rude encounter, and still more by the extreme fatigue they had undergone during the preceding week, insomuch that they |