CHAP. XII. conferences at Chatillon. "His Imperial Majesty's known condescendence of character, and the marked kindness he 1814. invariably showed me, led, on various occasions, to his communicating his observations and sentiments to me. At this period one of the most difficult and interesting points for adjustment at a general peace was, the fate of the Polish nation, and this peace began now to be confidently looked for. In one of my interviews with the Emperor, his Imperial Majesty dwelt at great length on the immense sacrifices of Russia, and, putting these foremost in his statement, he declared how doubly necessary it became him, on the eve of a settlement of Europe, to look to the permanent interests of his own empire. His Imperial Majesty stated that his moral feeling, honour, and every principle of justice and right, called upon him to use all his power to restore such a constitution to Poland as would secure the happiness of so fine and so great a people. The abandonment of seven millions of his subjects, were he to relinquish his Polish provinces in any general arrangement, without a sufficient guarantee to his country for the great utility and advantage of the measure, would be more than his imperial crown was worth. But consolidating these provinces with the duchy of Warsaw, under such a king and such a constitutional administration as Russia would name, would be productive of the happiest effects. He went on to observe that his character was well known, and ought to give confidence to Europe. I remarked in reply, that Europe could not insure at all times an Alexander on the throne. To this his Imperial Majesty rejoined, that the Grand Duke Constantine partook entirely his sentiments as well as his two brothers. He was happy also to believe that the proposition he had started, and the mode in which he viewed it, was seen by Austria in the same light; that he had had a long conversation with Prince Metternich a day or two since, in which the whole of his plan was opened, and that the Prince n'avait rien contre, or words to that CHAP. XII. 1814. effect. I was considerably struck at the time with so extraordinary a declaration from his Majesty, and ventured not only to express my surprise, but to assure him that Prince Metternich had held very different language to me, and that I never could suppose he would leave to England the task of being the only power which would oppose itself to his Majesty's views, in case they should not meet with general concurrence, when they were of so much more vital interest to Austria and Prussia. His Imperial Majesty next alluded in rather a menacing manner to his power of taking military possession of Poland, and seemed to be certain of the facility with which he could obtain his end, and I doubted much, from the firm and positive manner in which he expressed himself, whether he would ever be diverted from the purpose he now declared."1 So strongly were the Emperor's Sir Chas. views expressed on this subject that they awakened in Lord CastleSir Charles the most anxious apprehension as to the March 7, extent to which the liberties of Europe might one day 1814, MS. be menaced by this great and growing power; and his words, in a confidential letter to Lord Castlereagh at this time, are not a little remarkable, both as an instance of far-seeing sagacity as to future events now only in the course of accomplishment, and as a proof how minds of an elevated calibre can withstand all the influences of private kindness and imperial favours.* * "If we consider the power of Russia, unassailable as she is in front and rear, with an immense front, mistress of the Caspian, the Euxine, and the Baltic, with forty (now seventy) millions of brave, hardy, docile, enthusiastic, and submissive inhabitants, with immense armies highly disciplined, excellently appointed; her innumerable hordes of desolating cavalry, her adoption of the French maxims in war of making the countries where her armies march, feed and maintain them, what may we not fear from her? When we consider further those forces, flushed with success, and disposed to consider treaties and engagements with her as waste paper, if they stood in the way of any projects of aggrandisement; if we further consider her determination to surmount every barrier which engagements have interposed in order to advance herself into the heart of Germany, to supplant on the one side the ancient dominion of Prussia, on the other to turn the northern flank of Austria on the Vistula, as she has turned the southern on the Danube, and demanding, as it were, by the 1 Stewart to CHAP. XII. 112. Difficulties in Italy. A difficulty of another kind, but which proved hardly less serious in the end, arose at this time in Italy, spring1814. ing, like the others, from the successes of the Allies, which it required all the prudence and forbearance of Castlereagh to adjust, and which led to no small embarrassment in future times. This arose partly from the vacillating conduct of Murat, who, although he had joined the Allies and abandoned his benefactor, was hesitating before he openly united his forces to theirs, and was awaiting the issue of events in Champagne before he took the irrevocable step. It required no little management on Lord Castlereagh's part to keep the Allied Powers and the Neapolitan monarch together in these trying circumstances; but he contrived to effect it, and thereby did fortresses of Thorn and Cracow, the keys of Berlin and Vienna; when we further reflect on the natural march of empires from north to south, from the regions of frost and snow and famine to the climates of warmth, verdure, and fertility, and recollect the revolutions that have taken place in Europe, Asia, and Africa, from the desolating invasions of the northern hordes, what may we not fear and expect? "When, in addition to these circumstances, we further reflect upon the successive aggrandisements and incorporations of Russia during the last hundred and fifty years, the numerous Tartar tribes that are embraced within her military system, the provinces she has successively added to her empire from Persia, the Porte, Sweden, and Poland; that her whole system of government is a military despotism, and nothing known or regarded in it but military subjection on the one hand, and military property, military rank, and military honour on the other, what may not be the result? If we consider all these circumstances in all their bearings and dependencies, is there a serious and reasonable man in Europe that must not admit that the whole system of European politics ought, in its leading principle and feature, to maintain as an axiom the necessity of setting bounds to this formidable and encroaching power? Weighed against this superior and imperative duty—a duty urged by all the motives of self-preservation-every minor and secondary consideration resulting, whether from ancient rights or claims from family feelings and alliances, from views of future combination and power, ought to be postponed and disregarded. There is no other moral or physical safeguard against the stupendous greatness with which the Continent may ere long be menaced and overwhelmed, than in the personal character of the reigning Emperor, a mixture of benevolence and rectitude, a high sense of religion, and a generous view of all subjects. This affords, in my mind, the only and best guarantee against the far too formidable legions which have recently defiled over the Rhine; but how soon may that guarantee be lost!"-SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD Castlereagh, February 14, 1814, MS.; and LOND., 255, 256. A remarkable instance of political wisdom and foresight; the more so that it came from a young officer, the fellow-soldier of the Czar, and then basking in the brightest sunshine of his imperial favour. XII. 1814. the greatest service to the common cause, by retaining CHAP. Eugene's army to watch him in Italy. His instructions to Lord William Bentinck, the commander of the British forces in the Mediterranean, were quite explicit to acknowledge Murat on the throne of Naples, and stand by the Austrian treaty with him, provided he exerted himself honourably in the war; and an indemnity of some sort was provided for the legitimate King of Naples.* Murat, however, although he had little hesitation in betraying his benefactor, had considerable hesitation in imperilling his own throne; and on various pretexts he evaded finally declaring himself, till the capture of Paris left him no alternative but unqualified submission. about Ge Lord Wm. tion. Another matter connected with Italy, though less mo- 113. mentous in the outset, became still more serious in the Difficulties end, and gave no small disquietude to Lord Castlereagh noa, from and the whole British Government-an expedition from Bentinck's Sicily to the north of Italy, to co-operate with the Aus- proclamatrians, and, it was hoped, Murat, in driving the French entirely out of the peninsula: the command of it was given to Lord William Bentinck, who was entitled to demand it, being the commander-in-chief in Sicily. It was directed against Leghorn in the first instance, as Murat had taken umbrage at an ill-timed proclamation of the hereditary prince of Sicily claiming the crown of Naples. It after * "The point now of importance is to secure the effective and active support of the Neapolitans, whose active assistance appears indispensable to give the Allies that rapid and commanding success which may speedily decide the fate of Italy. I am sorry to find that Murat has, under some pretext, delayed the signature of the treaty in its amended form, and that he still continues to show some ménagement towards the enemy. The British Government never liked the Austrian treaty, but being entered into, they are quite willing to act up to its spirit, and to acknowledge Murat upon a peace, on two conditions: 1st, That he exerts himself honourably in the war; 2d, That a reasonable indemnity (it cannot be an equivalent) is found for the King of Sicily. I should hope, with this basis to work upon, you may not only quiet any alarm Murat may have felt as to the nature of our armistice, but furnish him with two very powerful incentives to come forward effectually. In doing so he will facilitate all his own views, and by assisting in the indemnities to the King of Sicily, he may secure his own title to Naples."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCE, Chatillon, February 21, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 285. CHAP. wards went on to Genoa, both as that was a very important maritime fortress, which it was an object to wrest 1814. from France, and as it afforded the best possible base for the British operations in the north of Italy. Upon arriving there, with a force of 7000 men, Lord William experienced no very formidable resistance, and the place was surrendered after the external forts had been stormed. But he very soon found that, though not disposed to risk their fortunes by joining a sinking cause, the Genoese people were animated almost universally with that passion for separate sovereignty which has so long been felt in Italy, and is the main obstacle to any united action, or the establishment of general independence.* Seeing that this was the general disposition, and yielding to the natural opinion, that the best way to reconcile the minds of men to a change of dynasty, and a general restoration, was to proclaim a return in every instance to the old authorities and form of government, Lord William issued a proclamation, without any authority from his superiors, promising such a restoration in unguarded terms.† This proclamation was received with unbounded transports in Genoa, the inhabitants of which yielded for a while to the pleasing illusion of a restoration of their ancient Doges, senate, and provincial independence and grandeur. But it proved not a little embarrassing to the Allied sovereigns, and especially the British Government, who had other views as to Genoa and the distribution of power "I am under the necessity of forming here a provisional government, which I shall do as soon as I can ascertain the persons who may be most acceptable to the people. I find that all desire their former independence and ancient form of government, with some modifications. All are equally desirous of not being annexed to Piedmont."-LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Genoa, April 23, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 491. "Considering that the general wish of the Genoese is to return to their ancient form of government, I declare, 1. That the constitution of the Genoese States, such as it existed in 1797, with some modifications which the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution of 1797, seem to require, is re-established."-LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK'S Proclamation, April 21, 1811; Parl. Deb. xxx. 393, 394. This proclamation was at variance with Lord William's instructions, which were to do nothing that might fetter the hands of the Allies in the final disposal of the Genoese territories.-Ibid. |