XII. 1814. in Italy, as they thought, with reason, that to leave France CHAP. surrounded by little monarchies and republics was just to invite the spoiler again to make inroads upon them, and that in the amalgamation of the lesser states was to be found the only security for their independence. Lord Castlereagh, accordingly, pronounced himself strongly against this unauthorised proceeding of Lord William Bentinck, and the proclamation was disavowed by the Allied Governments. But the effect of it remained, and the disappointed feelings of the Genoese vented themselves in loud complaints, which met with the readier reception in Europe that they appealed directly to the generous and patriotic affections.* 114. reagh's d'Angou Wellington. Another matter of not less importance came under Lord Castlereagh's notice at the same time, which was Lord Castlethe conduct to be pursued, in regard to the Bourbons, by policy as to the Duke of Wellington in the south of France. It had the Duke become necessary to take a decided line here, because lême with the Duc d'Augoulême suddenly arrived at the head- Feb. 25. quarters of the English general in Béarn, in the end of February, at the same time that the Count d'Artois made his appearance at the Allied headquarters in Champagne. The course which Wellington pursued in this * "I hope, from the course the Viceroy is pursuing, that Italy will wind up well. He is the best of the Buonaparte school, and has played an honourable and able part. If Buonaparte had been enabled to have maintained himself in the field in France, between Murat's rascality, Bellegarde's timidity, and Lord William Bentinck's impracticability and Whiggism, which seem to follow him everywhere, we should have been in danger of a serious disappointment in that quarter. As it is, we are masters, I hope, of the question now, in a military sense, and must weigh well the political complications, which are not merely personal to the sovereign claimants, but mixed up with a great deal of internal and extensive jealousy amongst the most of the Italian population." -LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD LIVERPOOL, April 27, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 520. "Murat is another sinner-whether to the extent that we can take notice of, I am not yet prepared to say; but the Viceroy has given some strong evidence against him. The events in France have secured us there. If the war had continued on this side of the Alps, Italy would soon have become a dangerous card, which was in itself a new source of alarm, intrigue, and weakness. As it is, we are escaping fast, I hope, from the military difficulty, whatever may be the embarrassment of the political combination.” — LORD Castlereagh to LORD BATHURST, April 27, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 512. XII. 1814. CHAP. delicate matter was precisely analogous to what Lord Castlereagh had recommended to the British Cabinet in regard to the negotiations at Chatillon-viz., to abstain from anything like forcing or even attempting to lead public opinion in France, and to avoid committing themselves in favour of the ancient family while still negotiating with the military Emperor at Chatillon. Wellington accordingly would only receive the royal prince incognito, though in that character he showed him the most delicate attention, and would not permit him to leave St Jean de Luz to accompany the army in active operation. This conduct met with Lord Castlereagh's decided approval; indeed, the letter Wellington wrote to Lord Bathurst* on the occasion was almost identical with those which the great diplomatist was at the same time addressing to the Cabinet from Chatillon. Lord Castlereagh's views on this subject were perfectly fixed and consistent from the outset. He was decidedly of opinion that the "ancient race and the ancient territory" afforded the best, perhaps the only, security likely to be permanent for the preservation of the peace of Europe. But for the permanence of that very object it was indispensable that the choice * "The people here all agree in one opinion-viz, that the sentiment throughout France is the same as I have found it here-an earnest desire to get rid of Buonaparte and his government, from a conviction that as long as he governs they will have no peace. The language common to all is, that although the grievous hardships and oppression under which they labour are intolerable, they dare not have the satisfaction even of complaining; that, on the contrary, they are obliged to pretend to rejoice, and that they are only allowed in secret and silence to lament their hard fate. They say that the Bourbons are as unknown in France as the princes of any other sovereign house in Europe. I am convinced more than ever that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption, and that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army and the employés civiles of his government, with some of the new proprietors. Notwithstanding this, I recommend your Lordship to make peace with him, if you can acquire all the objects you have a right to expect. All the powers require peace, even more than France, and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual on what he sees and hears in a corner of France. If Buonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall probably have another war in a few years.”— WELLINGTON to LORD BATHURST, November 21, 1813; GURWOOD, xii. 304, 305. XII. 1814. should be a voluntary one on the part of the French CHAP. people; for if it had either the reality or the appearance of constraint, it was not likely to be permanent, and the whole existing evils would be renewed. His whole correspondence and speeches, from first to last, demonstrated that this was his fixed opinion.* ture attempt in Flanders. An incident not as yet noticed in history occurred 115. during the sitting of the Congress of Chatillon, which de- Prince of Orange's monstrated how well founded was the caution of Lord imprudent Castlereagh in this respect, and what disastrous results and prema were likely to result from any premature attempts to direct public opinion in the conquered provinces as to the choice of their sovereign. It has been already mentioned that it was part of the plan of the Allied sovereigns to adopt Lord Castlereagh's plan of uniting Belgium to Holland, in order to form a respectable state capable of maintaining, with the aid of England and Prussia, its ground against its formidable neighbour. The Prince of Orange, as a matter of course, was acquainted with this arrangement, and he professed, as well he might, the greatest gratitude to the English minister for his support on the occasion. But being impatient to take possession and enjoy the fruits of the promised dominion, he seriously endangered it. Instead of calmly awaiting, according to Lord Castlereagh's advice, the time when "events might declare themselves," and when the incorporation of Belgium and Flanders, announced as the resolution of the Allied sovereigns, might be submitted to without a murmur as the decree of fate, he endeavoured prematurely to obtain a declaration from Flanders in his "Every pacification would be incomplete, if you did not re-establish on the throne of France the ancient family; any peace with the man who had put himself at the head of the French nation could have no other final result but to give to Europe fresh subjects of division and alarm; it could be neither secure nor durable. Nevertheless it was impossible to refuse negotiating with him when invested with power, without doing violence to the opinion of Europe, and incurring the whole responsibility of the continuance of the war." -LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Speech in Parliament, June 29, 1814; Parl. Deb., xxviii. 458. de from. The consequences were just the reverse of what be expected. The ancient division of the Flemings and CSA Derne fonded ca difference of religion, political cirenmstances, and bloody wars, broke out afresh, and in so mistakable a manner as suggested grave doubts as to the practicability of effecting the union.* Lord Castlereagh strongly represented, both to the Prince and Lord Clancarty, the British minister at his court, the extreme danger of such premature attempts, and he had the good sense to acquiesce in the advice. The obnoxious attempts were in consequence withdrawn, and the union with Holland was ultimately effected without open opposition, though not without secret heartbarnings, which gave rise to important changes in future times.+ 116. It is evident, from the detail which has now been given, General that the Congress of Chatillon, the most momentous of the negotia- modern times, was not broken up from any matters of Ca form, or any variance between the Powers engaged as to bearings of tion at Cha tilion. the lesser points in controversy. It failed because the * "I beg to call your Lordship's attention to a subject which I mentioned on a former occasion-I allude to the measures adopted by the Dutch Government to prepare the minds of the people of the Netherlands for the expected incorporation of their country with Holland. It would be difficult to give an adequate idea of the mischief which has already proceeded from their intemperate and ill-judged proceedings; and I fear that, if they are persevered in, they will lead to very serious evils. The great majority of the nobility, who, if the fate of their country were irrevocably fixed, would probably not be unwilling to worship the rising sun, have been provoked by these premature discussions to make declarations very unfavourable to the Prince of Orange; and as they are a high-spirited people, it is not unlikely they will continue their hostility to the Prince, merely to show their consistency to principles so publicly avowed."-LORD CLANCARTY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, The Hague, March 1, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 306. "I dined yesterday with the Prince. Before dinner he took me aside, and again repeated all the professions he had made the day before, adding that, if he had been before impressed with the impolicy of his proceedings in the Pays Bas, he was now most fully convinced that the efforts he had made, through his agents, for the purpose of obtaining a cry and soulèvement in his favour, were improper; that he was fully impressed with the necessity of waiting the result of your exertions in his favour, with the promptness and magnitude of which he expressed the most entire satisfaction, and to you personally great obligations."-LORD CLANCARTY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Hague, February 12, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 260. The views of the parties were irreconcilable on vital matters; it broke up on the eternal question between France and Europe. The frontier of the Rhine and the Alps, with Antwerp, Mayence, and Chambery, was the insurmountable difficulty; but for it peace would have been concluded between Lord Castlereagh and Caulaincourt in half an hour. Napoleon risked all rather than abandon them, because he felt that if he held them he could at any time renew his projects of conquest against Great Britain, Germany, and Italy. He knew better than any man that his throne was founded entirely on the prestige of military success; that conquest to him was the condition of existence. To retire within the ancient limits of France -to restrict himself to the crown of Louis XIV., was to abandon the whole new-born triumphs of the Revolution, and seemed to him equivalent to abdicating the throne, with this additional circumstance of humiliation, that he would probably be hurled down from it by his own subjects. CHAP. XII. 1814. 117. justice of Congress. In calmly contemplating, after the lapse of half a century, the merits of this great question, still seriously at Seeming issue between France and Europe, it is impossible to deny Napoleon's that there was great plausibility, and, as the facts then pleas at the stood, seeming justice, in M. de Caulaincourt's arguments in favour of Napoleon's side of the question, that the other great Powers of Europe had been materially aggrandised since the commencement of the struggle in 1792. Russia had gained Finland and a large part of Poland, besides extensive territories on the Danube; England had conquered the Mysore and the Mahrattas, and become lord paramount in Hindostan; and, though Austria had suffered severely in the contest, yet in the line of the Mincio, offered her by Napoleon, and the restoration of the Tyrol, she was more than indemnified for all her losses. To restrict France, therefore, in the midst of this general aggrandisement of the neighbouring Powers, to her ancient limits, was not to restore the balance of |