CHAP. XIL 1814. 118. reagh was question. power, but to destroy it, and destroy it in the most fatal of all ways, by greatly aggrandising the great northern colossus. Such a result was not less at variance with the basis put forward by the Allies themselves in the proposals of Frankfort, than hazardous to the general peace and independence of Europe, which they professed to have so much at heart. It is impossible to deny that these considerations, as Time has they were stated at the time, appear to be well founded; proved that Lord Castle- but time has now proved that they were erroneous, and right in the that Lord Castlereagh had correctly scanned the elements of future repose and balance of power in Europe, when he insisted for the restrictions of France to her ancient limits as the basis of any lasting pacification. The proof of this is decisive. France, by the treaties of 1814 and 1815, was reduced to her ancient limits, her resources were seriously impaired by a war-contribution of fifty millions sterling levied on her by the Allies, and an occupation, during three years, of a large part of her territory; her moral prestige and political influence were sensibly weakened by the double capture of her capital, and her military strength seriously impaired by the occupation of Algeria requiring the presence beyond seas of a fifth, at an average, of her embodied troops. Since that time, too, England has made great acquisitions in India, and Russia both in Europe and Asia. Yet all this notwithstanding, France has since shown herself more powerful than any other civilised state, and become again formidable to the liberties of Europe. Aided by England, she has defeated Russia in the Crimea, singly she has conquered Austria in Lombardy. She has succeeded, in the face of the Allied Powers, in annexing Savoy and Nice, and thereby becoming master of the keys of Italy. She has only been prevented by the wise union of Austria and Prussia, and the gallant front shown by the British Volunteers, from resuming the frontier of the Rhine, and with it the Great Napoleon's projects of aggrandisement in Europe. XII. 1814. All this has been done when starting from the limits of CHAP. 1790, and labouring under such serious subsequent difficulties; what, then, would it have been if she had started from the base of Antwerp, Alessandria, Mayence, and the Rhine, and instead of having incurred subsequent humiliation, she had closed the war with the lustre of having repulsed Europe in arms from her gates? Beyond all question, the peace would not have lasted five years, and the costly armed neutrality of 1860 would have begun in 1820. The peace of Europe has been often broken, and still more frequently endangered, during the last forty years, by France, defeated as she had been in the great war; it has never yet been either threatened or broken by any of the Allied Powers, at least against her, though they had been victorious in the strife. These considerations prove that such are the advantages which France derives from her central situation, compact territory, great population, extent of sea-coast, increasing wealth, and the military spirit and talents of her inhabitants, that not only was it indispensable in 1814 to reduce her to her ancient limits, but the same object must be pursued in after-times, and that it is in the formation of a defensive league by the other Powers, and a return to Lord Castlereagh's policy, that the only lasting security for the peace or independence of Europe is to be found. CHAPTER XIII. SIR CHARLES STEWART AND LORD CASTLEREAGH, FROM THE CHAP. 1814. of Lord Chas. Stew UPON the dissolution of the Congress of Chatillon Lord Castlereagh returned to Dijon, where the Emperor of Austria and the diplomatic body were assembled, and where 1. his Separation presence was urgently required to keep the Austrians Castlereagh steady to the Alliance; and Sir Charles Stewart with and Sir joyful steps moved towards the headquarters of Prince art after the Schwartzenberg. With him he remained till after the of the Con- taking of Paris, and bore a part in the important actions Chatillon. Which immediately preceded that event. It is fortunate that for these, the last and most decisive events of the war, we have the aid of his graphic pen describing what he himself had seen, and that his personal narrative becomes the story of the fall of the French Empire. breaking up gress of 2. movements of Napoleon and the Allies. To understand these, however, and appreciate the vital Previous importance of the events which followed, ending in the fall of Napoleon, it is indispensable to revert to the military operations, and give a brief abstract of what had occurred during the latter weeks of the sitting of the Congress of Chatillon. While the French Emperor was engaged in his brilliant operations against the Grand Army, which terminated in the victory of Montereau, a new and formidable enemy had appeared on the field, who had assailed France in a quarter where attack had never been anticipated, and who came ere long to exer cise a decisive influence on the fate of the campaign. CHAP. This was formed of the corps of Winzingerode and Bu- XIII. low, 50,000 strong, forming part of Bernadotte's army, 1814. which that prince, as the siege of Antwerp had been converted into a blockade, had been reluctantly obliged to allow to move forward into France. They took the Feb. 10. road by Avesnes to Laon, which town they occupied without resistance; thus forming an important rearguard Feb. 11. and support to Blucher, who was in advance towards Paris, but still under the orders of Bernadotte, whose temporising policy had already rendered him suspected by the whole Allied armies. Bulow occupied Laon, Winzingerode pushed on to Rheims. The advancedguard of the latter, on the 13th February, under the Feb. 18. enterprising and active Chernicheff, made itself master of Soissons, an ill-fortified town on the road from Laon to Paris, and a strategic point of much importance, as commanding the only bridge in that quarter over the river Aisne, which lazily flows in a deep and impassable bed between the two cities. So sensible was Napoleon of the value of this strategic point, that he had thrown an old and determined officer, General Rusca, into it with 18 guns and 4000 men. So ably, however, were Chernicheff's measures taken, that he succeeded in carrying it with very little loss, and making the whole garrison prisoners during the confusion occasioned by Rusca's death, who was killed on the rampart by a cannon-ball. Chernicheff, however, was not strong enough to maintain his important conquest; and he was obliged to march next day towards Rheims to rejoin Winzingerode, taking with 1 Lond. 282; him the captured guns and prisoners. Here the latter Burgh. 148, was in a position to reinforce Blucher, who, at Chalons, 149; Dan. was actively engaged in reorganising and concentrating his Koch, 277, army, which had lost nearly half its numerical strength ii. 24-27; in its late disastrous conflicts, and preparing to march to 358, 359. Schwartzenberg's assistance.1 Meanwhile Napoleon was pursuing the career of suc VOL. II. Ꮓ 127-129; 278; Vaud. Thiers, xvii. CHAP. 3. retreat of Grand Feb. 22. cess, so brilliantly commenced at Montereau, against the Grand Army under Schwartzenberg. Everywhere the 1814. Allied troops retired before him. On the second day Continued after that conflict, having concentrated the mass of his forces, he ascended the course of the Seine to Bray and Nogent; and Schwartzenberg retired towards Troyes, where-Blucher having been ordered up in all haste from Chalons-the whole Allied armies were ordered to assemble on the 21st. A hundred and fifty thousand men appeared at the rendezvous. Blucher, notwithstanding his losses, came up with 50,000 men and 300 guns on the field. The ground, however, was deemed unfavourable for a general battle; and in the night Troyes was abandoned, and the retreat was continued in great confusion to Chaumont. It was during this retrograde movement that the proposal for an armistice was made by the Allied sovereigns, mentioned in the preceding chapter. As these pacific overtures took place after a splendid series of successes on the part of Napoleon, and when the Allied armies were fully concentrated in strength double his own, it is not surprising that Napoleon was much elated, and, deeming the tide of success decisively turned, should have despatched orders to Caulaincourt at Chatillon to sign nothing, but await the issue of military events. At the same time he despatched an angry and characteristic letter to Augereau, at Lyons, who had been unsuccessful, strongly descriptive of the exaggerated expectations he had formed in regard to the possible, and by him expected, achievements of his troops.* The Emperor of * "Le ministre de la guerre m'a mis sous les yeux la lettre que vous lui avez écrite le 16. Cette lettre m'a vivement peiné. Quoi! six heures après avoir reçu les premières troupes venant d'Espagne, vous n'étiez pas déjà en campagne six heures de repos leur suffisaient. J'ai remporté le combat de Nangis avec la brigade de dragons venant d'Espagne, qui de Bayonne n'avait pas encore débridé. Les six bataillons de Nîmes manquent, dites-vous, d'habillement et d'équipement, et sont sans instruction! Quelle pauvre raison me donnez-vous là, Augereau! J'ai détruit 80,000 ennemis avec des bataillons gomposés de conscrits n'ayant pas de gibernes et étant à peine habillés. Les cardes nationales, dites-vous, sont pitoyables. J'en ai ici 4000 venant d'Angers |