CHAP. XIII. 1814. Russia, as well as Lord Castlereagh, was extremely averse to the armistice, insomuch that he sent instructions to Winzingerode not to suspend hostilities but under an order signed by himself. Napoleon, though highly elated with the proposal, was equally averse to a cessation of active operations, and refused to agree to any suspension of hostilities while the discussion of the terms of the armistice was going forward. Thus, though a temporary Dan. 201; lull of hostilities took place during the discussion of the Fain, 141, terms of the armistice between Napoleon and the Grand tine, ii. 131; Army, yet it never extended to the flanks, or embraced 374-376; the Army of Silesia and the French corps of Marmont 265-269. and Mortier, which was opposed to them.1 142; Valen Thiers, xvii. Plotho, iii. 4. of the Army Feb. 22. The operations of the Army of Silesia had now become very threatening; for that gallant host, which had been Movements reduced from 60,000 to 32,000 by its recent disasters, of Silesia. had again been raised to 48,000 by the arrival of the corps of St Priest, which had come up from Coblentz on the Rhine; and, taking advantage of the absence of Napoleon, in pursuance of his attack on the Grand Army, Blucher had recommenced active operations now on his own account, having once more separated from the Grand Army. Napoleon's plan, when he advanced up the left et de Bretagne en chapeaux ronds, sans gibernes, mais ayant de bons fusils : j'en ai tiré bon parti. Il n'y a pas d'argent, continuez-vous. Et d'où espérezvous tirer de l'argent? Vous ne pourrez en avoir que quand nous aurons arraché nos recettes des mains de l'ennemi. Vous manquez d'attelages: prenez-en partout. Vous n'avez pas de magasins: ceci est par trop ridicule ! Je vous ordonne de partir douze heures après la réception de la présente lettre pour vous mettre en campagne. Si vous êtes toujours l'Augereau de Castiglione, gardez le commandement; si vos soixante ans pèsent sur vous, quittezle, et remettez-le au plus ancien de vos officiers généraux. La patrie est menacée et en danger; elle ne peut être sauvée que par l'audace et la bonne volonté, et non par de vaines temporisations. Vous devez avoir un noyau de plus de 6000 hommes de troupes d'élite; je n'en ai pas tant, et j'ai pourtant détruit trois armées, fait 40,000 prisonniers, pris 200 pièces de canon, et sauvé trois fois la capitale. L'ennemi fuit de tous côtés sur Troyes. Soyez le premier aux balles. Il n'est plus question d'agir comme dans les derniers temps, mais il faut reprendre ses bottes et sa résolution de 93. Quand les Français verront votre panache aux avant-postes, et qu'ils vous verront vous exposer le premier aux coups de fusil, vous en ferez ce que vous voudrez."— NAPOLEON à AUGEREAU, 21 Février 1814; THIERS, Xvii. 360, 361. CHAP. 1814. Feb. 25. bank of the Seine from Montereau, had been to have crossed that river at Mery, above its junction with the Aube, and ascend its right bank to Troyes, thus interposing between Blucher and Schwartzenberg, and preventing their junction. But the rapidity of Blucher's march prevented the execution of this design, for on arriving at Mery he found Blucher already on the right bank prepared to dispute the passage. He, therefore, renounced that enterprise, and continued, as already mentioned, his march on Troyes. But no sooner did Blucher find that the French Emperor had gone in pursuit of the Grand Army, than, separating from Schwartzenberg, he resumed his design of a direct advance on the capital by the valley of the Marne, which he considered himself fully able to undertake, as he was to be reinforced by Bulow and Winzingerode. Setting out at once, he reached La Ferté-sousJouarre, on the Marne, without difficulty, and was advancing in the direction of Meaux, driving Mortier and Marmont before him, when in the night he received intelligence that Napoleon in person, having discontinued the pursuit of the Grand Army, was advancing by Sezanne directly upon his line of communication. The Prussian general immediately retreated across the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, breaking down the bridge behind him, and taking the road to Soissons, where he expected to effect a junction with Bulow and Winzingerode, now happily put under his orders by the joint efforts of the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh. Thus both xvii. 377. armies were effectually checked by Napoleon, and he 201, 202; had the satisfaction of seeing that, with the 70,000 men 360; Plo in a central position which he commanded, he was able to stop the advance alternately of an army of 100,000 and another of 50,000 men.1 1 Thiers, 379; Dan. Koch, i. 358 tho, iii. 265270. The departure of Napoleon to make head against Blucher was the signal as usual for the recommencement of offensive operations by Schwartzenberg, who had now closed up his reserves, and was at the head of 120,000 CHAP. XIII. 1814. 5. rations by Army. Bar-sur Feb. 27. men. They began with an attack by Wittgenstein and Wrede-who commanded the vanguard, 35,000 strongon Oudinot, who, having crossed the Aube at Bar-sur-Aube, was opposed to them with 18,000. The French, notwith- Renewed standing the great disparity of numbers, made a gallant active opedefence; but the odds were too great, and they were the Grand at length obliged to retreat over the river, leaving Bar- Combat of sur-Aube and 500 prisoners in the hands of the Allies. Aube. Their total loss was 3000 men, but they lost neither guns nor standards-a very honourable circumstance to them considering the inequality of force. The Allies were weakened by nearly as many, and Count Wittgenstein was so severely wounded, that he was obliged to cede the command of his corps to General Raeffskoi. Prince Schwartzenberg also was slightly wounded-a sure proof how serious matters had become when the generals exposed themselves so much in an inconsiderable encounter. The issue of the action, though not important in material results, was very much so in its moral Burgh. consequences, for it restored the spirit of the Grand Army, Vaud. ii.' which had been much weakened by the late disaster, and Koch, ii. 811; Plotho, arrested a retreat certainly across the Vosges Mountains, iii. 241-244. and possibly as far as the Rhine. 160, 161; 75-80; La Guillo This auspicious commencement encouraged Prince 6. Schwartzenberg to more extensive operations of an offen- Combat of sive character. Having collected four corps, mustering tière. 60,000 combatants, without counting the Guards, who March 3. were in reserve at Chaumont, he advanced against Marshal Macdonald, who, having been left by Napoleon to watch Schwartzenberg, with his own corps and those of Oudinot and Gerard, had only been able to assemble 35,000 men, and had taken post with them on a strong position on the elevated plateau of Laubressel to cover Troyes. Deep marshes protected the front of the position, and rendered it in ordinary seasons unassailable there; but a hard frost having covered them with a solid barrier of ice, the Allies were enabled to advance directly 1814. CHAP. against it, while, at the same time, they turned its left XIII. flank by a side attack. Seeing this, Macdonald withdrew his men, and a general retreat commenced to Troyes, in the course of which the Allies took 1500 prisoners and nine guns, while their entire loss was only 800 men. After this second victory, decisive success was in their power; for they had 90,000, including the Guards, to which the French, after the two defeats, could only oppose 30,000; and Napoleon with his redoubtable Guards and cuirassiers was far distant, engaged with Blucher on the Aisne. But the Austrian Cabinet had not lost hope of bringing Napoleon to reason, and concluding a peace which might preserve his family on the throne; and accordingly they paralysed Schwartzenberg's operations, and doomed him to an inactivity inexplicable on merely military considerations, when decisive success had come within their reach. The Russian reserves were brought up from Chaumont to the neighbourhood of Montierender. But nothing vigorous was attempted. Ninety thousand Allies seemed paralysed by 30,000 French, and no diversion was thought of, even when the scales hung comparatively even between Napoleon and Blucher on the Aisne. In vain Alexander urged Schwartzenberg in the strongest manner to move forward and threaten Paris, in Burgh. 176; order to relieve Blucher, who now had the whole weight Die Grosse of the French Emperor on his hands. 1 Koch, v. 34, 35; Chron. iii. Plotho, iii. Nothing could 472-476; divert the Austrian Cabinet from their determination to gain time, in order to give Napoleon time to save his throne.1 * Schwartzenberg advanced indeed to Troyes 251, 252. "The Emperor considers that the advance of the Grand Army to Sens is drawing us away from the enemy, and that therefore it is indispensable to direct all our forces to the right towards Arcis, between that town and Vitry; and, at all events, to reinforce them with the reserve, which should be ordered to move forward.”—ALEXANDER to SCHWARTZENBERG, March 8, 1814. "In consequence of intelligence received from Field-Marshal Blucher, the Emperor conceives it indispensable to begin to move by the right between Bar-sur-Aube and Vitry."-ALEXANDER to SCHWARTZENBERG, March 11, 1814. "I hasten to report to your Highness the reports received from Count St Priest. His Majesty has charged me to inform you that it is now more necessary than ever to act on the offensive. Henceforth your hands will be completely unbound, XIII. on the 5th, pushing his advanced posts to Sens and Pont- CHAP. sur-Yonne, but there he halted, and Macdonald withdrew unmolested behind the line of the Seine, where he established himself, with headquarters at Provins. 1814. 7. retaking of While the Allied Grand Army in Napoleon's absence was gaining these considerable advantages in the direction Important of Troyes, and prevented only by the separate interests Soissons. of the Cabinet of Vienna from following them up to the March 2. walls of Paris, a very different species of warfare had got up between Blucher and Napoleon on the banks of the Aisne. No sooner did the veteran Marshal hear of Napoleon's approach than he gave orders to concentrate his troops, which now amounted to nearly 50,000 men, without counting Winzingerode and Bulow's corps, just put under his orders by Lord Castlereagh's exertions, which were as many more. Having drawn in his men, Blucher retired, as already mentioned, across the Marne, which he passed at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, breaking down all the bridges in his retreat, and, after a demonstration against Meaux, which led to a sharp skirmish on the banks of the Ourcq, took the road to Soissons. He intended to have given battle with his whole united forces at Oulchy, on the right bank of the Ourcq, and his troops were all under orders to concentrate there but to reach that place it was necessary for Bulow, who was coming from Laon, to cross the Aisne; and the bridge of Soissons, held by the French, was the only one which spanned its waters, which were now rolling in an impetuous torrent, being largely swollen by a sudden thaw. Winzingerode, coming from Rheims, was on the left bank, the same side as Blucher, with 26,000 men, so that a junction with him could at any time be effected; but for Bulow to come up and reach the appointed point of rendezvous at Oulchy, it was necessary for that general to get across the Aisne, and the only bridge over it was in the hands of the enemy. and you may act according to military calculation.”—VOLKONSKY (Aide-de-camp to Alexander) to Schwartzenberg, March 12, 1814; Danilefsky, 194, 195. |