CHAP. X. upon by a rabble of fugitives. Explain fully my intentions to Vandamme: tell him what I expect from him. 1813. Never can he have a finer opportunity of earning his marshal's baton." 33. These orders placed Vandamme, when they came to Forces under be executed, in a situation of great danger though of Vandamme. the utmost importance. He had at Pirna 52 battalions, 29 squadrons, and 80 guns; and they mustered 27,000 infantry and 3000 horse. The Emperor put under him, in addition to his own corps, a division of St Cyr's corps, a brigade of Victor and Corbineau's cavalry, which brought up his force to fully 40,000. Immediately after the battle of Dresden, Mortier was advanced to Pirna with the Young Guard, 32,000 strong, distant about eight leagues from the scene of action, to support him if necessary. The Emperor, at the same time, issued orders to St Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat, to follow close on the enemy's footsteps, and drive them 1St Cyr, iv. on towards Töplitz, where he expected Vandamme would Thiers, xvi. be ready to receive them. This done, he halted the Young Guard at Pirna, leaving Vandamme to prosecute, alone and unsupported, his perilous movement into the rear of the Allied army at Töplitz.' Aug. 29. 128, 129; 327, 328; Bout. 40, 41; Vaud. 34. Great im portance of the posses sion of 1 That village was thus destined to become the theatre. of events not less important in their consequences than the victory of Platæa, or the battle of the Metaurus. All the roads from Saxony into Bohemia over the Erzgebirge range lead to, and intersect each other in, Töplitz, which lies at the foot of the mountains on the southern side in the Bohemian plain. If, therefore, Vandamme could, in obedience to his orders, make himself master of that important point before the Allies reached it, he would be in a situation to prevent their retiring columns, detached from each other and toiling through the passes, from debouching from the mountains ; while Murat, at the head of his redoubtable horse, and Victor, on the right road, and Marmont and St Cyr in the 1813. centre, pressed the rear of their columns; and Mortier, CHAP. with the Guard on the left road, could advance unop- X. posed to Vandamme's support. They might thus be exposed to almost certain ruin when attacked in rear and blocked up in front, while entangled with many thousand carriages among those narrow defiles and inhospitable ridges. On the other hand, if the French under Vandamme were defeated by the retiring masses of the Allied Grand Army, who would of necessity fight with the energy of despair to force their way through, a still greater catastrophe might be apprehended by Napoleon, as he would then be entirely cut off from the Elbe, and obliged to lay down his arms in the Bohemian plains. Thus both parties had equal motives for exertion; both saw clearly the vital importance of the contest; and the meanest soldier in the ranks was as strongly impressed with this as his chief. Vandamme was well aware of the perils with which his mission was attended, but he was a man of resolution, calm, experienced, and gifted with coup d'ail in danger: he knew that the Young Guard Jom. iv. was close in his rear at Pirna, and, never doubting that Fain, 312, he would be supported by that important body, he boldly 40, 41; set out, hoping to win his marshal's baton under the walls 328, 329. of Culm.1 1 398, 399; 313; Bout. Thiers, xvi. Culm, and extreme terror at In the race to Töplitz, however, the Allied generals 35. outstripped Vandamme. He did not receive intelligence Advance to of the result of the battle on the 27th till mid-day on the 28th, and it was too late then to occupy in force, Teplitz. the pass or do more than seize the heights overhanging it on the Aug. 29. eastern side, from whence, as already mentioned, he was driven by a vigorous effort on the part of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, supported by Ostermann Tolstoy's grenadiers. Thus the pass was opened in time to let the Russian general get through into the neighbourhood of Töplitz. But his force was considerably reduced by that rude encounter, and still more by the extreme fatigue they had undergone during the preceding week, insomuch that they CHAP. X. 1813. could not muster above 14,000 sabres and bayonets to oppose Vandamme, who, with nearly triple the force, was descending the mountains to make himself master of Töplitz. No sooner did his approach, with a force thought to be overwhelming, become known at that place, where the King of Prussia and whole corps diplomatique were assembled, than the utmost terror seized the persons assembled, with the exception of that monarch himself, 1 Fain, ii. who alone preserved his sang froid. The corps diplomatique all took to flight, hurrying across the fields Thiers, xvi. towards Deutsch Geyserberg and Laun, and nothing but the personal presence and courage of the King preserved anything like order in the rear of the fighting columns.1 314; Jom. iv. 399; Bout. 40; 329, 330; Lond. 125. 36. Vandamme's at Culm. Vandamme, conceiving he had only a beaten army to contend with, and recollecting the words of Napoleon, that first battle he should not allow himself to be imposed upon by a rabble of fugitives, descended from the mountains, deeming himself advancing to a certain victory. He soon found his mistake. In the first instance, he made the attack with only nine battalions on the Russian left wing, which was quickly repulsed. An obstinate action now ensued along the whole line: the French general brought up Duvernet's division, which restored the combat; the villages of Straden and Priesten were taken and retaken several times, but the latter finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The weight of the French attack, however, was directed against the Russian left, which was violently assailed by Vandamme in person with forces three times superior to those to whom they were opposed. The danger was extreme to the Allies; the Grand Army was ruined if the Eichswalde pass was reached.* But Oster * "The enemy now pressed Ostermann, and, having occupied the village of Kraupen, menaced seizure of the embouchure of Eichswalde, at the distance of a werst, where it was supposed the Prussian corps, &c., would attempt to break out. Indeed the danger seemed imminent, for the whole army still remained fixed in the mountains, unable to move from the breaking down of carriages and other impediments. The distance from Kraupen to their embouchure was but five wersts, and, if that pass was gained, ruin was inevitable for above a hundred and fifty thousand men.”—WILSON'S Private Diary, ii. 601. 1813. mann brought up the three noble regiments of Russian CHAP. Guards the Preobazinsky, Bonnet d'Or, and Simon- X. efsky; and those incomparable troops presented a barrier to their assailants which all their efforts were unable to break. In vain the French artillery closing to within half-musket shot, made huge chasms by discharges of grape in their ranks; steadily the veterans closed to the centre as the apertures were made, and, standing astride the dead bodies of their comrades, still presented an undaunted front. By this heroic resistance time was gained for the arrival of Count Diebitch, who came up with the grenadiers, and the Grand-duke Constantine with some cavalry of the Russian Guard. By their aid this formidable attack was arrested; the Russians retained their position in the centre; and, late in the evening, Vandamme, finding he could make no serious impression, drew off to the position from which he had descended in the forenoon to make the attack. The conduct of the Russian Guard on this occasion never was surpassed. "A body of troops," says Sir Charles Stewart,"consisting of about 8000, held in check during the day at least 30,000 men. As to the dauntless conduct of the Russian Imperial Guard, were I to attempt to describe to you the admiration I felt at witnessing their reckless bravery, I should fail for words to express it. The light cavalry of the Guard, consisting of the Polish and dragoon regiments, charged columns of infantry, regardless of every disadvantage or rule of mo-Stewart to dern warfare. If the troops had not held their ground, reagh, Sept. the columns of the army and the artillery retiring to 4,1813, Altenberg would have been ruined. The admirable con-xvi. 330, duct of the King of Prussia on this occasion was the theme. 314; of universal praise. Ostermann's corps lost 3200 men ;654. the cavalry took two standards and 400 prisoners.' Had Vandamme been his own master, or been at liberty to follow the dictates of prudence, he would have retreated after this rude shock, and rejoined the Young Guard at 1 Sir Chas. Lord Castle MS.; Thiers, 331; Fain, Kausler, CHAP. X. 1813. 37. Prepara second battle of Culm. Aug. 30. Pirna before any more formidable masses of the retreating enemy fell upon him. But the imperious commands of the Emperor left him no alternative; he was compelled at all hazards to push on to Töplitz. In the course of the tions for the night of the 29th he received a fresh order from Berthier, brought to him by an officer of the Swiss etat-major, enjoining him to push on without delay to Töplitz. On his arrival there he was to open a sealed letter delivered to him, which he was aware contained his brevet as fieldmarshal. Thus impelled alike by authority and ambition, Vandamme made preparations for renewing the conflict with his whole forces on the following day. Knowing that the Young Guard, 30,000 strong, was in his rear at Pirna, he never doubted he would be supported, and, notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the enemy, anticipated a glorious victory, which would complete the destruction of the whole right wing of the Allies. On their side, however, the Russians and Prussians made good use of their time. In the course of the night the King of Prussia, who, from his headquarters, which he had never moved, at Töplitz, had virtually obtained the command in that quarter, sent information to Kleist, who was still in the mountains near Ebersdorf, of what had occurred, and urged him to use the utmost efforts to gain the hill and defile of Nollendorf, through which the road to Pirna ran, while the enemy was engaged in front with the Allies, who were under the immediate command of Barclay de Tolly. Orders were at the same time sent to that general and Ostermann to make good their ground at all hazards at Culm, assuring them that they should be strongly supported in the course of the day by both the infantry and cavalry of the Guard. Thus the two armies 238; Thiers, were strangely interlaced on the same road; desperate 333; Jom. blows could not fail to be interchanged on the following Fain,ii. 315; day; and victory would probably remain to the party who was able to bring up the largest masses, and strike the hardest, at the decisive time and place.1 1 Cath. 237, xvi. 331 iv. 402, 403; St Cyr, iv. 128, 129. |