XIII. 1814. CHAP. Napoleon had 60,000 men under his command, animated with the prestige of recent victory; and the position of the Allies was very hazardous, as, if attacked, they would have to fight with a swollen impassable river in their rear, threatening the most serious danger in the event of defeat. From the embarrassment consequent on this hazardous position they were relieved by the capitulation of Soissons, which took place in consequence of violent threats held out by Bulow and Winzingerode, who appeared on opposite banks of the river at the same moment beneath its walls, against the garrison, which was only 1000 strong, under General Moreau. The importance of gaining possession of the passage over the Aisne at this moment was so evident, that when the French governor made some difficulty about capitulating unless he was allowed to bring away his guns, Woronzoff observed, that "so far from objecting to this condition, he would gladly make the French a present of his own guns on the condition of their immediately evacuating the fortress." The place was delivered up accordingly, and the Allied army gained the great advantage of being able to form a junction with Bulow on the opposite side. They were now above 100,000 strong, and perfectly concentrated — a 443; Muf state of things which proved decisive of the fate of the Dan. 207 campaign and of Napoleon, and was directly and exclu209 Koch, sively owing to the moral courage of Lord Castlereagh Vaud. ii. 15, in putting Bulow and Winzingerode under Blucher in vi. 205-207. the important conference at Bar-sur-Aube on the 25th February.1* 1 Thiers, xvii. 435 fling, 473; i. 374-376; 16; Marm. * There can be no doubt that the capitulation of Soissons, as matters stood, was a great advantage to the Allies; but the French historians are altogether in error when they describe it as the most decisive event of the campaignsecond in historical importance only to Grouchy's eccentric march to Wavre instead of Waterloo on 18th June in the succeeding year. M. Thiers says:— Quelque parti qu'il adoptât, Blucher était réduit à combattre avec l'Aisne à dos, et avec 45,000 hommes contre 55,000. . . . Qu'il voulût s'arrêter à Soissons pour y livrer bataille adossé à une rivière, ou qu'il voulût remonter l'Aisne, la position était la même. S'il s'arrêtait devant Soissons, Napoléon, se réunissant par sa gauche à Marmont et Mortier, tombait sur lui en trois ou quatre heures de temps; s'il voulait remonter l'Aisne pour y établir un pont, ou se XIII. 8. The delay in getting possession of Soissons, however, CHAP. having rendered the concentration at Oulchy impossible, the whole of Blucher's army defiled with Winzingerode's 1814. corps over the bridge of Soissons, on the 4th March, and Concentrathey were all united on that day, on the summit of the tion of the plateau overlooking Soissons, on the road to Laon. Na-on the road poleon was so irritated at General Moreau for giving up sons to Laon servir de celui de Bery-au-Bac, Napoléon de Fismes se jetait encore plus directement sur lui. . . . La perte de Blucher était donc assurée, et qu'allaient devenir alors Bulow et Winzingerode errant dans le voisinage pour le rejoindre? que devenait Schwartzenberg resté seul sur la route de Paris? Les destins de la France devaient donc être changés, car quel que pût être plus tard le sort de la dynastie impériale (question fort secondaire dans une crise aussi grave), la France victorieuse aurait conservé ses frontières naturelles ! . . . Voici comment s'était accompli cet événement, le plus funeste de notre histoire, après celui qui devait un an plus tard s'accomplir entre Wavre et Waterloo."THIERS, xvii. 443, 444. Amidst some truth there is great exaggeration in this statement. It is all demolished by the single fact, which is studiously keep out of view, that as Bulow was on the right bank of the Aisne, Winzingerode was on the left, and it was to Woronzoff, commanding one of his divisions, that Soissons capitulated. Blucher, therefore, had on the left bank of the Aisne not 45,000 men, as Thiers says, but 75,000 men; and he was actively engaged in constructing a bridge to bring Bulow over, or himself to join him, when Soissons capitulated. See MUFFLING, Aus Mein Leben, 124.* Winzingerode was lying in the valley of the Aisne when Blucher approached, and he failed to come to the rendezvous at Oulchy, on the Ourcq, from having engaged with Bulow in the attack on Soissons, he being on the left and Bulow on the right bank. If Napoleon had attacked Blucher, therefore, when forced back to the Aisne, he would have had not 48,000 but 75,000 men on his hands. Their situation however was critical, with Napoleon in their front and the Aisne in their rear; and the fall of Soissons was undoubtedly a great advantage, though by no means so important as the French writers represent. It is singular how Thiers, in so important a matter, should have fallen into such an error, when he himself says that Winzingerode commanded on the left bank of the Aisne; and he adds, "Le 3 au soir, Bulow et Winzingerode se donnèrent la main sur l'Aisne, et c'est ainsi que le 4 dans la journée Blucher trouva ouverte une porte qui aurait dû être fermée."-THIERS, xvii. 447. What decisively proves that Blucher by no means ran the risk alleged by the French historians on this occasion is the fact, that his whole baggage went up the left bank of the Aisne by Fismes to Bery-au-Bac, where they crossed that river, without being molested by the enemy. Much more must the columns of infantry and cavalry been able to do the same. For this decisive fact we have the authority of Baron Muffling, Blucher's quartermaster-general. "The baggage," says he, "was sent forward to Fismes. Conformably to this disposition the baggage was to march on the 4th March from Fismes to Bery-au-Bac. The baggage of York's and Kleist's corps obeyed this order, and crossed the river without difficulty; a portion of Sacken's, on the contrary, from some misunderstanding, remained at Fismes, and was captured that afternoon."-MUFFLING, 458, translation. "Bulow stood on the right bank of the Aisne, Winzingerode on the left; the communicating bridge was to be constructed at Vailly.”—MUFFLING, 467, translation. from Sois March 4. CHAP. XIII. 1814. the place without firing a shot, that he ordered him to be handed over to a military commission, and shot in twentyfour hours, on the Place de Grève.* As Soissons was now in the hands of the Allies, he was retarded a day and a half securing a passage higher up the stream, which gave time to the Allies to organise their great army on the level plateau between Soissons and Laon. Independent of the important accession of strength thus gained by Blucher, which more than doubled his effective force, he acquired much by the character of the generals of corps with whom he was now associated, for he had the highest opinion both of Bulow and Winzingerode, the former of whom had greatly distinguished himself in the campaign of the preceding year in Germany, while the latter he knew well to be one of the most able and enterprising cavalry officers in the whole Russian army. "When the two armies were united," says an eyewitness, Baron Muffling, "the aspect of the Army of Silesia, with their bronzed visages blackened by the smoke of the bivouacs, long beards, torn mantles, worn leather breeches, and unpolished arms, but erect carriage and strong limbs, formed 1 Muffling, a striking contrast to the splendid uniforms, burnished muskets, and well-filled baggage-waggons of the corps of 126; Claus. Bernadotte's army.' "These men have much need of Koch, i. 376; rest," said Bulow to Blucher, as the veterans of the Army 210, 211; of Silesia marched past. In effect, they had arrived 449-451. nearly at the last stage of physical effort, having been uniformly marching or fighting for two months.1 Mem. Le ben, 125, vii. 457; 377; Dan. Thiers, xvii. Napoleon having determined to win the bridge over the Aisne at Bery-au-Bac, above Soissons, or to construct one in that quarter, and not being fully informed of the magnitude of the accession of strength which the Army of Silesia "Le 3, à midi, le Général Moreau est sorti de Soissons avec les honneurs de la guerre, et a emmené quatre pièces de canon. Faites arrêter ce misérable ainsi que les membres du conseil de défense; faites-les traduire par-devant une commission militaire composée de généraux, et, pour Dieu, faites en sorte qu'ils soient fusillés dans les vingt-quatre heures sur la Place de Grève! I est temps de faire des exemples."-THIERS, Xvii. 449. 9. Advance of pursuit, and takes post had secured by the junction of Bulow and Winzingerode's corps, prepared to cross the river there and advance on XIII. Laon. Blucher meanwhile took post at CRAONNE, on the 1814. plateau which hangs over and extends from the road from Bery-au-Bac, by which the enemy was now approaching, Napoleon in to the great road from Soissons to Laon. The position Blucher there chosen was extremely strong. It consisted of a neck at Craonne. of land not half a mile broad, but a mile and a half long, bounded on either flank by steep slopes leading down to the ravines of Foulon and Ailles, the sides of which, difficult of ascent even to active infantry, were wholly impracticable for cavalry or artillery. The little river Lette flowed near by, in a straight line, in the bottom of the ravine to the north at the distance of a mile from the southern edge of the plateau, the Aisne ran in a deep and nearly parallel channel from east to west. A cross gully, of no great depth, crossed the plateau at right angles to the ravines on either side, and it was there Blucher resolved to make his first stand. The neck of the plateau at this point was only 500 yards across, and behind it another1 Personal position of equal strength was formed by some eminences, tion; Koch, like bastions, stretching each half-way across. The upper Thiers, xvii. parts of the hollows on either side were filled with wood, vi. 208. impervious either to cavalry or artillery.1 observa i. 389; 454; Marm. It was not by any means, however, his whole force 10. was here Allies. which Blucher had assembled in this strong position. The Force which narrow extent of the ground on the plateau itself forbade assembled the extension of any considerable force upon it. Besides by the the central position of Craonne, it was necessary to occupy Laon, commanding the communication with the Netherlands and Soissons, which guarded the important bridge over the Aisne and the direct road to Paris. To accomplish these objects, Bulow with his whole corps, 17,000 strong, was stationed in that town and its neighbourhood. D'York was posted on the plateau between Laon and Soissons with 23,000, including Kleist's corps. Soissons was occupied by 9000 veterans of Langeron's corps. Win 1814. CHAP. Zingerode's infantry, under Woronzoff and Strogonoff, was XIII. posted with Sacken in reserve, in a very strong position on the plateau of Craonne, forming the principal avenue to the position from Bery-au-Bac, where the French army crossed the Aisne; while Winzingerode, who was intrusted with a body of 10,000 cavalry and 60 pieces of horseartillery, and was to be supported, if necessary, by Kleist and Langeron, was instructed to pass the Lette, and fall on the right flank or rear of the French army, when actively engaged with the Russians in front, on the neck of the plateau. The Russian position, as a whole, might be regarded as formed by a mass of elevated plateaus, accessible only by Soissons on the south-west, and over the narrow plateau of Craonne on the south-east, with the Aisne flowing in a deep and impassable channel all along its front. The only bridges over it were those of Soissons and Bery-au-Bac, the former of which was in the hands of the Allies; and though there were two intermediate fords, yet they were of such a kind as did not endanger the position. On this strong ground the Allied army, 109,000 strong, were now assembled; but from their great and unavoidable dispersion, a small proportion of their great force was alone posted on the decisive position on the plateau of Craonne. The force there assembled consisted only of 22,000 Russians of Woronzoff and Stro1 Muff. 472, gonoff's divisions of Winzingerode's corps, with 60 guns. 473; Koch, Sacken's corps was in reserve, but never was under fire Die Grosse during the whole of the desperate actions which ensued; 575-577; and Winzingerode's horse, as will immediately appear, 457, 458. from mistaking their way, did not appear at all on the field of battle.1 i. 391; Chron. iii. Thiers, xvii. 11. reasons Napoleon's force was much less considerable, for it Napoleon's did not at the very utmost exceed 50,000 men ; and from forces, and the necessity of guarding different points, he could not hazarding bring more than 40,000 into the field at any one point. In these circumstances it appears almost an act of madness to have hazarded an attack on a veteran army strongly an attack. |