posted, and so very superior in number; and it is accordingly condemned as such by Marshal Marmont in his Mémoires. But the truth is, that in acting in this manner the French Emperor was no longer a free agent-he was forced on by an invincible necessity. Marmont tells us that such had been the losses of the French army in the active campaign which they had carried on for the last two months between the Seine and the Marne, that Napoleon could never reckon on more than 40,000 men under his immediate command, and often had only 30,000 whom he could bring actually under fire.† In making the furious onslaught which he did with a force so extremely inferior, on Blucher's strong position around Laon and behind the Aisne, his object was to force his way through, so as to lend a hand to the Flemish garrisons, who had received orders to be in readiness to break through the feeble blockading force of landwehr by which they were watched, and come to join him. By this means he expected out of the strongholds of Flanders, Holland, Rhenish Prussia, and the Rhine, to draw at least 50,000 excellent troops, who would be much more than a match for the blockading forces by which they were observed, and enable him to threaten the rear of Schwartzenberg and Blucher's armies with 100,000 men, all veteran sol "Attaquer Blucher quand l'Armée du Nord venait de le joindre, et que ses forces réunies s'élévaient certainement à cent mille hommes, était folie. C'était renouveler d'une manière plus entière et qui pouvait être plus funeste la faute de Brienne. A Brienne on avait échappé par miracle à la destruction, et on allait de gaieté du cours provoquer des chances encore pire; car, en combattant en avant de l'Aisne et de Soissons occupés par l'ennemi, si celui-ci eut eu la moindre resolution et eut agi avec plus de calcul, personne n'échappait de l'armée Française."-MARMONT, Mémoires, vi. 209, 210. "Jamais, dans le cours de cette mémorable campagnes, Napoléon n'a eu à sa disposition entre la Seine et la Marne plus de quarante mille hommes. Les efforts continus que l'on ne cessa de faire pour operer des levées, et nous les envoyer, n'eurent d'autre résultat que d'entretenir le nombre des combattants à peu près à la même force. Les détachements, arrivant journellement à l'armée, remplaçaient à peine les pertes causés par les combats, les marches, et la désertion, dont l'effet se fit toujours plus ou moins sentir. Les mouvements de l'Empereur d'une rivière à l'autre, avec une partie de ses forces, sa Garde, ses reserves, et son artillerie, partaient momentairement l'armée, où il se trouvait à environs trente mille hommes.-MARMONT, v. 209, 210.” CHAP. XIII. 1814. CHAP. XIII. 1814. diers. He had become sensible of the enormous mistake he had committed in leaving so large a part of his best forces to be shut up in the fortresses, when every sabre and bayonet was of value on the theatre of war between the Seine and the Marne, and he took this mode of correcting it. Great as the force was by which he was opposed, after Blucher's army was doubled by the junction of Winzingerode and Bulow's corps, he was very near succeeding; and had it not been for that junction, he, beyond all doubt, could have done so. It was Lord Castlereagh's moral courage at the council of war at Barsur-Aube, on the 25th February, which, by doubling Blucher's force, caused this well-conceived design to miscarry, and was the immediate cause of the overthrow of the Napoleonic dominations in Europe.* * "Il imagina qu'il serait possible de tirer parti contre l'ennemi des garnisons, puisqu'ils se servaient contre nous des troupes de blocus, et de mettre ainsi à profit ce qu'il appelait dans son langage profondément expressif, les forces mortes. En conséquence, il résolut de mobiliser tout ce qu'il y avait de troupes disponibles dans les places, et de les en faire sortir pour composer une armée active dont le rôle pourrait devenir des plus importants. On avait jeté dans les forteresses de la Belgique, du Luxembourg, de la Lorraine, de l'Alsace, des conscrits qui, placés dans de vieux cadres, avaient dû acquérir une certaine instruction, depuis deux mois et demi que durait la campagne. Ces données admises, il était possible de tirer de Lille, d'Anvers, d'Ostende, de Gorcum, de Berg-op-Zoom, 20,000 hommes environ, et 15,000 au moins. On devait en tirer plus du double des places de Luxembourg, Metz, Verdun, Thionville, Mayence, Strasbourg, etc. Si donc, après avoir mis Blucher hors de cause, Napoléon, à qui il resterait 50,000 hommes à peu près, en recueillait 50,000, en se portant par Soissons, Laon, Rethel, sur Verdun et Nancy, il allait se trouver avec 100,000 hommes sur les derrières du Prince de Schwartzenberg, et sans aucun doute ce dernier n'attendrait pas ce moment pour revenir de Paris sur Besançon. Au premier soupçon d'un pareil projet, le généralissime de la Coalition rebrousserait chemin, poursuivi par les paysans exaspérés de la Bourgogne, de la Champagne, de la Lorraine, lesquels, abbatus d'abord par la rapidité de l'invasion, avaient senti depuis se réveiller en eux l'amour du sol dans toute sa vivacité. Il arriverait ainsi à moitié vaincu pour tomber définitivement sous les coups de Napoléon. Ce plan si hardi était fort exécutable, car le nombre d'hommes existait, et le trajet pour les rallier n'exigeait ni trop de fatigue, ni trop de temps. En effet de Soissons à Rethel, de Rethel à Verdun, de Verdun à Toul, le chemin à faire n'excédait guère celui qu'on avait déjà fait pour courir alternativement de Schwartzenberg à Blucher. D'ailleurs, peu importaient deux ou trois jours de plus, quand la simple annonce du mouvement projeté aurait ramené l'ennemi de Paris vers les frontières, et dégagé la capitale. Ainsi la guerre pouvait être terminée d'un seul coup si la fortune secondait l'exécution de ce projet, car certainement le Prince de Schwartzenberg, déjà réduit à 90,000 hommes par le détachement envoyé à Lyon, re XIII. 1814. 12. Napoleon is Soissons, Berry-au crosses the March 5. Full of this plan, which, how hazardous soever, promised such important results, Napoleon in the first instance made an assault on Soissons, so recently occupied by the enemy, intending, if he took it, to make his attack by the direct road by that town to Laon. But although repulsed at the onset was made with great gallantry by the corps of but takes Marmont and Mortier, it was successfully resisted by Bac, and Langeron's Russian veterans under Radzewitz, and after Aisne. losing 1200 men in the attack, the assaulting columns drew off. Meanwhile he himself moved the remainder of his troops to his right, up the valley of the Aisne, intending either to construct a bridge of trestles, or find a passage at Bery-au-Bac, where there was one of stone in the hands of the Russians. Here he was more fortunate than he had been at Soissons. General Nansouty, with his advanced-guard, by a sudden attack made himself master of the town and bridge of Bery-au-Bac, which had been negligently guarded by the Cossacks, while Rheims was taken by General Corbineau, with 2000 prisoners and much baggage. Napoleon immediately crossed the greater part of his forces over the bridge of Bery-au-Bac, and got himself established in force on the right bank of the Aisne with 30,000 men without being disquieted by the enemy, who, deceived as to the real amount of his force, and conceiving they were in presence of the Emperor with 60,000 men, had merely established themselves on the neck of land on the plateau 478, 479, of Craonne, by which the road from Bery-au-Bac to Thiers, xvii. Laon passed, with Winzingerode's men in front, Sacken's Dan. 215in support a mile and a half behind, and Langeron's in tho, iii. 286; reserve a league back, intending to bar the access from 386, 387. the south-east to the plateau of Laon.1 The Emperor, being determined to force a passage, commenced the attack on the neck of the plateau of venant traqué par les paysans de nos provinces, ne pourrait pas tenir tête à une armée de 100,000 hommes, commandée par l'Empereur en personne.”— THIERS, xvii. 438-440. 1 Muffling, 435, 436; 217; Plo Koch, i. CHAP. XIII. 13. Battle of Craonne. March 7. Craonne at nine in the morning of the 7th March. The main attack along the plateau from the ravine on its left, 1814. which was preceded by a hundred guns, was intrusted to Marshal Victor; and he was supported on his right by Ney, who was to lead his corps from the valley of the Lette up against the village of Ailles and the left flank of the plateau; and on his left by a detached column, principally of cavalry, under Nansouty, which was to ascend from Ouche, in the valley of Foulon, and assail its right. It was intended that these flank attacks should scale the steep banks on either side, at the moment that the Allies were seriously engaged on the top with Victor in front. After a severe conflict, Victor made himself master of the farm and wood of Vauclerc, on the left of the plateau; but when he began to advance along the summit, and got within reach of Woronzoff's guns, he was received by so tremendous a fire from sixty pieces admirably posted on the neck, that he was obliged to withdraw beyond the reach of the discharge. Meanwhile Ney, farther on in the valley of the Lette on the Allied left, no sooner heard the cannon-shot on the summit than he commenced a vigorous attack on the village of Ailles, overhanging the Lette, with the divisions of the Guard which he commanded, and soon his advancedguard were seen climbing the steep ascent above that village, while, on the other side, Nansouty's horse were ascending the slope on the left which leads from the hamlet of Vassogne. No sooner did Napoleon perceive the French uniforms appearing on either side of the top, than he ordered Victor's men, who were re-formed in close column, to advance again to the attack along the neck of the plateau. With such vigour did this column rush forward that one of the Russian batteries was carried, 461; Dan. but in a few minutes retaken. The position of the RusKoch, 1.394, sians on the summit, however, had now become very iii. 290,291, hazardous, for the forces in the valley of Foulon on their right, and of the Lette on their left, were every minute 1 Thiers, xvii. 460, 225, 226; 395; Plotho, increasing, and the expected succour which was to have CHAP. met them had not made its appearance. XIII. 14. tour obliges retreat. This arose from a deviation from orders on the part 1814. of Winzingerode, who had made an unauthorised circuit winzinwith his corps of 10,000 cavalry and horse-artillery. gerode's deThat general had already been much impeded in his Blucher to march by the excessive badness of the roads, which the thaw had in many places rendered foot-deep of mud; and when the action commenced at nine in the morning, instead of being, as Blucher supposed, in the rear of the French, he was still in the valley of the Lette at Chevrigny. No sooner did Blucher hear of this contretemps than he set off, with his whole staff, at the gallop for Winzingerode's corps, of which he designed to take the command in person, rightly judging that to that body the duty of delivering the final stroke would devolve; and at the same time he sent orders to Sacken, who commanded in chief the forces on the plateau, to retreat if he saw himself in danger of being turned by the valleys on either side. The Field-Marshal did not overtake Winzingerode till he had reached Bruyères, and he then found that, instead of selecting Neuville as the point of passage of the Lette, he had gone on to Chevrigny, which occasioned a circuit of at least three leagues, and rendered it impossible for him to reach the scene of action in time to be of any service. Deeply mortified by this untoward circumstance, which deprived him of the immense advantage which he anticipated from the flank attack of so large a body of horse when the battle was fully engaged in front, 480, 481; Blucher resolved to concentrate his troops and fight the Thiers, xvii. final battle at Laon; and as he knew that Sacken with Dan. 226Winzingerode's infantry was overmatched on the plateau, iii. 290, 291; he sent orders to him to retreat in the direction of that 399, 400. town.1 But it was an easier matter to give orders to retreat than execute them without disaster, in presence of Napoleon with 30,000 veteran troops, of whom 6000 were VOL. II. 2 A 1 Muffling, 461-463; 228; Plotho, Koch, i. |