XIII. CHAP. admirable horse. Woronzoff, who commanded the Russians engaged, Sacken being far in the rear, was, however, 1814. equal to the emergency. At two in the afternoon, after Retreat of having made good the post for five hours against superior the Russians, forces, he gave orders to retire, which was done with unof the battle. daunted firmness and uncommon skill. Then shone forth 15. and results in its highest lustre the steadiness of the Russian soldiers in retreat, beyond all question the first in Europe in that difficult and trying operation. The troops were all formed in squares, which fell back by alternate bodies, the artillery in the openings, and the dismounted guns with such of the wounded as could be removed in front of the retreating column. The moment that Napoleon saw the retrograde movement commencing, he brought up all his available guns, a hundred in number, to the front, which sent a storm of round shot among the retreating columns, while his whole cavalry were hurled upon the masses in a headlong charge along the neck of the plateau. It seemed impossible that the Russian squares, encumbered with wounded and dismounted guns, could withstand so terrible an onset. Slowly, however, and steadily, they pursued their march, the squares alternately facing 461; Muff, and discharging their pieces, while the guns in the inter481 Dan. vals fired incessantly on the threatening masses of the 399 Vaud, pursuers. The danger became greater when they came 1.35-37 to the extended part of the plateau, because the French 290, 291. horse who had scaled the steep ascent on either side had then room to charge.1 1 Thiers, xvii. 460, 226-228; Koch, i.394 i. ; Plotho, iii. battle. 16. At this critical moment Wassilchikoff came up with Close of the Lanskoy's hussars and Ooshakoff's dragoons from Sacken's corps, the infantry of which was still in the rear, and they instantly charged the enemy with such vigour that the advance was checked, the cavalry thrown back, and time gained to draw off the guns and wounded to the position, which was still stronger, on the second neck of the plateau. There Woronzoff's whole guns not dismounted, sixty-four in number, were posted on the sloping ground in two lines, XIII. 1814. one above another. The Russian infantry retreated slowly CHAP. and steadily till they came abreast of the lower line, and then, facing about, opened with the artillery a tremendous fire on the enemy, the guns on their upper line at the same time firing over their heads with canister and round shot. The French brought up the Old Guard, which faced the storm with their wonted intrepidity, and Drouot on foot, directing his guns, replied with the utmost vigour to the Russian fire. This awful cannonade, almost unparalleled in war, lasted twenty minutes, when Woronzoff, 1 Koch, i. having gained time for his baggage, dismounted guns, and 391, 394wounded to gain the great road from Soissons, withdrew, iii. 290, 291; without being further pursued, beyond Vetain, and the 463-465; French reaped the barren honours of this well-fought Dan. 229.' field.1 396; Plotho, Thiers, xvii. Muff. 483; 17. results of Such was the terrible battle of Craonne, the most bloody and obstinately contested, if Albuera is excepted, of the Material whole war. The loss on both sides was enormous; on the battle. that of the Russians 6000 were killed and wounded, and the French historians admit a loss of 7000 or 8000.* This loss, in proportion to the number of troops engaged under fire, was greater than in any action during the whole revolutionary contest, Albuera alone excepted. The forces on the opposite sides were nearly equal; for although the French under fire were 29,423, and the Russians only 21,204, yet the latter had, till the artillery of the Guard came up under Drouot, the superiority in guns, and they enjoyed in addition the advantage of an extremely strong position, which the former were obliged to overcome by the sheer force of assault. This circumstance, too, explains how it came to pass that the French, though they gained the victory upon the whole, sustained * "Les Russes avaient perdu 6000 to 7000 hommes, et on ne sera pas étonné d'apprendre que, débouchant sous un feu épouvantable, nous en eussions perdu 7000 à 8000. La différence à notre désavantage eût même été plus grande, si notre artillerie, retardée non par sa faute mais par la distance, n'était venue à la fin compenser par ses ravages ceux que nous avions soufferts."— THIERS, xvii. 467. CHAP. XIII. 1814. 18. Its moral results. a greater loss than the Russians, who withdrew from the The moral effects of this desperate shock were felt in the thigh by a cannon-ball; Grouchy, Nansouty, and -Kocн, i. 391; and Die Grosse Chron., iii. 575-577. Thiers says (xvii. 466) that the French were 30,000 and the Russians 50,000 in this battle. The well-known inaccuracy, or rather accurate partiality, of that able writer in all questions where numbers are involved between the French and their enemies, renders this statement of little weight. But it is apparent how he makes it out without falsifying the returns of any of the Russian corps. He represents the Russians in the battle as composed of the corps of Winzingerode, Sacken, and Langeron, and without doubt their united force would have been 50,000 men. But the first only were under fire; the cavalry of the second only came up in the close of the day: the whole infantry of Sacken, and infantry and cavalry of Langeron, were a league in the rear, and never under fire at all. Muffling says, "Generals Count Strogonow and Count Woronzow already stood in four or five divisions, and Sacken's formed three more half a league in their rear, and Count Langeron's another again half a league farther back; the enemy could only attack by attempting to turn the wings by the valleys."--MUFFLING, 479. XIII. 1814. three other generals, wounded. On the Allied side the CHAP. sensation was still greater, and threatened more serious results. Ill-success, as usual in an army of confederates, was producing divisions. The Russians reproached the Prussians with their having thrown the whole weight of the contest on them: the Prussians retorted by referring to the dreadful loss they had sustained at Vauchamps. The first charge could not be denied; for out of 9000 men who had fallen at Craonne and Soissons, there was hardly one Prussian; and while the whole weight of the contest had fallen on Winzingerode's corps, Bulow's had not fired a shot. A little consideration would have shown that this was the result of accident, and of the gallant defence of Soissons by Langeron's men; for if that town had been taken, Napoleon would have moved direct on Laon by the great road from Paris, and in so doing would have come at once on the corps of Bulow and Kleist, stationed at Laon and the road leading to it from Soissons. When the Russians, too, complained of the weight of the contest having been thrown on the corps of the Army of the North at Craonne, keeping Sacken and Langeron in reserve, they forgot what they themselves had observed when the two armies were united a few days before, and how thin were the ranks and wan the visages of the soldiers of the Army of Silesia, compared to the overflowing array and splendid appearance of those of Bernadotte's comparatively untouched host. But all these considerations were for-1 Muff. 483, gotten in the soreness produced by recent disaster, and the 484; Bign. angry feelings of both officers and soldiers, constantly break- Fain, 159ing out, promised ill for any united action between them.1i. 404. xiii. 271; 161; Koch, concentrate Having resolved to make his final stand in the splendid position of Laon, and being impressed, from the desperate 19. onslaught at Craonne, with an exaggerated idea of the The Allies strength of the French army, Blucher gave orders for around the concentration of his troops in every direction. As a necessary consequence Soissons was abandoned by General advances to Radzewil, who could not long have maintained it from Laon, and Napoleon attack them. CHAP. want of provisions; and with great skill and no small difficulty he eluded the enemy's corps, and reached the 1814. general rendezvous around Laon. When the whole army was assembled there, it consisted, after all the losses it had undergone, of 104,000 men, including 22,000 horse and 260 guns—a force fully double of that which Napoleon could bring against it. This formidable array, divided into six corps, guarded the five roads which intersect each other from various quarters in Laon, having that town itself, situated on the summit of a conical hill 300 feet high, garrisoned by 17,000 men, as a huge redoubt in its centre. The two roads from Soissons and Bery-au-Bac unite at Laon. Napoleon, to cover Paris, had now moved to the former, and was approaching along it. In doing so he must come upon Etouville, which is a village two miles from Laon, situated at the extreme of a defile formed by the chaussée running through a marsh up to the foot of the hill, which it ascends by a sloping road. Chernicheff was posted at this village with four Russian regiments and twenty-four guns, with orders to hold it to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the garrison of Soissons to pass over and join the rendezvous. In obedience to his orders, he defended it successfully on the evening of the 8th against the reiterated attacks of Marshal Ney, with his divisions of the Guard, until the garrison was safely over. Then, and not till then, he withdrew, on the morning of the 9th, with his wounded and guns, and joined the general assemblage around the hill of Laon. By his retreat to Laon, Blucher had lost his communication with 1 Muff. 484; Nancy, on which he had hitherto relied for provisions; 469-471; and being absolutely without food, he was obliged to take Dan. 236, half of the bread of the two corps of the Army of the . 406-411; North. This embittered the spirit of the two armies, and Ence, 411. augmented the general ill-humour, for Bernadotte's men had hitherto experienced no such privations.1 Thiers, xvii. 237; Koch, Vahr. von Napoleon, on his part, felt the necessity, notwithstanding his great inferiority of force, of attacking the enemy |