CHAP. 25. Desperate Napoleon's affairs. ous. He had lost in the battle of Craonne, and those around Laon, fully 14,000 men-a grievous chasm in his 1814. forces, and in his circumstances irreparable, for he had no reserves on which he could fall back to renew the conflict. position of His project of breaking through the circle of his pursuers, and recruiting his shattered forces by the garrisons in Flanders and on the Rhenish frontier, was finally defeated; the force under his immediate command was reduced to 40,000 men, with which he had to make head against 90,000 at the disposal of the Allied generals immediately in his front, besides a still greater body, under Schwartzenberg, threatening Paris from the south. Marmont's corps, by the entire loss of its artillery, was completely incapacitated for the present, and in his rear was the deep and impassable stream of the Aisne, traversed only by the two bridges of Soissons and Bery-au-Bac. His circumstances appeared altogether desperate, and to any other commander they would have proved so, and led to an immediate accommodation. But Napoleon had not yet lost confidence in his star and the resources of his indomitable mind, and he continued the contest for a few weeks longer. But it was a last and expiring effort; every one saw that he had received his death-blow at Laon, and that his subsequent efforts, though they might prolong the contest, could not avert his fate. It is not a little remarkable that this decisive success should have been owing to an individual of the same family with the one who rendered decisive the triumph of Leipsic, and that Lord Castlereagh did the same essential service to the Allied cause by doubling Blucher's force at the expense of Bernadotte's army in 1814, which Sir Charles 485; Muff. Stewart had done in the preceding year by compelling him Burgh. 203. unwillingly to bring up his columns to the banks of the Partha, in the great battle of nations.1 1 Thiers, 491, 492; Considering the vast superiority of forces which the Prussian marshal now enjoyed, it for long appeared inexplicable how he did not take more advantage of it; XIII. 26. inactivity after the and that for nine days after the battle of Laon, while Napoleon, with a defeated and inferior army, was retreating by Soissons and Bery-au-Bac towards Rheims and 1814. the banks of the Marne, he remained inactive at Laon, Secret hisand even allowed his antagonist on the 13th to strike tory of the an important blow at the town of Rheims, where St of Blucher Priest, who had occupied it with 14,000 men, was totally battle. defeated, and the place taken, with 2500 prisoners, and a loss to the Allies in all of 3500 men. The reasons hitherto assigned by the military historians of the Allies for their extraordinary inactivity at such a crisis, though by no means without weight, were not adequate to explain so strange a circumstance, and so much at variance with the previous achievements of the glorious Army of Silesia and its heroic and enthusiastic chiefs. It was true that Blucher, for several days after the battle, was confined to bed by a serious complaint in his eyes; that the army was excessively fatigued by the efforts it had made; and that such was the penury of provisions from the presence of so great a force in a small space, and the loss of the communication with Nancy, on which the commissariat had hitherto relied, that an advance on the direct road to Paris would have induced absolute famine, if done in one mass. But all this would not explain such a prolonged inactivity when Flanders was in the rear, with Bernadotte to keep open the communications, and Napoleon in front with a beaten army, in a situation where a fresh defeat would prove total ruin. Marshal Saxe fought the battle of Fontenoy when confined to a litter; and somehow or other a victorious army seldom fails to find food in its triumphant advance. But the real secret of this inactivity has now been revealed by Blucher's quartermaster-general on the staff. Bernadotte was in the rear, it is true, but he was not to be trusted; nay, he had done enough to show he was seriously to be feared. Infatuated with the idea that he would be chosen by the French nation to succeed 1814. CHAP. Napoleon, and desirous, above all things, of doing nothing XIII. which might interfere with the realisation of that brilliant dream, he had not only halted all the troops still under his command at Liège, so far off as to be of no service to Blucher's army, but issued a proclamation interdicting all armaments in Rhenish Prussia on the part of the Allies, upon the ground that they were "contrary to old treaties, and especially the one ceding the left bank of the Rhine.” Nay, so far had his tortuous policy gone, that serious apprehensions were entertained at Laon that he might attack Blucher in rear, or at all events interrupt his whole communications with the Low Countries, and cut off all supplies from that quarter. So strong were the indications of a diverging and treacherous conduct on the part of the Crown Prince, that the Russian commander deemed it indispensable to remain where he was to be prepared for any event; and this explains an inactivity which, on any other supposition, would be inexplicable.* The successful issue of the battle of Laon, notwithstanding this temporary suspension of active operations, had the most beneficial effect upon the spirits and feelings of the Allied army. "The Russians," says Baron * "The Field-Marshal's plan of active operations after the battle of Laon very soon underwent an alteration in consequence of the accounts which came from the Netherlands. Notice was sent that the Crown Prince, with the Swedish troops, had made a halt at Liège, and would proceed no farther. Moreover, the monarchs had agreed among themselves that the provinces situated on the left bank of the Rhine, Clêves, Gueldres, &c., which formerly had belonged to Prussia, should be restored to that power; and General Von Bulow had therefore sent officers to Clêves to receive volunteers and establish the landwehr, as in the other reconquered Prussian provinces. But the Crown Prince had, on his arrival on the left bank of the Rhine, interdicted all armaments, declaring that it was contrary to former treaties with France, and especially the one ceding the left bank of the Rhine.' These instructions, with some others, awakened old recollections in the Field-Marshal, and excited his apprehension that the policy of Sweden might be different from that of the other Allies. As the communication with headquarters was interrupted, and he had been for some time without news of the Grand Army, he thought himself bound to use the greater precaution, and to hold himself prepared for any event that might occur. These peculiar circumstances will explain why the Silesian army continued, for nine days after the battle of Laon, in a state of inactivity, which could in no way be reconciled with its former conduct."— MUFFLING, 492, 493. CHAP. XIII. 1814. 27. Beneficial effect of the battle of the Allied 489. Muffling, "who know how to value bravery in other nations because they are brave themselves, did full justice to the Prussian army, and to Generals Kleist and York, for their ability and skill. The Prussians rejoiced that the lot had now fallen to them to avenge the loss of their brave Allies who had fallen at the battle of Craonne, Laon on by a defeat which must essentially contribute to the army. termination of the war. All were once more contented and joyful, and the discord of previous days was forgotten." This auspicious change was of the greatest 1 Muff. 488, importance, for the dissension in the army, in consequence of the disasters of the Prussians and the fearful carnage made of the Russians exclusively at Craonne, had risen to such a height, that but for it they could no longer act together. From this time forward, however, all causes of discord ceased, and all was harmony and concord till they arrived in Paris. A grand review was held of the whole force around Laon on the 17th, when it was found that the reinforcements received by the junction of St Priest's corps and other sources since the battle, had Vaud. ii. so completely compensated their losses that they mustered Grosse 109,000 combatants under arms, of whom 29,000 were 383, 386. cavalry, with 265 guns.2 Koch, i. 442-444; 209; Die Chron. iv. 28. this time. The day after the taking of Rheims, General Jansen arrived at Napoleon's headquarters, bringing with him Napoleon's 6000 men which he had drawn from the garrisons in the last neighbourhood of the Ardennes forest in obedience to the orders sent by the Emperor, which nearly compensated half the loss he had sustained at Craonne and Laon. He then held a grand review of his troops, and they amounted to 46,000 combatants; but the gaunt and worn aspect of the men, the threadbare and torn dresses, broken wheels and carriages, and the strange motley of uniforms in which they were clothed, bespoke the exhaustion of the empire, and the melting away of the vast military array which had so long held the world in awe. Napoleon's plan was already formed he felt too strongly the deficiency of his forces CHAP. XIII. 1814. and their desperate exhaustion, not to be aware that he could not much longer maintain the contest against the superior numbers by which he was threatened, and that his only chance of success was by breaking through the circle of his pursuers, and reinforcing his army by the garrisons which now lay inactive on the Rhine. He now felt in all its bitterness the fatal fault he had committed in striving to retain everything, and leaving more than half his disposable forces in distant garrisons when the centre of his power was violently assailed, and every sabre and bayonet was required between the Seine and the Marne. To remedy, so far as it was possible, even at the eleventh hour, this great mistake, he resolved to push forward towards the Rhine with all the troops he could collect, leaving Marmont and Mortier with their two corps, mustering 20,000 combatants, of whom 5000 were horse, and sixty guns, to make head as they best could, between the Aisne and the Marne, against the vast masses of Blucher, at least five times their strength. Previous to engaging in his bold and perilous, though necessary enterprise, he resolved to make a stroke at Schwartzenberg, who, taking advantage of the absence of Napoleon in his campaign against Blucher, and inspirited by the successful result of 314, 315; the battle of Laon, had again moved forward, and pushed his advanced-guard to Provins, within seventy miles of Paris.1 1 Koch, ii. 260, 261; Plotho, iii. Thiers, xvii. 509-513. 29. Gloomy state of ing in Paris. This had become the more necessary that this second advance of Schwartzenberg's had excited the utmost general feel- alarm in the capital, and the protracted calamities of the campaign had produced a conviction almost universal, that the war, with Napoleon at the head of affairs, had become interminable; and that if a change of government was not effected, it would end in destroying them all. It could not be said that any conspiracy for the restoration of the Bourbons, or any other change of government, had as yet been formed, though the partisans of the ancient family were close observers of the state of public feeling, |