and prepared to take advantage of it should a favourable opportunity occur. The declaration, too, of M. Lynch and the municipality of Bordeaux, in favour of the Bourbons, upon the occupation of that city by the left wing of Wellington's army, had made a great impression, though that prudent chief, in conformity alike with his own inclinations and the instructions of Lord Castlereagh, had immediately after issued a proclamation, declaring that the war was one for security to the nations-not a change of dynasty in France; and that no interference was either intended or would be permitted in the free choice of the French in regard to their internal government.* Still the fact remained, and was incontestable, that the utmost discontent existed among the whole inhabitants of Paris, and an amount of fermentation in men's minds, deemed in the highest degree alarming by the Government and whole local authorities there. Napoleon, who was fully informed of these particulars, and, as usual, ascribed them all, not to his own tortuous policy, but to the incapacity or disaffection of those in authority under him, wrote, in consequence, from Rheims on the 14th March, a letter to the Minister of Police in Paris, one of the most valuable monuments of the age, both as characteristic of the temper of men's minds at that crisis, and of the peculiar type and indomitable firmness of the Emperor's mind.† * "Le Maire de Bordeaux, le Comte Lynch, se mettant à la tête du mouvement, fit une proclamation dans laquelle il annonçait le rétablissement des Bourbons, et semblait dire que c'était pour rendre à la France ses princes légitimes que les Puissances Alliées avaient pris les armes. Lord Wellington, fidèle à ses instructions comme à une consigne militaire, écrivit au Duc d'Angoulême pour réclamer contre la proclamation du Maire de Bordeaux, et pour déclarer que le renversement d'une dynastie, le rétablissement d'une autre, n'étaient nullement le but des Puissances Alliées, et qu'il serait obligé de s'en expliquer lui-même devant le public, si on ne revenait pas sur l'assertion qu'on s'était permise."-THIERS, Xvii. 520. "Vous ne' mapprenez rien de ce qui se fait à Paris. Il y est question d'adresse, de régence, et de mille intrigues aussi plates qu'absurdes, et qui peuvent tout au plus être conçues par un imbécile comme Miot. Tous ces gens-là ne savent point que je tranche le noeud Gordien à la manière d'Alexandre. Qu'ils sachent bien que je suis aujourd'hui le même homme que j'étais à Wagram et à Austerlitz; que je ne veux dans l'Etat aucune intrigue; qu'il n'y a point d'autre autorité que la mienne, et qu'en cas d'événements VOL. II. 2 B XIII. 1814. CHAP. XIII. 1814. moves 30. against Schwartzen berg. Having taken his resolution to turn upon Schwartzenberg, and if possible drive him back towards Langres before carrying into execution his projected cross-march Napoleon towards the Rhine, Napoleon broke up early on the morning of the 17th, and directed his troops across the country from Rheims and the valley of the Aisne towards March 17. Epernay on the Marne. He took with him the whole Guard, Young and Old, cuirassiers and reserves, under Victor and Ney, various reinforcements which he had coming up from Paris, in all 12,000 strong, and the 6000 men whom Jansens had brought up to him at Rheims from the Ardennes, amounting in all to 45,000 men. If to these were added the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gerard, which were observing Schwartzenberg, his effective force would amount to 70,000, a body of men with which he doubted not of being able to effect something important against Schwartzenberg; and if his projected movement towards the Rhine, in which he was to be joined by Marmont and Mortier, was attended with the desired results, it would be swelled by the garrisons there to 135,000. He arrived the same night at Epernay, when his wearied troops for a time forgot their fatigues amidst the delicious wines of that place. He then learned that Schwartzenberg's troops, extremely scattered, were far advanced on the road to Paris on both banks of the Seine, and he resolved in consequence to continue his march towards Fère-Champenoise, crossing in this manner from the valley of the Marne to that pressés c'est la Régente qui a exclusivement ma confiance. Le Roi [Joseph] est 503. CHAP. XIII. of the Aube, and threatening the rear and communications of the Austrian Grand Army, as he had done those of the Army of Silesia by his side attack on Champau- 1814. bert and Vauchamps. The design was ably conceived, and was on the very point of being attended with the most important results; for Schwartzenberg's army was loosely scattered over a vast front sixty miles in breadth, 1 Thiers, from Fère-Champenoise by Provins to Sens, on the other xvii. 513, side of the Seine, with headquarters at Nogent, and it 497; Dan. was next to impossible that some of its isolated corps ii. 60; should not be exposed to the redoubtable blows of the 210. French Emperor before succour could arrive.1 521; Muff. 261; Koch, Burgh. 208 tion in the approach. March 17. No words can adequately paint the dismay which pre- 31. vailed in the Grand Army when this formidable appari- Consternation appeared on their flank at Fère-Champenoise; and Grand their rapidly increasing numbers, and the uniforms of the Army at his Guards and cuirassiers among their ranks, left no room for doubt that the Emperor was there in person. Schwartzenberg was laid up with gout in bed, and none of the other generals in his absence would venture to give any orders. To add to the general embarrassment, both Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart were absent, being still detained at the Congress of Chatillon, which broke up on that very day. In this extremity the Emperor of Russia acted with a decision which reinstated affairs after a most dangerous crisis. Instantly setting out from Troyes, where he was when the intelligence arrived, he travelled, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Prince Volkonsky, with the utmost haste to Arcis-sur-Aube, where Schwartzenberg now was. Meeting General Toll, the quartermaster - general, in the antechamber, he said, "What are you about here? we shall lose the whole army." "It is a great blessing," replied Toll, "that your Majesty has come; we could not persuade the generals of the danger; but now your Majesty has come, you will set all to rights." Instantly orders were sent out to concentrate the troops in all directions, between Troyes and CHAP. Pogny; Wrede's corps being left in possession of Arcis XIII. to guard the important bridge over the Aube at that place. Alexander, who rightly divined Napoleon's intentions, underwent the most dreadful anxiety for the next two days. "These gentlemen," said he to Barclay, looking towards the Austrian generals, "have made my head half grey. Napoleon will amuse us here with insignifiKoch, ii. 67, cant movements, and meanwhile march with the main 68; Burgh. 212-214 body of his forces on Brienne, and fall on our communications." 1 1 Dan. 265; 32. movements the Allies. In truth the crisis was of the most violent kind, and Napoleon's Alexander was far from being in error in his apprehenand those of sions, for the French Emperor, by marching direct on Arcis, from which he was only twenty miles distant, might with ease have routed Wrede, gained possession of the bridge of Arcis, become master of both banks of the Aube, and fallen direct, by following the great road from thence to Troyes, into the centre of the widely scattered Allied army. Ignorant, however, of the scattered condition of his opponents, and believing their main body to be at Provins, when it had really never March 19. advanced beyond Nogent, Napoleon, instead of following the direct road and falling on Wrede at Arcis, turned aside to Plancy, where he had assigned a rendezvous to Oudinot, Gerard, and Macdonald, who, being near Provins, had orders to march in that direction to meet him. On reaching Plancy he found that Schwartzenberg was in full retreat, and that consequently his flank movement, from being directed too near the head of the column, had failed. Convinced, however, that it was by threatening their rear alone that he could force the Allies to fall back, Napoleon still adhered to his original plan, and resolved to move to his left and remount the course of the Aube to Arcis, whence he could either threaten their rear by Troyes, or continue his projected movement to recover the garrisons on the Rhine and the Meuse by Vitry and Bar-le-Duc, which would equally CHAP. XIII. 1814. menace their great line of communication by Chaumont. His junction with Macdonald's force being now secure, his army would, when all assembled, amount to 70,000 men. Sending orders, therefore, to that marshal to follow him with all speed, he set out early on the 20th, the March 20. infantry ascending the right and the cavalry the left bank of the Aube, and came about mid-day to Arcis. But meanwhile the opportunity had been lost, the surprise was over, and the Allied army, in obedience to Alexander's orders, was rapidly concentrating behind the screen of low hills which the high-road from Arcis to Troyes crosses immediately after leaving the former town. In this position they completely barred the highway to Troyes, and as both parties were rapidly concentrating, a great battle, which would probably prove decisive, seemed inevitable. It took place, accordingly, but without the desperate character of the shock at Craonne or Laon; for Napoleon's object was not to engage in an affair of life or death with the Austrian army, but to force them to concentrate and thereby stop their advance to Paris, while he pursued his deep-laid 263, 264; and long-cherished movement to the eastward, between 318, 319; the two Allied armies, to reinforce his troops with the 213. garrisons on the Rhine.1 1 Thiers, xvii. 521 283; Dan. Plotho, iii. Burgh. 210 Aube. Napoleon arrived at Arcis about mid-day on the 20th, 33. and found the town evacuated by Wrede's corps. It Battle of was immediately occupied by Sebastiani's cavalry. Ney's Arcis-surcorps from the right bank was quickly passed over, and March 20. Friant's division of the Old Guard being close at hand, the Emperor gave orders to continue the advance with the utmost vigour on the road to Troyes, persisting in the opinion, notwithstanding all the information to the contrary, that the enemy were in full retreat, and that they would find only a slender rearguard on the other side of the screen of hills. He was soon undeceived. Hardly had the French advanced-guard begun to ascend the slopes when the Russian cavalry, under Kaisaroff |