1 XIII. 1814. 186; Koch, Bar-sur-Aube on the other, advancing his headquarters CHAP. successively from St Dizier to Vassy and Doulevant. His light cavalry from thence got on the great road from Troyes to Chaumont, directly in the rear of the Austrian Fain, 185, Grand Army. They here captured a pontoon train with ii. 84-90; a great quantity of baggage and ammunition which was 339; Burgh. moving up for the use of the Grand Army, and spread Die Grosse terror in the whole Allied communications from Troyes 97-99; to Vesoul.1 Plotho, iii. 218, 219; Chron. iv. Dan. 279. 38. interrupted The Allied generals were at first induced to suspect a feint when they heard Napoleon was moving towards the Important Rhine, not retreating to Paris; but their surprise was despatches changed into alarm when intelligence arrived that he of Napoleon. stood with his whole army on the flank of their communications, and had already cut them off from their reserve parks and magazines. Napoleon had never entertained a doubt that this state of things would induce the Austrians to retreat, more nervous than any nation in Europe about their communications.* It is more than doubtful whether this result would not have ensued in the present instance, had not an accidental circumstance put the Allied commanders, who were following in Napoleon's footsteps towards Sommepuis, in possession at once of his object in moving on St Dizier, and the extremely critical state of things in the capital. These consisted in two letters to the Emperor, one from the Empress, the other from the Duke of Rovigo. The letter of the Minister of Police announced that beyond all doubt a conspiracy was hatching in the capital, which awaited only the approach of the Allied armies to break out into open insurrection. At the same time another despatch was brought in by a second party of Cossacks, "I marched on St Dizier," said Napoleon afterwards to General Kohler, the Austrian Commissioner at Elba, "because twenty experiments had convinced me that I had only to send a few hussars on your line of communications to spread dismay among you. On this occasion I stood on them with my whole army, but you never troubled your heads about me: 'twas because the devil had got possession of you."-DANILEFSKY, 279. 1814. * CHAP. containing a letter from the Emperor to the Empress, XIII. in which he revealed his object in moving on St Dizier, which was to reinforce his army by the garrisons on the Rhine. These despatches, which were of the last importance, were immediately brought to the Emperor Alexander, who was at Schwartzenberg's headquarters at Dampierre, on the night of the 23d, and he was wakened to read them in the middle of the night. While he was still reading them, another messenger brought in despatches from Count Pahlen, with advices of his having fallen in with Chernicheff at the head of Blucher's advanced-guard, who announced that his general had crossed the Aisne at Neufchatel and Bery-au-Bac, and advanced to Epernay and Chalons.1 1 Thiers, xvii. 550, 551; Dan. 286; Burgh. 224, 339. 39. Stewart and advise to march with both armies to Paris. Two general officers at the headquarters of the Allies, Sir Charles who entirely agreed in their ideas as to the manner in Volkonsky which the war should be conducted, now rose to prominent importance, and materially influenced the fate of the war. These were Prince Volkonsky and Sir Charles Stewart. The former of these was one of Alexander's aide-de-camps, and had constant access to his person; the latter possessed great weight, not only from his being the brother and known representative of Lord Castlereagh's opinions, but from the inestimable service he had rendered to the Allied cause in the preceding year, at the battle of Leipsic. They both concurred in opinion that the present moment, if properly taken advantage of, might be rendered decisive of the war. Napoleon, pressed between two great armies, each superior in strength to his own, had at length come to the end of his resources. He "My love! I have been for some days constantly on horseback. On the 20th I took Arcis-sur-Aube. The enemy attacked me there at eight o'clock in the evening. I took two guns, and retook two. The next day the enemy's army put itself in battle array to protect the march of its columns on Brienne and Bar-sur-Aube, and I resolved to approach the Marne in order to drive them farther from Paris, by approaching my own fortified places. This evening I shall be at St Dizier. Adieu, my love! Embrace my son !”—See Burghersh, 339, and DANILEFSKY, 285. Strange to say, this despatch, on which, as will immediately appear, the fate of the world came to depend, was not written in cypher, but in ordinary style. XIII. 1814. could no longer keep them both at bay, as he had so long CHAP. done by maintaining an intermediate position, and striking alternately at one and the other; and the recent advices from Paris proved that discontent was at its height in that capital, and that nothing but the approach of the Allied armies was wanting to cause an insurrection fatal to his power to break out. These views were strongly supported by Count Pozzo di Borgo, who had constant access to, and great influence with, Czar; and who, a compatriot of the French Emperor, and 22, 1814; deeply injured by him, united to talents of no ordinary ix. 374; kind, and eloquence the most persuasive, a Corsican thirst 546, 547. for vengeance.1* also 1 Sir Chas. Stewart to the E. Cooke, Esq., March Cast. Cor. Thiers, xvii. 40. tions urged on the other side. Powerful as these considerations were, and strongly as they spoke to the chivalrous disposition of the Emperor ConsideraAlexander, already sufficiently disposed to enter into them, there were other arguments, not less weighty, adduced on the other side, and which weighed most strongly with Schwartzenberg, Barclay, and the elder generals, the superiors in rank in both the Imperial armies. The Allied army, it was urged, is not a homogeneous mass, obedient to one will, directed by one interest; it is an aggregate of the troops of many different nations, rivals in war * "Le Comte Pozzo di Borgo, revenu de Londres, lequel, ayant acquis sur les Alliés une influence proportionnée à son esprit, ne se lassait pas de leur répéter qu'il fallait marcher sur Paris. Le but de la guerre, disait-il, est à Paris. Tant que vous songez à livrer des batailles, vous courez la chance d'être battus, parce que Napoléon les livrera toujours mieux que vous, et que son armée, même mécontente, mais soutenue par le sentiment de l'honneur, se fera tuer à côté de lui jusqu'au dernier homme. Tout ruiné qu'est son pouvoir militaire, il est grand, très-grand encore, et, son génie aidant, plus grand que le vôtre. Mais son pouvoir politique est détruit. Les temps sont changés. Le despotisme militaire accueilli comme un bienfait au lendemain de la révolution, mais condamné depuis par le résultat, est perdu dans les esprits. Si vous donnez naissance à une manifestation, elle sera prompte, générale, irrésistible, et Napoléon écarté, les Bourbons que la France a oubliés, aux lumières desquels elle n'a pas confiance, les Bourbons deviendront tout à coup possibles, de possibles nécessaires. C'est politiquement, ce n'est pas militairement qu'il faut chercher à finir la guerre, et pour cela, dès qu'il se fera entre les armées belligérantes une ouverture quelconque, à travers laquelle vous puissiez passer, hâtez-vous d'en profiter, allez toucher Paris du doigt, du doigt seulement, et le colosse sera renversé. Vous aurez brisé son épée que vous ne pouvez pas lui arracher."-THIERS, xvii. 546, 547. CHAP. divided by language, creed, and interest, whom stern XIII. necessity and a universal sense of suffering have alone 1814. brought to act together. It has often already been on the point of falling to pieces; a single serious disaster would at once occasion its dissolution, and reinstate Napoleon and the French empire more formidable and oppressive than ever. It is true the flank movement of the Emperor to St Dizier has uncovered Paris, and opened to the Allies the advance to that capital, and the united armies may now advance without serious opposition to Paris. But, meanwhile, what is Napoleon about? He has placed himself on our communications, intercepted all our stores, reserves, and reinforcements; become master of our magazines, and doubled the strength of his active army by the addition of all the garrisons on the frontier and along the Rhine. What will it avail the Allies that they have taken Paris, and brought about a political revolution there, if the French Emperor has meanwhile doubled his military strength, gained possession of all our resources, and, with 130,000 men, lies between our armies and the countries from which alone we can. receive either succour or support? Perilous at all times, before the army of the Emperor is destroyed, an advance to Paris has now become doubly hazardous, since by his Stewart to recent masterly movement his strength has been doubled, Lord Castle- and his military position in every respect so much imMarch 25 proved. It is evident that no reliance whatever can be Dan. 286, placed on Bernadotte, or the Army of the North, which is 220. still at Liège, and has never yet, except by the corps taken from under his orders, taken any part in the campaign.'* 1 Sir Chas. reagh, 1814, MS.; 287; Burgh. * "From the Crown Prince I expect nothing effectual in these, or indeed in any other parts. He is still at Liège, and though I have repeatedly written to Mr Thornton to urge him forward towards Antwerp, no assurance is returned of his being even inclined to move from Liège. In the mean time he is doing all he can to irritate the Dutch, by his treatment of the district about Maestricht as an enemy's country, and loading it with frequent and severe requisitions. He even affects to refuse to recognise the Prince of Orange by his proper titles. His Royal Highness feels the slight, and it is natural that he should do so. Though we are promised Walmoden, not a word is uttered upon The only wise course is to follow Napoleon wherever he goes, to run him down and destroy him. When that is done, and not till then, a political revolution, to close the drama, may be looked forward to in Paris. CHAP. 1814. 41. sky's opin Paris. Opinions were thus divided, when Alexander, who had ridden on in the morning to Sommepuis, summoned his Volkonprincipal officers to ask their advice. The Russian Em- ions on an peror himself, who always inclined to the opinion that the advance to grand object was to destroy the military power of Napoleon, deemed that the better course would be to unite with Blucher at Vitry, and, with their united force, pursue the French Emperor towards the Rhine. In this opinion Barclay concurred, and Count Toll. Diebitch was of the same way of thinking; but suggested that, while the united armies proceeded in pursuit of Napoleon, Bulow, who lay at Soissons, should make a dash at Paris. But Volkonsky upon this replied, "It is well known that at Paris there are 40,000 National Guards, and depôts of regiments; to these are to be added the corps of Marmont and Mortier, who will, on Bulow's approach, fall back on the capital. It is impossible to expect that with his corps, 30,000 strong, the Prussian general can effect anything against 70,000 men who will be there assembled. the other hand, if we follow Napoleon we must leave a considerable rearguard to ward off the attack of these two marshals. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that it would be advisable to detach against Napoleon a numerous body of cavalry and some regiments of infantry, with instructions everywhere to prepare accommodation for the Emperor, that it may be believed we are following with the whole army. Meanwhile, we ought to march straight on Paris through Fère-Champenoise, and Blucher On the advance of the Crown Prince from Liège. I wish to God we were fairly rid of this chap, and that he was put down in the midst of his newly-acquired territories in Norway, where he is already, it should seem, fully as popular as he is here, and where he would at least be prevented from doing harm." -LORD CLANCARTY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Hague, March 22, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 383, 384. |