CHAP. ferred the order of Maria Theresa on the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia.

X.

1813. 43.

honour of

Stewart.

Sir Charles Stewart, who, as usual, was in the front in Wound and this battle on the second day, with Colloredo's corps, Sir Charles was severely wounded in the thigh by the bursting of a shell early in the action. He continued in the field, however, till the victory was secured in the evening, when he was conveyed to his tent, fainting from loss of blood. He had been also in the whole battle on the preceding day, alongside of Ostermann, when with the Russian Guards he made so glorious a stand against the forces, then three times superior, of the enemy. His gallantry on both occasions had been so conspicuous, and the services he rendered so important, that the Emperor Alexander soon after, as a special mark of admiration and esteem, sent him the decoration of the fourth class of the order of St George of Russia, which was conferred only for distinguished services in the field. It was accompanied by an autograph letter of his Imperial Majesty, expressed with all the grace and felicity for which he was conspicuous, such as few British subjects have ever 1 Wilson, ii. received, and which is justly preserved with pride among the many honourable trophies in the archives of the Londonderry family.'

104; Lond. 128.

1*

On the morning of the 30th August, fraught with these

* "TÖPLITZ, 27 Septembre 1813.

"M. LE GÉNÉRAL STEWART, J'ai été témoin comme toute l'armée du zèle indefatigable que vous avez déployé dans cette campagne, où, toujours présent aux champ d'honneur, vous vous êtes fait remarquer dans les endroits les plus exposés par le sang froid et la plus belle valeur.

"Il est de mon devoirs d'honorer d'aussi brillantes qualités, et je crois vous donner une preuve de la justice que je leur rends en vous envoyant les marques de l'ordre de St George de la quatrième classe. Vous savez qu'elles ne s'accordent qu'à la vertu militaire. Elles vous rappeleront le mémorable jour de Culm où votre sang a coulé, et tous les braves qui y ont combattus vous verront avec plaisir porter une décoration qui rappellera que vous avez partagé et leurs gloires et leurs dangers.

"Recevez avec ces témoignages particuliers de mon estime l'assurance de mes sentimens.-ALEXANDRE."

The original of this letter is in the possession of Frances Anne, Marchioness of Londonderry.

CHAP.

X.

1813.

44.

Receipt of

trous news

leon.

disastrous consequences to Napoleon, he was engaged in studying the map at Dresden, and anticipating the brilliant accounts he every hour expected to receive from Vandamme in regard to his operations in the rear of the Allied army. "At this moment," said he to Berthier, the disas"Marmont and St Cyr must have driven the Austrian by Naporearguard on Töplitz: they will there receive the last ransom of the enemy. We cannot be long of receiving news of Vandamme, and we shall then learn what advantages he has derived from his fine position. It is by him that we shall finish in that quarter. I will leave there some corps of observation, and recall the rest to headquarters; and I calculate that, after the disasters experienced at Dresden, it will take at least three weeks for the army of Schwartzenberg to reorganise itself, and again take the field. It will not require so much time to execute my projected movement on Berlin." Such were Napoleon's views on the morning of a day big with his fate and that of the world. In the afternoon disastrous news began to circulate, at first in whispers, then more openly, as to a great misfortune which had occurred beyond the mountains. It was even said that Vandamme's corps had been destroyed. Soon the arrival of General Corbincau confirmed the intelligence, and from him Napoleon received authentic details of the action, and learned that the Allied sovereigns, so far from returning to Prague dejected and defeated, would make their entry bearing with them the trophies of victory. The Emperor received the intelligence calmly; and turning to Berthier, said, "To a flying enemy you must either offer a bridge of gold or oppose a barrier of steel; Vandamme, it would appear, could not oppose that barrier of steel. Can we have written anything which inspired him with that fatal idea of descend- 320, 321. ing into Bohemia? Fain, look over the order-book."1

"No one," says Dr Johnson, "ever rose from an ordinary situation in life to high destinies, without great and commanding qualities in his mind being blended with

1 Fain, ii.

CHAP.

X.

Napoleon's

against Van

disobedience

of orders.

meannesses which would be inconceivable in private life." Napoleon was a remarkable example of this singular but 1813. just observation. He made it an invariable rule never to 45. admit he had judged wrong in anything, and, with whatfalse charges ever injustice, to lay the blame of every disaster which damme for occurred on others rather than bear any part of it himself. Understanding, according to the first account, that Vandamme was killed, he immediately began laying the whole blame on that ill-fated officer. He positively maintained, verbally as well as in writing, that he had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the summit of the mountains, and not engulf himself at their feet.* This was entirely false; so far from having given Vandamme any such order, he had enjoined upon him directly the reverse-namely, to march direct on Töplitz, at their feet, where he would cover himself with glory, and find his marshal's baton.t Nay, on the very day on which the disaster occurred, Napoleon, so far from being ignorant of what Vandamme was doing, had written to St Cyr a letter, in which he recounted with satisfaction the successes gained by Vandamme the day before in the plain close to Culm over Ostermann.‡ Napoleon's attempt, there

* "This unhappy Vandamme, who seems to have been killed, had not left a single sentinel upon the mountains, nor a reserve in any quarter; he engulfed himself in a hollow, without feeling his way in any manner. If he had only left four battalions and four pieces of cannon on the heights in rear, this disaster would not have occurred. I had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the heights, and encamp his corps there, and send down into Bohemia nothing but parties to disquiet the enemy and obtain news.”—Napoleon to ST CYR, September 1, 1813; ST CYR, iv. 392.

"March direct to Töplitz; you will cover yourself with glory. Do not let yourself be imposed on by a rabble of fugitives."-BERTHIER to VANDAMME, August 29, 1813. "Aujourd'hui 29, à six heures du matin, le Général Vandamme a attaqué le Prince de Würtemberg près de Hollendorf; il lui a fait 1500 prisonniers, pris quatre pièces de canon, et l'a méné battant; c'étaient tous Russes. Le Général Vandamme marchait sur Töplitz avec tout son corps. Le Général Prince de Reuss, qui commandait une de nos brigades, a été tué. Je vous écris cela pour votre gouverne. Le Général Vandamme me mande que l'épouvante est dans toute l'armée Russe."-NAPOLEON au ROI DE NAPLES, 29 Août 1813; THIERS, xvi. 356, 357.

"I have received your letter of the 6th from Reinhard Grimme, in which you describe your position behind the 6th corps [Marmont's]. The intention of his Majesty is that you support the 6th corps; but it is desirable that you

X.

1813.

fore, to throw the blame of the disaster on a brave soldier CHAP. whom he imagined to be dead, is founded on an entire fabrication; but fortunately for the cause of truth and justice, his letters remain to convict him of a far more serious offence than a military error-viz., the coining a deliberate falsehood to relieve himself, by charging a misfortune of his own creation on the head of a gallant lieutenant, forced to incur it, whom he believed at the time to be no more.*

46.

here committed by

Napoleon.

In truth, this military error was one of the gravest kind, and was attended with the most disastrous effect on his Great error future fortunes. He sent Vandamme forward with a force which did not exceed, at the very utmost, 40,000 men, directly into the rear of the Allied army, 100,000 strong, who were forced to fall upon him with the energy of despair in order to effect their retreat into Bohemia. He did this, too, when he had the Young Guard, 30,000 strong, only nine leagues in the rear, which he halted when within reach of decisive success, and allowed to remain inactive at Pirna. Even worse than this, he had committed what Marmont justly calls the "inconceivable fault" of not having informed Vandamme that the Young Guard had been halted, and still leaving him under orders to advance alone and unsupported to Töplitz. Napoleon himself admitted, contrary to his usual practice, to St Cyr a few days

should select for that purpose a road to the left, between the Duke of Ragusa and the corps of General Vandamme, who has obtained great successes over the enemy, and made 2000 prisoners."-BERTHIER to ST CYR, August 30, 1813; ST CYR, iv. 388.

"On ne savait pas ce qu'étaient devenus Haxo et Vandamme on allait jusqu'à les croire morts l'une et l'autre. Le secrétaire du Général Vandamme ayant reparu, Napoléon fit saisir les papiers du Général pour en extraire sa correspondance militaire, et enlever la preuve des ordres envoyés à cet infortuné. Napoleon eut même la faiblesse de nier l'ordre donné de s'avancer sur Toplitz, et sans toutefois accabler Vandamme, en le plaignant au contraire, il écrivit à tous les chefs de corps que ce général avait reçu pour instruction de s'arrêter sur les hauteurs de Culm, mais qu'entraîné par trop d'ardeur, il s'était engagé en plaine, et s'était perdu par excès de zèle. Le récit authentique que nous avons présenté prouve la fausseté de ces assertions, imaginées pour conserver à Napoléon une autorité sur les esprits, dont il avait en ce moment besoin plus que jamais."-THIERS, xvi. 400, 401.

CHAP.

X.

1813.

after, that he had committed a great fault, and missed the opportunity of striking a decisive blow, by halting the Young Guard at Pirna on the 28th.* Had he not done so, that formidable body of veterans would have come on the field in the very middle of the battle on the 30th, directly in the rear of the Prussians, and the fate which befell Vandamme would have been that of Kleist. What would have been the fate of the Allied army, if, when descending in confusion and disorder the passes of the Boehmerwald they had found the Young Guard and Vandamme, 70,000 strong, flushed with victory, prepared to stop their progress in front of Töplitz? Then was the crisis of Napoleon's fortunes. Disaster great and irreparable would have befallen the Allied armies, and the consequent disunion of their councils would have led to a peace glorious to France, and destructive to the liberties of Europe.†

In truth, the error committed by Napoleon on this oc

"The Emperor admitted to me, in conversation on the 7th September, that if he had not halted his Guard at Pirna on the 28th, but, on the contrary, followed it up on the traces of Vandamme, he would have found a great opportunity of striking a blow in the neighbourhood of Töplitz."-ST CYR, iv. 137, 138.

Three of the ablest military historians of France, who were all actively engaged in these very operations, concur in admitting the grave fault committed by Napoleon. St. Cyr says: "On the 29th, in the evening, the Emperor must have known that Vandamme had fought the whole day, not only against Ostermann, but the forces which Barclay had brought up to his support. He had, therefore, the whole of that night to make his dispositions, which a man such as he could easily have done in an hour; and if he had conceived the position of Vandamme hazardous, as unquestionably it was, he had time to draw his corps back, or support it by his Guard. The latter corps could have marched to Nollendorf or Peterswalde in a few hours; that is, before Kleist's Prussians, who were encamped on the night of the 29th at Fürstenwalde, had come up.” -ST CYR, iv. 129.

Jomini says: "Vandamme's defeat was a double misfortune; for it was to be ascribed to an evident oblivion of the first principles of war, which prescribe the pursuit to extremity of a beaten enemy. Napoleon should unquestionably have pursued, à l'outrance, the defeated army of the Allied sovereigns. There was the vital point of the war; all the rest was merely secondary, and could have been repaired. There also was the greatest chance of disorder from the number of chiefs who commanded the different corps. If he had quitted Pirna to fly to the relief of Macdonald, routed on the Katzbach, the proceeding would have been at least intelligible, but he did not then know of it; and his return to Dresden from Pirna, having no other object but to prepare the march upon Berlin, was one of the greatest faults of his whole career. Independent of its